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Editorial
This is the first issue of the Croatian International Relations Review (CIRR) 
published electronically and with open access. Over the previous seven-
teen years, the CIRR has been available only to subscribers in print-form. 
In order to reach a broader audience, the decision has been made to 
change the publication’s format; printing costs and environmental con-
cerns have added weight to this decision. The CIRR is the only English-
language journal of this nature in Croatia.  
Thematically, the current issue focuses on various aspects of the crisis in the 
European Union. The first article explains how the EU budget has evolved 
from its policy-driven origins to the one that drives Community policies. 
Some of the more pertinent questions addressed here include: what lies 
behind the budget-driven policies? How does this reflect on the Union’s 
capacity to advance its long-term goals? How, and if at all, can the com-
mon budget’s autonomy be ensured? Can a commitment to secure au-
tonomous budget resources further probe the Member States’ willingness 
for fiscal and political integration? Although no definite answers can be 
given at this moment, the author concludes that securing independent EU 
budget resources may be instrumental in solving the deep economic crisis.
How the expected benefits of EU-membership have materialized for the 
Central and Eastern European states? How have positive expectations 
weighed against the reality of EU policy-making? Drawing on a liberal inter-
governmental theory, the article proposes some alternative explanations 
to the rational institutional and normative theories of enlargement, which 
have long heralded the benefits of full membership for new member states. 
The article delves into issues relevant to Croatia’s upcoming EU membership 
and of interest to acceding states as well. In the end, the author underlines 
the need for further theoretical and empirical research on EU enlargement 
in order for more comprehensive conclusions to be drawn.
The third article offers a distinct perspective into what looks as the fourth 
pillar of Hungarian foreign policy. In addition to its three traditional foreign 
policy goals – Euro-Atlantic integration, good relations with neighboring 
states, and care for the Hungarian national minority abroad, the fourth 
focuses on the so-called “Eastern wind doctrine”. As such, the article 
first provides an overview of the previous and current Hungarian govern-
ments’ east bound-orientation, from Russia and the Central Asia to the 
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Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, before sharpening its focus on the 
evolution and present state of Hungary’s economic and political relations 
with China. It concludes with an observation that ultimately a state’s inter-
nal strength and stability are the best resource on which to base mutually 
beneficial partnerships.
A further contribution to this edition’s thematic focus is the fourth article which 
analyses the economic and social challenges in post-transition Serbia. In 
short, the global crisis has revealed structural weaknesses within Serbia’s eco-
nomic and social systems. Despite initiating a series of reforms in a number 
of different sectors (health care, state pensions, unemployment protection, 
social welfare, etc.) in an effort to harmonize Serbia’s domestic legislation 
with EU standards, their implementation has been limited. Serbia continues 
to fall behind the EU – a fact only aggravated by the global economic crisis.
The final article addresses the EU’s capacity, with respect to its diplomatic 
and military resources, to respond to crises around the world such as was 
the Arab Spring. The article gives a brief overview of the intervention in Libya 
in 2011 and concludes that the EU should modify some of its policies in order 
to promote long-term democratic stability in the Southern Mediterranean 
and the Near East. EU-NATO cooperation should and can be improved fol-
lowing some of the steps suggested by the author at the end of the article. 
The Book Review section, in this issue, looks at recent releases on internation-
al politics in transition, global trends, democratization in Eurasia, the External 
Action Service and the European diplomacy, and the future of the EU. 
On a more personal note, we sadly report of the sudden death of one of 
the contributors to this issue. Professor Drenka Vuković passed away on 
June 10 this year. Hereby we express our deep condolences to her friends 
and colleagues at the University of Belgrade and abroad. 
In the end, we would like to sincerely thank reviewers for their collabora-
tion. Accepting to review an article on top of a busy agenda is not a mi-
nor task. We fully understand this and appreciate the effort. In the same 
way, we thank all colleagues in IMO who contribute to and assist with the 
CIRR being published. We particularly thank the Ministry of Science, Edu-
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Abstract
The financial perspective of 2000-2006 has fundamentally changed the relationship between the 
EU’s budget and its policies. Whereas prior to this perspective, the EU maintained a policy-driven 
budget; in its aftermath, Community policies became budget-driven. Since then, the latter has been 
the prevailing tendency. The major factor behind the budget-driven policies is the strong juste retour 
approach, where Member States, as their primary goal in budgetary debates, attempt to optimise 
their net position against the Union’s budget. The priority of the net position is rooted in the EU’s 
failing own resources system. Instead of genuine own resources, three-quarters of the budget is 
financed by GNI-based resources. The autonomy of the common budget and the reintroduction of 
policy-driven budget planning could only be ensured by (1) a genuine own resources system based 
on the resources generated by Community policies, or (2) a specific Community tax, or a combina-
tion of the two. This raises significant questions concerning further Member State sovereignty shar-
ing and their overall readiness for fiscal and political integration. 
KEY WORDS: 
budget-driven policies, policy-driven budget, own resources, net position, autonomy of the budget
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1. Introduction
The 2012 European Union budget includes 147.2 billion EUR in commit-
ment appropriations, or rather 1.12% of the total EU GNI, and 129.1 billion 
EUR in payment appropriations (0.98%). To date, EU budget expenditures 
have been dominated by Community policies established by the Treaties: 
29.9% of the EU’s budget is allocated for the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), while 35.8% is spent on cohesion policy measures. Critics of these 
figures have argued for more resources dedicated to competitiveness, 
research and innovation, education, justice and home affairs, energy se-
curity, and climate change initiatives.  
Source: European Commission, “Financial Programming and Budget”, http://ec.europa.eu/
budget/figures/2012/2012_en.cfm
In our view, spending resources on policies that contribute to European-
wide objectives stipulated in the unanimously ratified Treaties is as right as 
it is justified, namely the procurement of funds for policies that could help 
future generations combat economic, social, and ecological challenges. 
However, with only 1% of the joint EU GNI allotted to such policies, Europe-
an citizens should not expect much. Such lackluster budget appropriates 
raise a number of significant questions, specifically why the EU has not al-
located more resources for common objectives – measures that generate 
European added value. Certainly there are ways to make better use of 
the EU’s policies. Of course, during periods of serious economic downturn, 
many might argue that expectations should be tempered. However, in the 
so-called “good old days”, when economic growth seemed ubiquitous, 
similar short-sighted budgetary visions permeated the Community. 
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This article examines the key problems stemming from EU integration, and 
addresses whether a sui generis regional economic union with traces of 
political integration needs a common budget at all. In doing so, this arti-
cle analyzes various integration theories as a means to answer the above. 
Following that, the article provides an overview of the budget’s evolution; 
particular attention is given to the relationship between the EU budget and 
Community policies financed from it. Unfortunately, the conclusions of this 
section’s analysis are not promising. Finally, this article shall share the views 
of the author, specifically that the major issue behind the EU’s budgetary 
deficiencies derive from the organization’s flawed system of resources. In 
other words, a budget without a Treasury will always fall short of its mission. 
2. Integration Theories
Since the Communities were first established, political consensus has been 
achieved on the necessity of having common budgetary measures. The 
different budgets of the Communities, namely those of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), 
and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were merged 
into one single budget of the Communities in 1970.1 Though much of the 
1980s were characterized by bitter budgetary debates, a multiannual fi-
nancial planning system was introduced in 1988, which took as its form the 
so-called financial perspective of 1988-1992. While the necessity of having 
a common budget has generally been accepted, its role within European 
integration processes has not been sufficiently addressed by the more 
advanced theories of integration. 
In our view the Communities’ budget has played a catalyst role in the 
history of Europe’s economic integration. First, in looking at classical lib-
eral integration theories, we can infer that economic integration does 
not necessarily raise the need for a common budget. However, develop-
1 Decision adopted by the European Council on 21-22 April 1970 (Merger Treaty, Article 20(1) as amended by 
Article 10 of the First Budgetary Treaty).
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ment theories, neo-liberalism, federalism, neo-functionalism, institutional-
ism, and the optimal currency area theory provide sufficient theoretical 
justification that economic integration goes hand-in-hand with the ideas 
of common policies requiring common resources, and budget redistribu-
tion in a regional economic integration.2 
Classical liberal integration theories (see: R. Aron; B. Hughes; J Schwarz; G. 
Myrdal) focus on the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. 
The co-operation of distinct economic units of comparable developmen-
tal levels does not raise the need for joint financing activities. Indeed, dis-
mantling the barriers of the free movement of goods, services, capital, and 
labor did not involve significant financing from the Communities’ budget. 
Similarly, according to regulation theories (Tinbergen, 1965), regulation 
and common rules play a fundamental role in deepening European in-
tegration. However, the adoption of common regulations does not re-
quire joint financing, apart from administrative costs. The Communities’ 
budget does not assume control over the financial regulation activities of 
the Member States; and the transposition of Community legislation as well 
relies on the national budgets of the Member States. 
Thus, the role of the common budget in the integration of economic units 
of the same level of development cannot be explained by classical or 
regulation theories. A first-glance conclusion may be that deepening Eu-
ropean integration does not necessarily involve the need for common 
resources. In that sense, the EU budget seems to lack theoretical reason-
ing within European integration. However, this assessment is superficial. 
The role of the common budget can be much better explained by other 
theories, specifically development theories, neo-liberalism, federalism, 
neo-functionalism, institutionalism, and the optimal currency area theory.
When assessing development theories (Palánkai, 2001), the level of devel-
opment of the respective economies, economic units, and the juncture 
of integration should all be simultaneously taken into consideration. The 
different development levels of the economies are reflected by asym-
metries, which heightens the need for transfers even in the early stages of 
co-operation. According to development theories, budgetary transfers 
2 The following is a summary finding of the author’s research, published in his PhD Dissertation, Ivan, 2005 
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are necessary between the economies in order to ensure that the co-
operation of countries of different development levels does not lead to 
situations of unilateral dependency.  
According to neo-liberal theories (Kindelberger, 1966; Pelkmans, 1997), 
integration fosters enhanced potential and real competition. Moreover, 
competition mechanisms promote integrated economic structures. Com-
petition, the convergence of productivity levels, and the evolution of the 
single market are the building blocks of integration theory, which result in 
convergence at the macro-economic level. Measures financed by the 
common budget, such as cohesion policy, research framework programs, 
infrastructure networks, internal market programs, as well as market inter-
vention in agriculture and rural development all affect the establishment 
of conditions for macro-economic convergence. Therefore, the appar-
ent lack of necessity for a common budget dissipates, while budgetary 
transfers promoting macro-economic convergence deepen integration.
Regarding federalist theories, European Union governments constitute a 
special collective political structure that serves the wealth of the Com-
munity (W. Wallace, 2000). In this system, they define political objectives, 
namely those specified in the Treaties and implemented by Community 
policies. The achievement of these objectives relies on transfers aiming at 
economic convergence and on mechanisms compensating those who 
relinquish certain national economic interests in order to meet common 
Community goals.
According to neo-functionalism and its spill-over theory (George and 
Bache, 2000), more and more functions should be delegated to integra-
tion institutions due to the diminishing capacities of the individual states. It 
seems rather obvious that such common institutions would be unable to 
carry out their mission (i.e., economic and social convergence) without 
budgetary means and transfers. 
Conflicting interest theories (Lindberg, 1963) help explain the budgetary 
debates of the Member States. These disputes have always secured the 
necessary financing means for the Communities, more or less according 
to the given stage of integration. By the growing size of the budget, it 
has become evident that the agreements made on the EU’s financial 
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perspective aim to mitigate conflicts amongst Member States, which 
subsequently advances the integration process. Therefore, according to 
conflict theories, the common budget has played a significant role in the 
history of European integration. 
Links can be seen between the deepening of European integration and 
the common budget, which can be better understood with the help of 
institutionalism. The “English School” of institutionalism (Bull, 1997) acknowl-
edges the idea of co-operation in international relations if tangible profits 
may be gained. The EU’s cohesion policy, which helps the regions and 
Member States in need of development aid progress toward the more 
advanced Member States, and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
are common policies where the Member States co-operate for concrete 
gains – financed by the common budget – that otherwise would be out 
of their individual reach. This is considered yet another building block to 
describe the role of the budget in European integration. 
In the phase of integration where currency areas are established, partici-
pating states have limited room to maneuver against shocks when they 
lack a national monetary policy (see: P. Kenen; R. Mundell; R. McKinnon). 
Therefore, the European Economic and Monetary Union, as a non-optimal 
currency area, would need a common budget that could ensure stability 
by providing budgetary transfers in case of asymmetric shocks. Though 
unexpectedly, this assumption has proven to be true since the beginning 
of the current financial crisis. 
Integration theories and theories of international co-operation (Kiss, 2003) 
help explain the link between the common budget and the integration 
process as mutually reinforcing factors. 
Despite the fact that most integration theories underpin the necessity of a 
common budget in European regional economic integration, in our view, 
the general budget of the European Union still has a limited impact on 
the deepening of European integration, especially when compared to 
its potential arising from the relatively wide-range of Community policies. 
Prior to addressing this issue, the next section will examine the main evo-
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2. Evolution of the Relationship between the Budget 
of the Communities and Community Policies
The current debate centering on the proposal by the European Com-
mission for Multiannual Financial Framework, “A Budget for Europe 2020” 
(European Commission, 2011a) is a top-down discussion. The prevailing 
intention is to establish first the ceiling of the budget, and then define the 
content of the Union’s policies under the named budgetary constraints. 
This Council debate leads to budget-driven policies, hardly a new phe-
nomenon in the EU. In fact, one might suggest that the establishment of 
budgetary ceilings has become the primary substance of multiannual 
planning under the responsibility of the Member States. While it is accept-
ed that the agreed upon Multiannual Financial Framework delineates 
the ceiling of the EU’s budget, a more logical and meaningful approach 
would first establish an agreement on the EU’s current common objec-
tives and necessary measures (in other words, defining EU policies), and 
second establish the adequate budgetary ceilings – a system not without 
precedent in the history of European integration. 
The current proposal of the European Commission clearly follows the line 
first seen in the Agenda 2000 proposal (European Commission 1997). To 
illustrate, the following presents an overview of the common European 
budget’s evolution. (Iván, 2006):
1. 1957-1969: Individual budgets of the three Communities (ECSC; EEC; 
Euratom);
2. 1970-1987: Annual common budget (General Budget of the Com-
munities);
3. 1988-1999: Policy-driven multiannual financial perspectives; 
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1. 1957-1969: Individual budgets of the three Communities 
(ECSC, EEC, Euratom)
During the first decade of European integration, the common objectives 
established by the three Treaties were supported by a shared political will 
between the Member States. The limited individual budgets of the three 
Communities did not create deep conflicts amongst the founders. On the 
whole, separate budgets served the financing of joint measures.  
2. 1970-1987: Annual common budget (General Budget of 
the Communities)
The First Budgetary Treaty3 established a single general budget for the 
Communities in 1970. The common budget was much more transparent 
and budgetary effectiveness largely improved. However, the oil crisis of 
the 1970s, combined with the enlargement of the Communities and the 
United Kingdom’s continuous claim that it receive a substantial rebate 
from the common budget, annually led to unsustainable and long-wind-
ed budgetary debates. In fact, the European Parliament three-times re-
fused the annual budget proposal (1979, 1982, and 1985). Germany twice 
refused financing its portion of the UK’s rebate (1981 and 1982). The an-
nual budgetary procedure proved to be insufficient in providing a stable 
and reliable budgetary framework for Community policies.
3. 1988-1999: Policy-driven multiannual financial perspectives 
Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, initiated 
a change to the annual budgetary proceedings. In his assessment, the 
annual budgetary debate did not provide the necessary stability for the 
multiannual programs, and the debate of year n had just finished when 
the Commission was obligated to present the proposal for the year n+1; 
as such, there was almost no reprieve for the Member States in the budg-
etary debate. The Commission then proposed to establish a multiannual 
financial framework, termed “financial perspective” until 2006. Multian-
nual planning defined the priorities, headings, and ceilings of the Com-
munities’ budget.  
3 See footnote No. 2. 
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The first multiannual financial perspective, the “Delors I Package” span-
ning the period 1988-1992, was agreed upon by the Council, the Com-
mission, and the European Parliament in an Inter-institutional Agreement. 
This five-year period gave way to a spectacular evolution of EU common 
policies. The Delors I financial perspective re-established the balance of 
the common objectives and the interests of the Member States. The com-
mon budget became policy-driven; in other words, the evolution of Com-
munity policies largely defined the financial framework. The same char-
acteristics were valid for the Delors II financial perspective in the period 
1993-1999, which by then had already been established for seven years 
(the same length of time for all of the following frameworks). 
With the adoption of the first financial perspective, the principle of budg-
etary discipline was also agreed upon:4 the Communities’ expenditures, 
in a controlled manner, should have served both the objectives of the 
single market defined in the Single European Act, as well as the objec-
tives of social and economic cohesion. This interpretation signifies the ac-
ceptance of the primary role of Community policies, alongside the provi-
sion for not allowing any uncontrolled expenditure increases outside the 
agreed upon Community policy objectives.  
The internal market, regional policy, the Economic and Monetary Union, 
the reform of the CAP in 1992, research and development, and the Trans-
European Networks played a significant role in the evolution of commit-
ment appropriations within the budget during the periods 1988-1992 and 
1993-1999. There was a strong link between Community policies and the 
commitment appropriations of the common budget. 
4. 2000-2013(-2020): Budget-driven Community policies under 
multiannual financial frameworks
The financial perspective of 2000-2006 has drastically affected the rela-
tionship between the budget and Community policies. The debate on the 
Agenda 2000 proposal led to the end of a policy-driven budget; Commu-
nity policies have now become budget-driven. The multiannual financial 
framework of 2007-2013 has continued this tendency, which more than 
likely will remain the dominant model for the next framework, 2014-2020. 
4 88/377/EEC Decision, OJ L. 185, 1988.
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In 1997, at the beginning of the debate on the third financial perspective, 
it was not yet clear what factors would determine the financial framework 
beginning in 2000: the Community policies or the net positions. Discussions 
on the Agenda 2000 were not only framed by the positions of the larger 
Member States, as had had happened previously, but also by two distinct 
groups of countries: the net payers and the net beneficiaries. 
The debate on the Agenda 2000 once again explicitly unveiled the Mem-
ber States’ interests. During the years 1998-1999 it became evident that 
the negotiating position of the Member States was governed by their net 
budgetary position against the EU’s budget. Such an approach turned 
out to be dominant, and continues to flourish today. The priority of the net 
position, namely the overriding role of the juste retour principle, has re-
sulted in a serious misinterpretation of the benefits of European integration 
(which is the most serious criticism against the short-sighted net position).
The political objective of expenditure “stabilization” presented by the net 
payers during the Agenda 2000 debate was nothing more than a well-de-
signed maneuver to improve their net budgetary position. The relationship 
between the Communities’ budget and Community policies has fundamen-
tally changed since the adoption of the financial perspective for 2000-2006. 
The result of the political negotiation for the 2000-2006 financial framework is 
that the budget has become dominant vis-à-vis Community policies. The net 
position became more important than the appropriate financing of com-
mon policies; the Union’s policies, in short, became budget-driven. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the EU’s historic 2004 enlargement also 
directly impacted the financing of Community policies. The final phase of 
accession negotiations concerning the budget and other related chap-
ters were largely determined by the position taken by the EU-15 in the 
negotiations of the Agenda 2000, which as noted above, gave priority to 
budgetary constraints. In our view, strangely enough, even the acceding 
countries contributed to the primacy of the budget over common poli-
cies by having set their net position objective as a political benchmark of 
the negotiations’ success. 
The current financial framework (2007-2013) originally intended to high-
light policies of sustainable growth and competitiveness. There was a 
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short-lived hope that Community policies could regain some of their im-
portance for the multiannual budgetary planning. However, it quickly 
became evident that it would be difficult to continue financing the “his-
torical” Community policies and simultaneously start financing the new 
challenges of competitiveness, energy infrastructure, security and justice, 
and neighborhood policy – the total of which would fall below 1% of the 
total EU GNI. The Commission was successfully innovative in renaming the 
main headings of the previous financial framework of 2000-2006, but its 
proposal, to a large extent, continued to finance very similar measures. 
Cohesion Policy, formerly a main heading, was converted into a sub-
heading under Sustainable Growth. Even the Common Agricultural Policy 
became hidden under the broad title of Preservation and Management 
of Natural Resources.
Financial Framework 2007-20135










ble Growth 51.267 52.415 53.616 54.294 55.368 56.876 58.303 382.139
1a. Competitive-
ness for Growth 
and Employ-
ment












54.985 54.322 53.666 53.035 52.400 51.775 51.161 371.344
5 Interinstitutional Agreement, 2006
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600 690 790 910 1.050 1.200 1.390 6.630
3b. Citizen-
ship
599 568 590 593 595 597 598 4.140
4. EU as 
a global 
player
6.199 6.469 6.739 7.009 7.339 7.679 8.029 49.463
5. Adminis-
tration* 6.633 6.818 6.973 7.111 7.255 7.400 7.610 49.800
6. Com-




120.702 121.473 122.564 122.952 124.007 125.527 127.091 864.316
as a percent-
age of GNI








1,06% 1,08% 1,07% 1,04% 1,03% 1,02% 1,01% 1,00%
Margin 
available
0,18% 0,18% 0,27% 0,24% 0,28% 0,27% 0,30% 0,24%
Own Resources 
Ceiling as a 
percentage of 
GNI
1,24% 1,24% 1,24% 1,24% 1,24% 1,24% 1,24% 1,24%
* The expenditure on pensions included under the ceiling for this heading is calculated net of 
the staff contributions to the relevant scheme, within the limit of € 500 million at 2004 prices 
for the period 2007-2013.
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The next financial framework debate is only now approaching its end. The 
proposal of the European Commission and the discussions in the Council 
make it undoubtedly clear that the budget-driven nature of the EU poli-
cies will continue to rule for the next financial framework (2014-2020). 
3. The Main Reasons behind the Budget-Driven Poli-
cies Phenomenon
As noted above, the model where Community policies shaped the budg-
et fell out of favor during the Agenda 2000 discussions. In our view, there 
were three major issues at the end of the twentieth-century directly im-
pacting the relationship between the budget and EU policies. 
1. The Stability and Growth Pact 
2. The assumptions on the fifth enlargement of the European Union 
(2004)
3. The increasing role of the GNI-based own resources
1. The Stability and Growth Pact 
The Stability and Growth Pact introduced a new mechanism aimed at 
the sustainability of public finances in the Member States. This framework 
established the rules of economic policy coordination, particularly in the 
field of national budgetary planning. As an important element of the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union, it promulgated basic regulations to prevent 
and correct budgetary imbalances. The Pact, coupled with the “Maas-
tricht Criteria”, the preparation of convergence, and stability programs 
all together were too demanding on the national treasuries. The exces-
sive deficit procedure, which was triggered in cases of non-compliance, 
could even result in sanctions (questions remain as to how seriously Mem-
ber States took such procedures). The Member States were (and are) 
paying approximately 1% of their GDP to the common budget; it should 
be noted that this 1% could (and can) be quite crucial in the avoidance 
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of the excessive deficit procedures. Thus the national budgetary position 
took on a new meaning and dimension, while the gains and objectives 
of Community policies became of secondary importance in many – or 
perhaps, most – Member States. 
2. The assumptions on the fifth enlargement of the European 
Union (2004)
Preparations for the EU’s fifth enlargement raised deep concerns in many 
Member States, particularly between 1997 and 1999 during the debate 
on the Agenda 2000 package, which included a proposal for the finan-
cial perspective for 2000-2006. The European Commission proposal fore-
saw five new Member States acceding to the EU in 2002. However, the 
enlargement round expanded to twelve countries, ten of which acceded 
in 2004, and a further two in 2007.  
It was clear from the beginning that all of the acceding continental coun-
tries (ten out of the twelve applicants) would be beneficiaries of the two 
most expensive Community policies: the Common Agricultural Policy and 
the Cohesion Policy. Both their incomes per capita and regional develop-
ment levels were far behind the EU-15 average. Moreover, the agricultural 
sector tended to dominate the applicants’ economies. As such, they duly 
expected considerable budgetary transfers. Yet the high net assumptions 
forecasted for financing the enlargement were quickly offset by the long 
transitional periods “offered” to the newcomers. Moreover, uncertainty 
and fear caused by the forthcoming budgetary burdens of enlargement 
grew steadily in Member States that had previously accepted the largest 
share of their own resources from the Union’s budget (i.e., the net payers). 
Likewise, fears amongst those who had been net beneficiaries of Commu-
nity policies were similar. In sum, it was frighteningly clear that the budget 
pie would not add weight, but rather its slices would be much thinner. 
The conflict of the net payers and net beneficiaries eventually led to the 
“stabilization” of the EU’s budget, or rather a situation where the ceiling 
on budget expenditures largely became frozen in spite of the needs of 
Community policies and those connected to enlargement. The financial 
perspective agreed upon in March 1999 contained two tables: one for 
the EU-15 and one for the needs of enlargement. The latter followed the 
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Commission’s original assumption that enlargement would take place in 
2002 and involve five new Member States. When enlargement finally took 
place in 2004 (and again in 2007) with a much larger number of states, it 
was not deemed necessary to renegotiate the financial framework. This 
was mainly due to two factors: the two-year delay, which saved pay-
ment appropriations in 2002 and 2003; and the long transitional periods 
accepted by the acceding countries for the Common Agricultural Policy 
and (the shorter transition periods in the case of Cohesion policy). 
The focus of the net payer Member States, i.e., the “stabilization” of the 
budget, reflected well the needs of the Stability and Growth Pact. Stabil-
ity, which was supposed to be respected by the national budgets, was 
to as well be applied to the EU’s budget. However, this was a rather mis-
leading interpretation, one that stemmed from the differences between 
the functions of the individual Member States’ budgets and the Union’s 
budget. The functions of the national budgets can only be identified to a 
limited extent in the EU budget. Specifically, the Union’s budget does not 
finance public institutions, public services, social allowances, and classi-
cal justice and home affairs; further, there is no common taxation policy. 
The Union’s budget cannot fulfill tasks of economic policy like macro-eco-
nomic stabilization due to its very limited size. However, the EU budget 
performs transfers and provides for economic development measures, 
and also has limited regulatory competencies (e.g. agricultural policy). 
The mission of the EU’s budget is to finance common objectives with the 
instruments of Community policies. 
3. The increasing role of the GNI-based own resources
Before assessing the impact of the GNI-based own resources on the budg-
et’s evolution, it is necessary to reiterate the structure of own resources 
within the EU’s budget. The own resources comprise the following:
 - Customs duties are levied on imports under the Common Customs 
Tariff introduced in 1968. 
 - Agricultural resources are import duties charged on agricultural 
products imported from third-countries. The agricultural duties, ear-
lier known as levies, were introduced in 1962, but after the transposi-
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tion of the multilateral trade agreements into Community law, there 
is no longer any difference between agricultural duties and customs 
duties. Besides agricultural duties, there are also levies on the pro-
duction of sugar and isoglucose for Community sugar producers. 
 - Customs and agricultural duties are called traditional own resourc-
es because they are generated by Community policies. 
 - Value added tax (VAT) based resources were introduced in 1970 
because the traditional own resources were insufficient in financing 
the Community budget. It is calculated on the Member States VAT-
base. VAT resources are collected according to a call-in rate of the 
VAT-base, now equal to 0.3% of it.
 - Gross national income (GNI) based resources were introduced 
in 1988 by the Council as a fourth own resource based on the Mem-
ber States’ GNP. Their purpose was to help balance the budget; 
until then, the other resources proved to be insufficient.6 
 - Other revenues (providing approximately 1% of the total resources) 
are taxes and deductions from the staff remunerations of EU institu-
tions, bank interest, and third-country contributions to certain Com-
munity programs, etc. 
By the end of the 1990s, the share of the different own resources in the 
Union’s budget had to a large extent changed. Until 1970, the budgets 
of the Communities were financed by the traditional own resources. Be-
tween 1970 and 1988, VAT-based resources played a balancing role to 
keep the budget in balance. This led to a growing role for VAT-based 
resources. During the second financial perspective, the share of the tra-
ditional own resources and the VAT-based resources began to decrease, 
while GNI-based resources increased. In 1996 the share of the traditional 
own resources was 19%; VAT-based resources accounted for 51%; and 
GNI-based resources almost 30% of the total budget. By 1999, these shares 
had changed as follows: 17%, 38%, and 45%, respectively. By the end of 
the third financial perspective (2006), the ratio of the traditional resources 
decreased to 11%; VAT-based resources to 14%; and GNI-based resourc-
es increased to 74%.  
6 According to the Union’s Financial Regulation, the budget should be balanced; neither deficit nor suffice is allowed.
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XV
III (66) - 2012
23
The traditional own resources (after having retained 25% of them as col-
lection costs) are paid monthly to the Commission’s account. One-twelfth 
of the annual VAT-based and GNI-based resources are paid on the first 
working day of every month. As the two latter resources provide almost 
90% of the Member States contribution, the Union’s budget no longer re-
lies on any Community policies, but rather on the payments of the nation-
al treasuries. Because of the own resources system (often referred to as 
“own”), there is practically no Community ownership of the revenues any-
more. Moreover, own resources have become quasi-membership fees for 
the Member States. As a result, the contribution of the Members States has 
weakened the position of the general budget of the government,7 so one 
can imagine the enthusiasm of finance ministers about the current “own” 
resources system. This situation has led to a strong juste retour approach, 
where the optimization of the net position against the Union’s budget is 
now the number one issue for every Member State in the debate over the 
multiannual financial framework. 
Source: The European Union’s General Budget for the Financial Year 2012 (2012/70/EU, 
Euratom)
7 While the Member States’ contribution to the EU budget is government expenditure, the funds allocated in favour 
of a Member State have a neutral effect on the government’s budget balance because the EU funds enter the 
treasury’s account and then paid out as expenditures for the final beneficiaries. The EU allocations only positively 
impact the current account balance. 
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4. A Key Issue for an Effective EU Budget: A Farewell 
to Juste Retour
The dominant debate of the Agenda 2000 continued in 2004-2005 during 
a discussion in the Council concerning the current financial framework for 
2007-2013 (note: the same Member States conflicts are occurring today for 
the framework 2014-2020). The expectation that the new challenges con-
fronting the EU, namely competitiveness, energy security, climate change, 
justice and security, and neighborhood policy, would again strengthen 
the position of the Union’s policies, will most likely not come to fruition. The 
acknowledged necessity of the new policies will not be sufficient enough 
to reposition the budget-driven nature of the EU’s policies. In order to lib-
erate the common policies from the budget, the European Union would 
need a budget independent of the national treasuries, or rather one that 
is mostly sovereign (in the sense that it has its own genuine resources).  
Real own resources would allow the EU to expel its simple and short-sight-
ed net position approach. Such own resources would give the Union’s 
budget the potential to serve directly and efficiently both the conver-
gence and deepening policies of European construction via policy-driv-
en Community expenditures. Moreover, economic policy functions of the 
budget could be enriched to improve the overall competitiveness and 
wealth of EU citizens. 
We contend that the autonomy of the common budget could only be 
ensured by such a real own resources system based on resources gen-
erated by Community policies, the establishment of a specific Commu-
nity tax, or a combination of the two. Until now, traditional own resources 
have provided a best case example; however, their current share in the 
revenues is becoming increasingly insignificant. 
The idea of a Community tax is not a new one. When the ECSC was found-
ed, a supranational charge was introduced and levied on coal and steel 
products. Later, when the European Commission issued its communica-
tions regularly before the debates of the financial perspectives, accom-
panied by reform proposals for the own resources system, several ideas 
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were frequently raised by the collage. In 2004, the Commission identified 
three possible types of Community taxes: an energy tax, a VAT tax, and 
a corporate tax (European Commission, 2004b). While all three already 
existed in the Member States, the idea of transforming them (or transform-
ing part of them, as was proposed in the case of VAT) into a Union tax 
was then and now politically unrealistic. The Member States have firmly 
refused any intervention into their respective taxation policies, arguing 
that fiscal sovereignty is an indispensable element of national sovereign-
ty. There remains no economic or political argument on the horizon that 
could convince the national treasuries to accept the sharing of taxation 
powers with others, in spite of the depth of the financial crisis. Since the 
basic principles of modern international financial law were established 
by Gustav Lippert (Lippert, 1912), financial sovereignty has remained a 
superseding standpoint. 
In our preference for the Community method, the most appropriate solu-
tion besides a Union tax would be the creation of own resources by virtue 
of Community policies, like in the case of traditional own resources. At first 
glance, the constraints of today’s Community instruments considerably 
limit any possibilities to generate additional own resources. In spite of this, 
we envision relatively significant potential in some Community measures, 
namely those in the field of energy policy, climate change measures (par-
ticularly the Emission Trading Scheme), financial market regulation, and 
even the regulation of the telecommunication market.  
Summarizing our view, despite strong national fiscal sovereignty, there 
is an alternative option to make GNI-based resources dominant within 
the current own resources system. This option would have two pillars: 
resources generated by Community policies; and revenues resulting 
from Union-wide taxation. In this model, the latter could assume the 
balancing role (but not its size and share) of the present GNI-based 
resources. This scheme would (re-)introduce the power of collecting 
a supranational tax, which would be a key element in the frequently 
discussed creation of a fiscal union. 
From the point of view of our preferred two-pillar system, the 2011 pro-
posal by the European Commission for a Council decision on the own 
resource system should be welcomed. The Commission has proposed 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XV
III (66) - 2012
26
the introduction of a financial transaction tax at the level of the Europe-
an Union and a new VAT resource eliminating the VAT-based resources 
from 1 January 2018 at the latest (European Commission 2011b). Both 
proposals would reduce Member States’ direct contributions and ef-
fectively alleviate the problem of juste retour. The Commission’s pro-
posal also addresses the necessary phasing-out of rebates and cor-
rection mechanisms, which may have been justified at the time of their 
introduction; today, however, they pose the biggest obstacle towards 
the achievement of budgetary transparency. 
A system of real own resources would ensure the autonomy of the EU’s 
budget. Beyond its autonomy, the appropriate size of the budget could 
also be addressed. In fact, we deem these two factors necessary for 
the future success of the European project. The choice for the Member 
States between the following two options, which was described almost 
four decades ago by Daniel Strasser, then Director of the Budget, is 
still valid (Strasser, 1975): a budget which is based on equal redistribu-
tion amongst the Member States, bearing in mind the optimization of 
the net budgetary position, or a budget with the mission of deepening 
European integration based on the principle of solidarity amongst the 
Member States. 
As long as the only concern for the Member States – no matter whether 
they are net payers or net beneficiaries – is the improvement of their 
individual budgetary position, the Community instruments will remain 
of secondary importance. 
The matter of real own resources is not simply a budgetary issue; it is 
a much deeper question than the mere impact it will have on the na-
tional treasuries. The more logical question concerns the next steps on 
the path of European integration: Is there any intention to accept own 
resources of a supranational nature? A debate on this topic would 
surely provoke further questions of sovereignty sharing and the (big) 
question mark of readiness for fiscal and then political integration. At 
the time of this article’s completion, it is very likely that no answers will 
be illuminated within the debates on the Multiannual Financial Frame-
work. These questions, however, could rather be answered by correct-
ing (and not merely mitigating) the effects of the deep and elongated 
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financial crisis caused by European integration. If the decision-makers 
heed the above, more progressive conditions for the Union’s budget 
will be triggered and it will finally get what it has been missing for far too 
long – a Treasury of its own. 
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ABSTRACT
Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) were expected to benefit substantially from European 
Union (EU) membership. As full members, they would take advantage of formal decision-making 
powers. Furthermore, EU instruments and norms would influence distributional issues and the com-
mon market would facilitate economic convergence. However, these positive expectations, which 
are underpinned by rational institutional and normative theories of enlargement, have become chal-
lenged by the effects of the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds. Therefore, drawing on the liberal 
intergovernmental approach (LIG), the article proposes to test an alternative explanation. First, it is 
proposed that EU decision-making powers are constrained by other powers possessed by the national 
governments. Second, the distributional issues are determined by individual interests and relative 
power (dependence). Third, economic convergence depends on the ability of individual governments 
to influence economic processes. The meta-study of post-accession Council decision-making, as well 
as case studies of some of the central distributional issues from the pre- and post-accession periods, 
and macroeconomic trends support the proposed LIG-based explanation.
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1. Introduction
The European Union (EU), established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, 
sought to fill the political vacuum created by the collapse of Europe’s 
communist regimes. Several Member States promoted the employment of 
enlargement mechanisms as the EU’s strongest foreign policy tool (Schim-
melfennig, 2003). Desperate to re-establish political and economic credibil-
ity, the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) were ready to em-
bark on the path towards ‘Europeanization’. In 1993, the European Council 
introduced the EU’s accession criteria while meeting in Copenhagen.
In contrast to the issue of ‘deepening’, ‘widening’ has been largely overlooked 
by the grand theories of European integration (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmei-
er, 2002; Faber, 2009).9 Most of the theoretical approaches concerning eastern 
enlargement are underpinned by rational institutionalism, normative theory, 
and constructivism (Schimmelfennig 2001; 2003). Only a few studies relate to 
the more realist (governmental) tradition in integrations theory (e.g. Moravcsik 
and Vahudova, 2003). Further, Kajnč (2009) has specifically noted a lack of 
studies that scrutinize the effects of accession on the CEEC. 
The assumption underlying the rational and normative institutional theories 
of enlargement was that the ‘widening process’ is driven by the EU’s institu-
tional and normative ‘growth bias’. This assumption supported the predic-
tions that the CEEC would substantially benefit from EU accession. First, as 
full members, the CEEC would acquire formal decision-making and pro-
cedural powers, which would improve their position relative to the older 
EU Member States and the rest of the world (Schulz and König, 2000: 656; 
Tsebelis and Yataganas, 2002). Second, they would benefit from EU policies 
and instruments (Hosli, 1999; König and Bräuninger, 2004: 421; Zimmer et al., 
2005). The common normative and institutional framework would improve 
the outcomes they could otherwise expect with distributional issues (Schim-
melfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 520; Dimitrova, 2002). Third, the common 
9 During the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement process, several authors tried to address the problem of under-theorization of 
EU enlargement. By pointing to the under-conceptualization of dependant and independent variables, disinterest 
in several dimensions of the enlargement process, and the weak generalizability of the arguments, Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier (2002: 501-4) have put forward principles for a broader, comparative analysis of ‘widening’, 
founded in the international institutional theory. However, problems still remain. In accordance with Faber (2009: 
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market would facilitate economic convergence (Baldwin et al., 1997).
On May 1, 2004, eight CEEC became full members; Romania and Bulgaria 
later acceded in 2007.10 Although the experiences accumulated over the 
first years of membership are somewhat mixed, several of the original ex-
pectations now seem to have been overly optimistic. First, there is little 
evidence that the new Member States (NMS) are able to turn their vot-
ing and procedural rights into material gains. Terms describing the post-
enlargement decision-making atmosphere in the Council of the EU often 
refer to a “status quo” or “business as usual” (Best et al., 2009).11 Although 
four NMS have successfully completed rotating presidency terms, the op-
portunities to push forward their own agendas are still perceived as “lim-
ited” (Udovič and Svetličič, 2011). Unquestionably, the ‘downloading’ of 
EU standards has had a positive impact on the NMS. However, the influ-
ence of community policies and norms on the most important distribu-
tional issues, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), cohesion and 
structural funds, and the overall agreement on the Multi-Annual Financial 
Framework (MAFF), has been constrained by the interests of the largest 
Member States (Mrak and Rant, 2008; Lovec and Erjavec, 2012). Finally, 
in the initial post-accession years, the GDP of the NMS grew at a rate of 
5-6% (Commission, 2009). Yet with the ensuing economic crisis beginning 
in 2008, growth trends have reversed. The eurozone crisis has exposed 
deeper structural economic asymmetries, which have surely influenced 
the economies located in the EU’s periphery (Inotai, 2011). 
Drawing on the liberal intergovernmental approach (LIG) (Moravcsik, 
1998: 20; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 68-9), this article offers 
an alternative explanation of the effects of enlargement. First, following 
the LIG, Community institutions merely serve the credibility of the commit-
ments made by national governments. Thus, formal decision-making and 
procedural powers are constrained alongside other capacities possessed 
10 Based on the recommendation of the European Commission, which was formally endorsed at the Luxemburg 
Summit in 1997, five CEEC countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia) and Cyprus 
started accession negotiations in March 1998. In December 1999, the Helsinki European Council opened 
accession negotiations with six others: Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Malta, Bulgaria, and Romania. After negotiations 
stalled in 2000-2001, the June 2001 Gothenburg Summit gave a green light for the final phase of the negotiations 
with the CEE-8, Cyprus, and Malta. In 2002, the EU and its candidates negotiated remaining issues such as CAP, 
cohesion, and structural funds. Accession talks were concluded at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 
(Bohle, 2003). The accession treaty was signed on April 16, 2003.
11 Following Best et al. (2009), the real question is not how enlargement has changed the EU, but how the EU has 
changed so little after bringing in ten NMS.
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by the states. Second, when interests are clear, the outcomes of bargain-
ing over distributional issues are determined by the compatibility of indi-
vidual interests and relative powers, understood in terms of asymmetrical 
interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Moravcsik and Vachudova, 
2003). Third, economic convergence depends on the ability of individual 
governments to influence economic processes. 
The remainder of the text is structured as follows: within the section on theo-
ry, the alternative approaches towards eastern enlargement (rational insti-
tutional and normative on the one hand; and the LIG-based approach on 
the other) are further established and compared. Later, after briefly discuss-
ing the design of the research, we present the research results, which are 
organized in accordance with the related enlargement issues that have 
been identified (decision-making, distribution, and cohesion). We con-
clude with an explanation of the relevance of the results, particularly where 
they regard the various foreign policy strategies of the NMS. 
2. Framework for the Analysis
The CEEC were considered to benefit from EU accession by acquiring for-
mal decision-making and procedural powers through Community poli-
cies and norms influencing the distributional issues, and through the ef-
fects produced by the unrestricted access to the common market. In this 
section, a rational institutional and normative theories-based explanation 
and LIG-based explanation are assessed and compared with regard to 
each individual issue. 
a) Formal Decision-Making Powers
Where the EU has established community competences, formal decision-
making procedures are applied. The Council of the EU, commonly seen 
as the most important decision-making body in the EU (Steunenberg and 
Selck, 2006: 55; Moravcsik, 2008) reaches decisions through quality ma-
jority (QM) vote, unanimity, or simple majority (Roozendaal et al. 2011). 
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In practice, however, the Council strives to reach consensus. Even if the 
Council resorts to a QM vote, the votes allocated provide each individual 
member state with substantial decision-making powers (Hayes-Renshaw 
and Wallace, 2006: 279; Naurin and Wallace, 2008: 1). The GDPs of the 
NMS account for no more than a 5% share of the EU’s total GDP; howev-
er, almost one-third of the total Council votes are allocated for the NMS. 
Thus, their bargaining position relative to older Member States (as well as 
non-EU countries) should be improved. In addition, functions such as the 
rotating Council presidency would enable the NMS to push forward their 
own agendas (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006; Thomson 2008).12
Following LIG, the national governments authorize Community institutions 
to provide accountability for their commitments (Moravcsik and Schim-
melfennig 2009: 70-1). Various instruments and practices still enable the rel-
ative powers possessed by the national governments to be translated into 
decision-making outcomes (also see: Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse, 
2007: 1; Hosli et al., 2008: 15).13 Thus, common decision-making can be 
seen as instrumental (Heyes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006: 252; Moravc-
sik, 2008). Prior to, during, and after the EU enlargement rounds, Mem-
ber States have argued that greater decision-making efficiency must be 
implemented. Formal decision-making powers, available to smaller and 
medium-sized Member States, have systematically narrowed (Plechano-
vová 2008: 4-5; Thomson, 2011: 5).14 Upon the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification, 
the powers of the presidency have as well shifted from the Member States 
to the EU. The presidency lost part of its leadership stake in the Council 
(now led by President of the Council Herman Van Rompuy), in addition 
to having to share powers related to external action with the European 
Parliament and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy 
(Catherine Ashton), who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (Balázs 2011: 5). 
12 Presidents carry out administrative tasks, set political priorities, mediate between other Member States and represent 
the Council externally. Council decisions are shown to be more favorable to the chair at the time of adoption than 
to other Member States (Thomson 2008).
13 This can explain why the resort to the formal vote is atypical. For example, the overview of winning coalitions, 
formed in the Council in the 1998 to 2004 period, demonstrates that most winning coalitions have a large 
combined voting weight and that minimal winning coalitions are rare (Roozendaal et al. 2011).
14 Under the current Nice Treaty rules, which will be in place until October 2013, a QM vote requires 71.3% of the 
total votes representing at least 62% of the population of the EU. In order to form a blocking minority, the NMS 
need the votes of at least one additional Member State (Baldwin and Widgren, 2004: 18). With the Lisbon Treaty 
(which will come into force after a 2014-2017 transition period), a QM vote requires the support of 55% of the 
Member States (15 Member States), representing 65% of the population. In addition, a blocking minority must 
consist of 35% of the population of the EU plus one Member State. The new rules were explained as a ‘bait-and-
switch’ tactic (get the NMS in and then reduce their power) (Baldwin and Widgren, 2004: 2).
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b) Community Framework and Distributional Issues
Institutional and normative setting is a framework in which political actors 
pursue (‘maximize’) their interests (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 
510-12). The EU’s eastern enlargement has revealed the importance of 
specific Community institutions and norms (Schimmelfennig 2001; 2003). 
The EU’s distributional policies and norms would substantially improve the 
bargaining position of the NMS (Hosli, 1999; König and Bräuninger, 2004: 
421; Zimmer et al., 2005). 
Following LIG, in cases when interests are clear (when the dispersion of costs 
and benefits is relatively low), governments try to maximize their own interests 
by maximizing the interests of various domestic actors (Moravcsik and Schim-
melfennig, 2009: 68, 76). In foreign policy, governments do that by enabling 
the redistribution of resources from the domestic groups that are positively af-
fected by international cooperative agreements to those that are negatively 
affected (resulting in the so-called two-level games) (Putnam, 1988; Moravc-
sik, 1998: 89-90, 161). Second, in doing that, governments draw on the relative 
powers they possess.15 The relative powers are measured in terms of relative 
dependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The power asymmetry between the 
older and newer Member States was evident. Drawing on a relative power 
based bargaining model, Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003: 56) have argued 
that the NMS would be unable to influence substantially the distributional is-
sues. This could provoke changes in EU policies, namely pillarization.
c) Convergence
EU entry was intended to raise output and growth rates by stimulating 
entrepreneurship, foreign direct investment (FDI) (on the basis of rational 
expectations), and technology transfers (Baldwin et al. 1997: 125). The 
common market was expected to facilitate economic convergence.
In accordance with LIG, governments use their powers to influence the 
effects of the markets (Moravcsik 1998). The ability to do that depends on 
15 Following Schneider (2007: 87), “the empirical findings of a probit analysis on the EU accession negotiations 
and outcomes of all five EU enlargement rounds support the theoretical claim /.../ that EU members impose 
discriminatory measures on new members to redistribute enlargement gains from new members to particularly 
negatively affected EU members as to render expansion pareto-efficient”. Baldwin and Widgrén (2004: 6) point 
out to the importance that the status quo has on the bargaining setting.
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the relative strength of political powers to determine the role of market 
forces. Second, the operation of states and markets depends on specific 
economic and political structures. Thus, ‘free trade’ policies can both in-
crease or decrease asymmetries in power and economic development.
3. Research Design and Methods
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In order to test the relevance of alternative theoretical approaches that 
attempt to explain the role of formal decision-making powers in the post-
accession period, we employ a meta-analysis of the studies on post-
accession decision-making in the EU Council. It must be noted that the 
design of some of these studies has been criticized. 16 Critics have point-
16 Most of the decision-making studies have a similar design (e.g. Hertz and Leuffen, 2008; Thomson, 2011). They 
are usually based on formal decision-making indicators such as the number of dissenting views, the length of 
procedures, and the final voting. They monitor a substantial number of legislative procedures. The studies are listed 
in Table 2 below. 
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ed to the specific characteristics of Council decision-making, such as low 
transparency and the often small number of dissenting views (Hagemann 
and De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007: 1; Plechanovova, 2011). When interpreting the 
results, these criticisms have been taken into account. Further, the argument 
that the analysis of formal decision-making procedures should be combined 
with an analysis of the substantial issues that are being discussed (Hosli et al., 
2008: 15; Hertz, 2010: 132) has been taken into consideration while establish-
ing other areas of empirical research, and while designing other employed 
research methods. For example, a substantial effort has been put toward a 
case study of the effects that the eastern enlargement has had on the CAP, 
which still accounts for a large share of community decision-making, and 
represents the single biggest distributional mechanism.
4. The Results
a) Small Remain Small
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 Best et al (2009)*; Hage-
mann and De Clerck-
Sachsse (2007); Hage-
mann (2008); Hosli et al. 
(2008); Best and Settembri 
(2008)
Even faster with 
less opposition
X X





Thomson et al. (2006); 
Thomson and Hosli (2010); 
Thomson (2009; 2011)
X Minor N-S (E) X
 * Meta-study conducted by Best et al. (2009), who refer to a first wave of publications on the 
institutional impact of the 2004 enlargement, some of which are listed in the box (see Best 
et al., 2009: 14) and were, for the purposes of this study, inspected individually.
Some of the studies suggest that the length of the procedures and the 
number of dissenting views regarding the distributional issues has some-
how increased slightly. Some of these studies also present evidence of 
a clustering of the decision-making positions on the axes N-S(E)17 (Hertz 
and Leuffen, 2008; Hertz, 2010; Thomson 2009, 2011). However, the sig-
nificance of these indications can be questioned since it varies and is, in 
general, weak. Further, what should be evident from Table 2 is that the 
evidence that the studies provide regarding the individual operational 
indicators are mixed and contradictory. Many studies observe virtually no 
strong cleavages between the N-S(E) Member States, or any significant 
conflict over the distributional issues (Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse, 
2007: 6). There is equally little evidence demonstrating that the legislative 
output has been decreased and/or that a decrease could be explained 
by the number of Member States in the Council, or with the constellations 
of their preferences (Hertz and Leuffen, 2008). Further, various indications 
suggest that procedural efficiency has in fact been enhanced (Best and 
Settembri, 2008: 44). 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the empirical evidence. We 
have already noted that there are limitations to the generalizations that 
can be made on the basis of the formal decision-making indications that 
the studies employ. Several authors suggest that we do not actually know 
17 Northern-Southern (Eastern) member states
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what is going on before and during Council decisions (Hagemann and 
De Clerck-Sachsse 2007: 5). Following Plechanovova (2011), compared 
to most legislative bodies in democratic political systems, occurrences of 
contested legislation is scarcely noticeable in EU Council decision-making. 
Even in those rare instances, few dissenting positions are recorded. This 
did not change with the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement. The ability of the ‘proce-
dural models’ to predict results did not improve (Hertz 2010: 12), nor was 
there any evidence found in the practice of consensus decision-making 
(Mattila 2009: 844). Following the concluding remarks of the meta-study 
conducted by Best et al. (2009: 114-5), all major Council decisions were 
adopted relatively smoothly after 2004; there was no significant change in 
the quantity of the adopted decisions; and the Union of 27 was still under 
the substantial influence of national interests. In other words, it was “busi-
ness as usual” for the EU (Best et al., 2009: 114). 
The insignificant change in the formal procedures is an important empiri-
cal fact. Since the argument that states that the NMS would be able to 
draw on decision-making powers is based on the assumption that the 
procedures play an autonomous role, the role of the procedures, which 
is evidently weak, calls into question the relevance of the institutional as-
sumptions and the procedural argument. 
Schneider (2007) and Hertz (2010) argued that the older Member States 
would be able to accommodate the decision-making setting to serve 
their purposes. Both the changes in the more formal (see Baldwin and 
Widgren, 2004) and informal procedures and settings support this argu-
ment. Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse (2007), who based their analysis 
of post-accession decision-making on in-depth interviews with the individ-
ual decision-makers, argue that the Council meetings themselves seem 
more formal; however, more pre-negotiation also takes place. Further-
more, the de facto role of the Commission, the Council Secretariat, and 
the Presidency was strengthened; further, “the agenda has moved to the 
informal settings of luncheon tables and Council corridors” (Hagemann 
and De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007: 2; also Best et al., 2009). Studies based on 
specific policy aspects argue that the changes in the decision-making 
procedures have empowered the larger states vis-à-vis smaller and less 
‘comitology-experienced’ Member States (e.g. Elsig 2010).
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The presidency of the Council has allowed presiding Member States the 
ability to achieve better bargains on contested issues (Thomson, 2008). In 
2008, Slovenia was the first new Member State to preside over the Council, 
followed by the Czech Republic in the first-half of 2009. Hungary and Po-
land, assuming presidencies in 2011, were the first NMS to preside over the 
Council in the post-Lisbon era. The cases studies of individual presidencies 
(Udovič and Svetličič, 2011; Balázs, 2011: 4-7, 13; Jesień, 2011: 21-3) dem-
onstrate that the NMS were relatively successful in carrying out their repre-
sentation and coordination functions. The presidencies allowed them to 
push forward some of their specific national agendas. However, positive 
conclusions are much less convincing where it regards their ability to capi-
talize on the presidency’s function to achieve better bargain outcomes.
In addition to the formal and informal changes in procedural settings, 
policy substance has been changing as well. Following Thomson (2011: 
50), the EU went from “being mainly about the level of integration to be-
ing mainly about regulating the single market”. The changes in various EU 
policies have been underpinned by a philosophic shift from deepening 
towards negative integration and pillarization (also Best et al., 2009: 121; 
Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003). 
Before turning to the substantial policy issues, some conclusions can be 
made regarding the more formal decision-making indications. A rational 
institutional theory-based explanation would assume that, regardless of 
the policy issue, the NMS, once inside, could draw on their formal pro-
cedural powers, enabling them to push forward their own agenda. We 
found little empirical evidence to support such behaviour. There is also a 
lack of evidence showing the decisive role of NMS votes; the influence 
of the formal procedures is insignificant and there is a strong status quo 
bias present in the decision-making outcomes (Hertz 2010: 13). In sum, the 
empirical evidence demonstrates that the NMS have accommodated 
to the new decision-making setting relatively quickly (also Hertz 2010: 95). 
However, the evidence also demonstrates that the various non-proce-
dural capacities possessed by the states are reflected in the more formal 
decision-making procedures. At best, Community institutions can be seen 
as weak intervening variables.
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b) The Asymmetrical Two-Level Game
“We are not yet able to see ourselves as a sovereign subject of interna-
tional political, economic and other relations.” 
(Borut Pahor, former Slovenian Prime Minister, August 2011)
The collapse of communist regimes strengthened the CEEC’s depend-
ency on the EU market. The rapprochement strategy pursued by the 
EU was based on the implementation of economic reforms, namely 
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. The Copenhagen Cri-
teria directly stressed the need for the NMS to be able to meet the 
market forces of the EU. Although in the early 1990s ‘Europe Agree-
ments’ were generally oriented toward free trade; quantitative limita-
tions were established on trade products such as textiles, steel, and 
agricultural products, where the CEEC had a comparative advantage 
(Bohle, 2003). The CEEC’s strategy was based on gradualism and the 
continuation of state support in some economic sectors; although the 
limited economic resources and dependency on foreign trade and 
capital brought forth pressures to implement free trade policies, even 
in cases where differences in direct and indirect supports, enjoyed by 
the producers in various states, would have detrimental economic and 
social effects.
The agricultural sector highlights this point. Compared to the 1980s, 
when several CEEC exported their agricultural products to the Euro-
pean Community, the trade pattern reversed in the 1990s. Despite the 
fact that basic production factors’ prices were lower,18 due to the EU’s 
heavily subsidized production, the import of agricultural products ac-
counted for a substantial share of the CEEC’s trade and trade deficit 
with the EU. Since, in the 1990s, CEEC agriculture employed 10-25% of 
the total labour force and contributed approximately 10-20% to the 
respective national GDPs (Herok and Lotze 2000) the supply of cheap 
food had negative consequences for the economies as a whole. In 
addition, it hardly helped the CEEC’s agriculture overcome its struc-
tural problems. In the late 1990s, still less than 20% of Polish farmers 
18 In Poland, agricultural land prices were just one-tenth of the land prices in Germany. The CEEC faced the loss of 
traditional markets and the collapse of its agro-food system, previously regulated and sustained via state control.
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had bank accounts or used bank services (Karasinska-Fendler 2009).
In the 1990s, the collapse of the state planning system and economic 
reforms resulted in economic distress and the loss of social standards, in 
turn lowering the prices of production factors. EU accession was there-
fore considered a means to improve substantially the position of the CEEC 
since they would be granted unrestricted access to the common market 
and would be able to benefit from Community policies aiming at redis-
tribution, such as the CAP, cohesion, and structural funds. At the end of 
the 1990s, interests groups in the EU-15 fearing the negative externalities 
of enlargement began to pressure their national governments to moder-
ate its effects. Through provoking temporal or permanent migration, EU 
enlargement was considered to increase competitive pressures in sectors 
employing semi-skilled labour (the so-called “Polish Plumbers”). Farmers 
in the EU-15 also expected price pressures to increase with enlargement. 
Since CEEC farmers would be entitled to agricultural subsidies, which were 
still largely based on production, overall production would increase, pro-
voking the growth of policy costs and pressures for additional decreases 
in agricultural product prices (Lovec and Erjavec, 2012). With CAP ac-
counting for almost half of the Community’s budget, the governments of 
the countries who contributed to the Community budget (the northern 
Member States), wanted to cap CAP funding. In addition to the recipients 
of CAP funds, the recipients of the structural and cohesion funds (older 
southern Member States), who accounted for an additional one-third of 
the Community budget, were as well concerned that the accession of 
the relatively less developed CEEC would decrease their share in the re-
distribution pie (Bohle, 2003). 
Accession negotiations formally began in 1998-1999. The CEEC were 
under severe pressure to meet the standards of the EU. The acquis 
was “massive”; its implementation was “nonnegotiable, uniform and 
closely enforced”. Furthermore, negotiations were in fact a “little 
more than a process of checking that the candidates have adopted 
the EU law” (Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003: 51). The ability of the 
CEEC to impact the distributional issues was severely constrained. A 
transitional period was provisioned for the free movement of labour.19 
19 The labor migration cannot simply be perceived as a substitute for trade. Cheap labor-based industries are highly 
mobile and produce little positive externalities. In contrast, emigrant remittances have greatly helped the balance of 
payments in some countries (in 2006, they accounted for approximately 5.5% of the GDP in Bulgaria and Romania; 
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The overall direct transfers that the NMS would receive from the EU 
were to be capped at 4% of the recipients’ GDP (Moravcsik and Va-
chudova, 2003: 49). In 1999 the “Agenda 2000” agreement on MAFF 
for the period 2000-2006 established financial ceilings for the financing 
of various community programmes. The Agenda 2000 also introduced 
CAP reform, further decreasing the guaranteed prices on the commu-
nity market and fixing agricultural subsidies (direct compensatory pay-
ments) to historical production levels (Garzon, 2007: 28-9). Candidates 
were pressured to agree on relatively low reference quantities for direct 
farm payments. In addition, direct payments were to be only gradually 
phased-in (reaching full levels only in 2013) (Lovec and Erjavec, 2012). 
In 2002, after more than a year long stall in accession negotiations, dur-
ing which time the older Member States attempted to settle the internal 
distributional issues triggered by the planned enlargement, France and 
Germany reached a general agreement on the 2007-2013 MAFF and 
on the ceilings on the funds available for various community policies 
such as CAP. In October 2002, the Schroeder-Chirac agreement was 
endorsed by the European Council. By the end of 2002, accession nego-
tiations successfully concluded (Lovec and Erjavec, 2012).
The EU financially supported some of the costs related to the imple-
mentation of the acquis. The support that the NMS would receive un-
der the community programs would still be substantial. However, most 
of the costs related to the implementation of the acquis were left 
to the candidate countries. The available supports would be much 
lower than those for previous applicants (e. g. the southern Member 
States). The financial arrangements effectively limited the receipts eli-
gible to the NMS and protected those of the richer existing members 
(Moravsik and Vachudova, 2003: 46, 51). The pillarization of the poli-
cies would further constrain the opportunities available to the NMS.20 
Various structural issues, such as the quality of infrastructure and in-
stitutions, were not properly addressed. Under such terms, the market 
approach towards integration would result in relatively higher eco-
over 2% in the Baltic States; and 1.5% in Poland) (Commission, 2009). In 2009 emigrant remittances still accounted 
for 5% of Romania’s GDP (Filipescu, 2009: 87). 
20 In 2003, a year before the candidates became full members, the CAP was further reformed. The “Fischler Reform” 
decoupled substantial shares of supports from production and strengthened the role of supports based on rural 
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nomic and social costs for the NMS.21 
Following a period of hard political bargaining, candidates could 
hardly count on soft capital such as community norms. A Eurobarom-
eter opinion poll taken in 2002, just as the EU governments were con-
cluding the terms for the 2004 enlargement, found that 41% of EU citi-
zens did not want to know any more information about the candidate 
countries; 76% did not wish to live or work in them; and 91% felt no ties 
of any kind to them. The radicalization of the candidates’ arguments 
would only delay the process. Thus, they accepted the offer as the 
best bargain possible under the given circumstances. The accession 
agreement would still result in an improved net position of various 
interest groups (such as farmers) and countries as a whole (Schrader, 
2000: 238). At the end of the day, the political elites in the NMS tried 
to sell the agreement as a political success.
In the post-accession period, asymmetrical dependence continued 
to exist. During the years immediately following accession, NMS de-
pendency on the EU market reached historically high levels22; in par-
ticular, the larger NMS were highly dependent on the internal EU mar-
ket (Elsig, 2010: 3). During the 2007-2013 MAFF negotiations, the group 
of six net contributors (Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the UK) argued against an EU budget increase beyond 
1% of the EU’s total GDP. Correspondingly, budget recipients tried 
to preserve the allocated shares. The final agreement was closer to 
the position of the net contributors (Thomson 2011: 2), but also some-
how preserved the funds that the individual recipients were granted 
through mechanisms, such as the CAP (Lovec and Erjavec 2011). The 
lowest common denominator agreement on MAFF took the most from 
the NMS, thus highlighting their relative weakness. 
21 The agricultural sector once again illustrates the point. Although accession would improve the financial position of 
the average farmer (Schrader, 2000: 238), enlargement would also result in higher food prices. Finally, the total 
effects would depend on the organization and control over the parts of the agro-food chains (Herok and Lotze, 
2000: 662), where the capital from the EU-15 played a substantial role.
22 For the period 2004-2006 84.6% of Czech; 73.4% of Estonian; 76.5% of Hungarian; 75% of Latvian; 64.9% of 
Lithuanian; 77.8% of Polish; 85.2% of Slovak; and 66.4% of Slovenian trade in goods was intra-European. The 
CEEC’s share in EU-15 trade was, evidently, much smaller.
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Table 3: Economic structure of the CEE-8/10
Member state EU’s GDP share (%) 








Bulgaria 0,23 6,3 32,3 61,4 - 4,1
Cyprus 0,12 2,7 19,2 78 5,1 9,1
Czech 1,03 4,1 37,6 58,3 4,4 12
Estonia 0,12 3 28,5 68,5 5,5 16,8
Hungary 0,82 2,8 31,5 65,7 5,3 25,7
Latvia 0,16 3,3 22 74,7 14,6 4,7
Lithuania 0,22 5,3 33,3 61,4 16,3 5,2
Malta 0,04 2,7 22,3 74,9 2,3 -
Poland 2,5 16,1 29 54,9 17,6 3,3
Romania 0,98 7,9 35,6 56,5 - 4,2
Slovakia 0,44 2,6 33,5 63,9 5,1 4,9
Slovenia 0,27 2 34,4 63,5 9,7 5,2
NMS 6,99 4,9 29,9 65,1 8,6 (CEE10) 
9,8 (CEE8)
9,7 (CEE8)
EU-15 93 2,8 27,2 70 4,8 18
Source: Elsig 2010.
Romania and Bulgaria, which entered the EU in 2007, share rather similar 
experiences with the CEE-8. Following Filipescu (2009: 86), less than two 
years after accession, and in spite of being integrated in all important 
EU structures, “this widespread political representation does not seem to 
have translated into any significant advances on the social front: there 
seems to have been no progress in finding solutions to the major problems 
for Romanians, such as social inclusion or the free movement of Roma-
nian workers in the EU”. 
In 2007-2008 the CAP underwent a so-called Health Check reform. Sever-
al NMS would get the least out of the reformed policy (Lovec and Erjavec, 
2011). The contemporary “greening of the CAP” is in line with the further 
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pillarization of this policy. Seven years after enlargement, self-sufficiency 
shares in several food commodity groups in Member States like Slovenia 
had fallen to historically low levels (close to 30%). When trying to influence 
preparations for the 2014-2020 MAFF, Poland, holders of the rotating presi-
dency, faced political limitations (Jesień, 2011: 21).
Community norms and institutions have clearly influenced particular issues 
where the interests of the new and the older Member States were less clear, 
or where the costs and benefits were dispersed. However, the most highly 
contested issues from the pre- and post-accession periods, including those 
concerning direct redistribution, help illustrate the role of interests and rela-
tive power (dependence), which influence bargaining outcomes. Had the 
two-level game been more symmetrical (as with Germany and France), 
NMS farmers would be able to benefit from the enlargement substantially 
(Moravcsik, 1998: 206-8). Instead, the eligibility of financial supports was 
constrained. The negotiation’s outcome clearly reflected how asymmetry 
in mutual dependence constrained both the opportunities available to 
the individual interest groups involved in the two-level bargaining games, 
and the win-sets available to individual governments.
Finally, asymmetrical dependence also influenced the quality of govern-
ments and other political institutions. Negative integration enabled lower 
compensations than would be required in a multi-level system in which 
stronger vertical and horizontal democratic principles were in place. Thus, 
it further deepened the problem of the EU’s democratic deficit (compare 
with Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007: 4).
c) Convergence in crisis
Through various policies, governments distorted the operation of market forc-
es. However, the (eventually) unconstrained mobility of capital, goods, and 
labour was still considered to facilitate economic growth in NMS, leading 
to economic convergence. Following the Commission (2009), in the period 
2004-2008, NMS grew at an average rate of 5.6% (against the 2.2% average 
growth rate of the older Member States), with Slovakia and the Baltic states 
reaching growth rates as high as 7–10%. It was estimated that joining the EU 
gave the new members an extra annual growth boost of around 1.75 per-
centage points over the period 2000–2008. The economies were converging. 
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Table 4: Growth, Relative GDP pc (EU-27 = 100), employment and inflation
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EU-27 2.5 2.0 3.3 3.2 0.3 -4.4 2.1 
GDP pc (EU= 100)
63.0 63.54 64.4 65.3 65.8 64.5 64.1 
2.0 2.2 2.2 2.3 3.7 1.0 2.1 
EU-15 2.4 1.8 3.1 3 0 -4.4 2.1 
113 113 112 112 111 110 110 
64.8 65.3 66.1 66.8 67.1 65.8 65.4 
*Euro 17 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.6 
Bulgaria 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.2 -5.5 0.4 
35 37 38 40 44 44 43 
54.2 55.8 58.6 61.7 64.0 62.6 59.7 
6.1 6.0 7.4 7.6 12.0 2.5 3.0 
Cyprus 4.2 3.9 4.1 5.1 3.6 -1.9 1.1 
89 91 91 92 99 100 99 
68.9 68.5 69.6 71.0 70.9 69.9 69.7 
1.9 2.0 2.2 2.2 4.4 0.2 2.6 
Czech 4.7 6.8 7 5.1 3.1 -4.7 2.7 
78 79 80 83 81 82 80 
64.2 64.8 65.3 66.1 66.6 65.4 65.0 
2.6 1.6 2.1 3.0 6.3 0.6 1.2 
Estonia 6.3 8.9 10.1 7.5 -3.7 -14.3 2.3 
57 62 66 70 69 64 64 
63.0 64.4 68.1 69.4 69.8 63.5 61.0 
3.0 4.1 4.4 6.7 10.6 0.2 2.7 
Hungary 4.8 4 3.9 0.1 0.9 -6.8 1.3 
63 63 63 62 64 65 65 
56.8 56.9 57.3 57.3 56.7 55.4 55.4 
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6.8 3.5 4.0 7.9 6.0 4.0 4.7 
Latvia 8.9 10.1 11.2 9.6 -3.3 -17.7 -0.3 
46 48 51 56 56 51 51 
62.3 63.3 66.3 68.3 68.6 60.9 59.3 
6.2 6.9 6.6 10.1 15.3 3.3 -1.2 
Lithuania 7.4 7.8 7.8 9.8 2.9 -14.8 1.4 
51 53 56 59 61 55 57 
61.2 62.6 63.6 64.9 64.3 60.1 57.8 
1.2 2.7 3.8 5.8 11.1 4.2 1.2 
Malta -0.5 3.7 3.1 4.4 4.1 -2.6 2.5 
78 78 76 76 79 82 83 
54.0 53.9 53.6 54.6 55.3 56 56.1 
2.7 2.5 2.6 0.7 4.7 1.8 2.0 
Poland 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.8 5.1 1.6 3.9 
51 51 52 54 56 61 63 
51.7 52.8 54.5 57.0 59.2 59.3 59.3 
3.6 2.2 1.3 2.6 4.2 4.0 2.7 
Romania 8.6 4.2 7.9 6.3 7.3 -6.6 -1.6 
34 35 38 42 47 47 46 
57.7 57.6 58.8 58.8 59.0 58.6 58.8 
11.9 9.1 6.6 4.9 7.9 5.6 6.1 
Slovakia 5.1 6.7 8.3 10.5 5.8 -4.9 4.2 
57 60 63 68 73 73 74 
57.0 57.7 59.4 60.7 62.3 60.2 58.8 
7.5 2.8 4.3 1.9 3.9 0.9 0.7 
Slovenia 4.4 4.0 5.8 6.9 3.6 -8 1.4 
87 87 88 88 91 87 85 
65.3 66.0 66.6 67.8 68.6 67.5 66.2
3.7 2.5 2.5 3.8 5.5 0.9 2.1 
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Legend: 
 - First row: GDP real. Grey colour: below EU-15 average.
 - Second row GDP pc PPS (EU-27= 100). Black colour: stall or decline 
in GDP pc gap.
 - Third row: employment rate in age group 15-64. Black colour: sharp-
er unemployment rise than in the EU-15. 
 - Forth row: inflation: Annual average rate of change in Harmonized 
Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs). Light grey colour: above EU-15 
average. Dark grey colour: above domestic growth.
* 2010 is the last year for which the consolidated data is available for all the indicators listed. 
Data: Eurosta
With the financial and economic crisis reaching a tipping point in 2008, 
growth trends have since reversed. Being relatively small and open econo-
mies dependant on the EU market, the NMS have essentially ‘imported’ the 
crisis. However, compared with the EU-15 average, all of the NMS, with the 
exceptions of Malta and Poland, faced a much higher decline in econom-
ic activity (Table 4, first row). The convergence gap, measured in terms of 
GDP per capita (accommodated with PPS) relative to the EU-27 average, 
increased for all of the NMS but Poland and Malta (Table 4, second row).
The depth of the crisis in the NMS (as well as in other peripheral countries 
such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece) highlighted the fragility of post-
accession growth. Following Inotai (2009: 93-4), the effects produced by 
liberalizing trade between the EU and its candidate countries largely took 
place before 2002. During the period 2004-2008, accession-related posi-
tive expectations and the declining prices of money provoked domestic 
and foreign (capital) investment growth in the NMS. The depth of the cri-
sis demonstrated that much of that growth was, in fact, inflated. At the 
advent of the crisis, foreign capital quickly diminished in NMS countries. 
The NMS (with Hungary being the extreme example) faced tremendous 
current account deficits. The private sector subsequently transferred the 
economic burden onto the labour market and banks. Private crediting 
came to a halt. In all of the NMS, unemployment grew at faster rates than 
in the EU-15 (Table 4, third row).23 In order to prevent a further deepening 
23 The crisis affected the market of migrant work, provoking a decline in remittances. The European Commission has 
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of the economic and social crisis, state authorities continued to spend by 
increasing public debt. Soon, they faced the reality of weakened credit 
ratings and the growing ‘price’ of money. In spite of these contractions, 
all countries faced considerable real prices growth (Table 4, fourth row), 
which pointed to problems inherent in the current market structures.
Due to unequal economic trends in various parts of the eurozone, the euro-
zone crisis was inevitable; however, non-eurozone NMS also felt the impact 
of market asymmetries.24 The governments of the richer Member States pres-
sured poorer members to accept fiscal austerity measures by decreasing 
wages and social standards in order to meet market forces (and remain in 
the eurozone). The alternative solution, now only beginning to be discussed, 
is a further multi-speed division of the EU. Poorer members have tried to bar-
gain for some burden-sharing. Meanwhile, the depth of the crisis has begun 
to challenge the economic and political sustainability of the eurozone. Fol-
lowing Inotai (2011: 56), in Germany and France, fiscal consolidation would 
require 20 years of sustained growth. To match these figures, NMS growth 
would have to be approximately 3-5% in order to absorb the available la-
bour (as opposed to 2% in the more developed Member States). It is not yet 
clear whether governments will be open to economic reforms, or even if 
such reforms would actually facilitate more sustainable growth levels. 
5. Discussion: We Got in. Now What?
“We are all swimming in the same Central European pot … We are a stack 
of small and insignificant countries – and therefore we should cooperate 
… None of us can make big leaps alone.” (Karel Scwarzenberg, Foreign 
Minister of the Czech Republic, in Kořán 2011: 66)
EU accession was considered a substantial benefit for the CEEC. They 
would gain decision-making powers; Community norms and policies 
would influence distributional issues; and market forces would facilitate 
allowed Spain to put limitations on the inflow of workers from Romania.
24 The eurozone crisis is not the problem of a common currency per se, but rather the problem of a common market 
(obstacles to the mobility, problems of economic structures, institutions, unharmonized taxes and economic policies).
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economic convergence. Expectations depicting the EU as a “free lunch” 
of sorts were underpinned by rational and normative institutional theory 
of enlargement (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002). The explana-
tion of the accession-related issues proposed in this article is based on 
LIG (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009). Our main argument is that 
decision-making powers are still constrained by other powers possessed 
by the national governments. Distributional issues are determined by in-
dividual interests and power (dependence) asymmetries. Finally, con-
vergence depends on economic structures and the ability of individual 
governments to influence economic processes. The empirical evidence 
presented in this article supports the LIG-based explanation. In addition, 
the study supports the already-established argument that further theoreti-
cal and empirical effort is needed in order to reach more comprehensive 
explanations of EU enlargement (Faber, 2009), and as well as that various 
implications of EU accession have not yet been properly assessed from 
the perspective of the NMS (Kajnč, 2009).
The following outlines some of the practical conclusions regarding the po-
sition of the NMS that can be drawn from this research. Following Moravc-
sik (1998), De Gaulle once said that although he likes to share his drink 
with his friends, he likes to drink from his own glass. The CEEC may have 
considered accession as an end to traditional interstate politics, a sys-
tem that would be replaced by technocratic governance embedded in 
Community norms. If the ‘real powers’ that the governments possess are 
still the most important determinant of cooperative decision-making, the 
NMS should, in order to strengthen their position, engage in a closer co-
operation amongst each other and with other Member States; here they 
could define shared priorities and form strategic coalitions. Second, the 
problem of asymmetrical dependence can be tackled through diversifi-
cation and a spatial dispersion of economic activities and partnerships. 
Strategic alliances with non-Member States can also be forged. In addi-
tion, governments should not leave the strategies related to long-term 
economic development to the markets. Third, convergence is still more 
likely if a country stays with the core group of EU Member States; although 
this would require strong political consent and careful long-term planning 
of economic reforms. 
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Abstract
Hungary’s centre-right government has increasingly demonstrated a strong interest in strengthening 
both its political and economic ties with China. On the one hand, Budapest’s determination results 
from the country’s acute need to locate new sources of investment for its weakened economy. On 
the other, however, the movement east is strongly connected with the ruling party’s distant attitude 
to western organizations and its perception of the rising global importance of central Europe. This 
article shall outline how Hungary has been implementing its more active foreign policy towards 
China and the likelihood of success.
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1. Introduction
Since its formation in May 2010, the Viktor Orbán stewarded centre-right 
government in Hungary has made enhanced Asian ties a cornerstone of 
its foreign policy. The strategy for the eastern shift was first presented in 
a November 2010 meeting with members of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zsolt Németh, explained 
Hungary’s movement toward Asia as the result of the eastern continent’s 
growing global significance; he noted, “The future of the world economy 
and politics seems to be increasingly inclined to Asia, therefore both Hun-
gary and the European Union should consider deepening relations with 
this region as their primary interest” (HVG, 2010). Németh listed Japan, 
South Korea, and China as Hungary’s primary Asian partners; however, 
over the last two years, Budapest’s diplomatic efforts have increasingly 
concentrated on reinforcing its contacts with a much larger share of the 
continent: from northeast Asia through central Asia and Transcaucasia, to 
the Persian Gulf. Between 2010 and 2012 high official missions headed by 
the prime minister, president, the speaker of the National Assembly, and 
a host of government ministers have included visits to Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Brunei, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, 
Thailand, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan, as well as 
multiple trips to Russia and China. The new weight affixed to the govern-
ment’s eastern interests has since provoked criticism that such a policy 
already enjoys an equal status with Hungary’s three traditional foreign 
policy aims established in the beginning of the 1990s (Kałan, 2011)27, and 
as well maintains a firm conceptual footing – the so-called “Eastern wind 
doctrine”. The latter stems from Orbán’s November 2010 speech, where 
he stated that, “Hungary is anchored in western waters, but the wind in a 
world economy blows from the East” (Index, 2010). 
27 The three traditional priorities of Hungary’s foreign policy are: European integration (and building a strong position 
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2. Orbán and China: No more idealism 
Because of its political, economic, military, and demographic potential, 
China is Hungary’s most important Asian partner. Although it is the cur-
rent Fidesz-KDNP government that placed China at the top of Hungary’s 
foreign policy agenda, the policy is actually a revival of bilateral rela-
tions previously enacted by the left-wing governments headed by Péter 
Medgyessy (2002-04), Ferenc Gyurcsány (2004-09), and Gordon Bajnai 
(2009-10). Rapprochement began in August 2003, when Medgyessy be-
came the first Hungarian PM since 1959 to visit Beijing. Afterward, his two 
successors also held official visits to China (including three visits by Gyurc-
sány). China has reciprocated in kind, sending both the General Secre-
tary of the Communist Party of China, Hu Jintao (2004), as well as Vice 
President Xi Jinping (2009). As a result, educational contacts (a Hungari-
an-Chinese Bilingual Elementary School opened in Budapest in Septem-
ber 2004), and cultural contacts (the Confucius Institute in Budapest was 
established in December 2006; a Hungarian Season exposition was held 
in China in 2007-08) have significantly deepened. Among other achieve-
ments during this period include the arrival of a Bank of China branch 
office to Budapest (2003), and the initiation of a direct flight connection 
between Budapest and Beijing (2004). That same year marked the begin-
ning of an increase in trade between the two countries. Trade volume 
tripled in 2004 over the previous year (from 1.2 billion USD (2003) to 3.3 bil-
lion USD in 2004). Since then, economic cooperation has grown annually, 
peaking in 2008 at 7.2 billion USD (KSH, 2012). Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Hungary rose in 2010 to around 460 million USD, which accounts for 
more than half of all Chinese investments in central Europe (CEED, 2012).
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Table 2:
Chinese investments in Central Europe,            
2006-2010 (mln USD)








Source: Central and Eastern Europe Development Institute.
Rapprochement between Hungary and China in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, which has periodically assumed the form of uncriti-
cal admiration from the Hungarian side28, may be explained by both the 
28 Quite typical for the Left’s attitude towards China was the opinion of former-PM Gyurcsány, who wrote in 2009: 
“China is fascinating! I have no doubts, that in [the] next few decades the country will rise […] In China nothing is 
for free. One has to pay for health system, schools… There is no one general pension system for everyone. In China 
there is order, at least in comparison with many European states. Everyone, with whom I spoke - whether it was 
supporter of communists or not - claimed that without [the] one-party system and without “market communists” there 
would not be neither (sic) order nor success in China”.
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reinforcement of China’s position in global politics and Hungary’s new-
found attractiveness since its accession to the European Union in 2004. An 
additional factor stems from social and historical ties. Among all central 
European countries, Hungary has the largest population of Chinese di-
aspora. Officially, between 10,000 and 15,000 Chinese make their home 
in Hungary, which represents nearly 0.2 percent of the country’s popula-
tion29. Moreover, both Hungary and China retain fond memories of mutual 
cooperation after World War II (Szunomár 1, 2011), and recall – not insig-
nificantly – the Asian roots of the Hungarian nation (Matura, 2011). 
While the Hungarian left’s pro-active attitude towards communist China 
was understandable, the current involvement of the centre-right Fidesz is 
rather surprising given the past behaviour of its leadership. In 1989, Orbán, 
then a young democratic activist, organized a public protest in Budapest 
against the Tiananmen Square massacre. Ideological differences were 
also among the reasons why Hungary’s ties to China were considerably 
distant during Orbán’s first term as PM (1998-02). In December 2000, the 
Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, János Martonyi, signed a common 
declaration of friendly relations between the two countries (MFA, 2000); 
however, in that same year, the government in Budapest made several 
gestures which could be interpreted as confrontational. Notably, the Hun-
garian consulate in Shanghai was closed (Népszava, 2010), and after-
wards Orbán held a half-hour meeting with the Dalai Lama in Budapest 
(Orbán.hu, 2000). In addition, while serving as the opposition following the 
2002 parliamentary elections, Fidesz’s position on China was rather unen-
thusiastic. Such an attitude reflected the influence of the dissident experi-
ences of the centre-right movements during the 1990’s, particularly with 
regard to foreign policy, which placed the promotion of human rights 
and civil freedoms above economic interests when determining relations 
with non-democratic states.
Immediately prior to the 2010 elections, Orbán began opting for more 
flexibility with China. During the campaign the two dominant Hungarian 
political parties, Fidesz and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP), equally 
demonstrated a vaster interest in the Asian power. Ildikó Lendvai, then a 
leader within MSzP, was in Beijing at the beginning of March 2010, mere 
29 The large number of Chinese first appeared in Hungary in the early 1990s. This was facilitated by the governments’ 
abolition of visas for citizens of China, a policy which lasted between 1988 and 1992. Currently, the majority of 
Chinese live in Budapest and its surroundings, as well as in border towns: Nyíregyháza and Szeged.
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weeks before the first round of elections (Gondola, 2010). One month later 
the left-wing government’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Balázs, opened 
a new Hungarian general consulate in Chongqing (Népszava, 2010). Fur-
ther, Orbán as the leader of the opposition in autumn and winter 2009 
made two extended trips abroad: to Russia and China, respectively. As a 
result of the latter, political relations between Fidesz and the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) were officially established (Népszabadság, 2010).
The current Fidesz-KDNP government’s resignation from a value-based 
foreign policy towards a position more characteristic of realpolitik is a 
pragmatic response to the same global trends that have made China 
a centre of international political and economic capital. Moreover, the 
pressure to shift has been vastly heightened by Hungary’s unstable eco-
nomic condition, and its acute need to locate new sources of investment. 
Notably, it was only two months after his landslide 2010 victory that Orbán 
decided to cease loan extension talks with the International Monetary 
Fund, and begin a firmer rhetoric against Hungary’s political depend-
ence on the EU. As such, stronger and – as evidenced by the trade figures 
between 2004 and 2010 – economically beneficial relations with China 
began to be considered a key opportunity for economic recovery for a 
weakening Hungary, which to reiterate had just previously ended discus-
sions for more western funds. The move reveals Orbán’s behaviour as a 
classic realpolitik: instead of seeking closer cooperation with an organiza-
tion in the midst of a deep economic crisis, he developed contacts with 
an increasing global power. The latter notably did not impose any politi-
cal commitments on his country and showed no interest in the domestic 
transformations made by his government. 
3. China’s hub in Central Europe? Budapest’s dreams 
of power
Upon seizing power in 2010, Hungary’s centre-right government did not 
want to dismiss the inroads paved by its predecessors and vigorously 
sought to maintain enhanced relations with China. In August 2010, the 
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Deputy PM, Zsolt Semjén, met in Beijing with his Chinese counterpart (Hun-
garian Spectrum, 2010); two months later, Orbán himself visited Shang-
hai to attend the closing ceremony of the World Expo, where the Hun-
garian pavilion received the silver medal for excellence. With regard to 
the World Expo, the new PM’s interest was quite unexpected, since as 
the leader of the opposition he strongly criticized the previous left-wing 
government for investing too much money on the pavilion’s promotion. 
Orbán’s presence in Shanghai enabled him to set up meetings at the 
highest political level, as well as experience firsthand China’s economic 
success story30. The intensive round of meetings during Fidesz-KDNP’s first 
year in power was further enhanced by the Minister of National Devel-
opment, Tamás Fellegi, who along with Hungarian entrepreneurs, held a 
series of consultations with Chinese officials, bankers, and businessmen in 
December 2010 and March 2011. A further symbolic sign of a change in 
Fidesz’s policy towards China occurred when Orbán refused to meet with 
the Dalai Lama in September 2010 (Ballad, 2010). By the onset of 2011, 
China and Hungary’s political relationship had strengthened so rapidly 
that Hungary was now considered China’s third – just after Greece and 
Portugal – potential “foothold in Europe” (FN24, 2010).
In the ensuing year, Hungary’s policy toward China continued. During 
Hungary’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union (January – 
June 2011), the Royal Palace of Gödöllő hosted the prestigious Asia–Eu-
rope Meeting (ASEM) in June 2011 with the participation of foreign affairs 
ministers from many Asian states, including China. Yet the central point 
in bilateral contacts over the last two years occurred on 24th June, 2011, 
when Wen Jiabao became the first Chinese PM since 1987 to visit Hun-
gary, The date was notable in that it was just one week prior to the end 
of Hungary’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Moreover, 
Jiabao’s trip started in Budapest, before visiting Berlin and London. One 
could argue that China’s unique relationship with Hungary was empha-
sized by this order. Additionally, China and Hungary finalized several eco-
nomic agreements during the visit, with the latter promising to provide 
a 1 billion EUR loan (Hungarian Spectrum, 2011), which further allowed 
Hungarian commentators to highlight the special significance of the Sino-
Hungarian relationship. Stressing the importance of his Chinese guests, 
30 In Shanghai Orbán met with his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao, and visited local factory of Huawei and ZTE, 
the largest China-based networking and telecommunications equipment suppliers. 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XV
III (66) - 2012
66
Orbán invited his counterpart for a morning walk along the Danube and 
even accompanied him on the road to the airport (Szunomár 2, 2011). 
The host government also took care to quell all anti-Chinese protests dur-
ing the visit (Politics.hu, 2011).
Such a vast increase in contacts with China was not only justified as an 
economic boon to Hungary, but a strategic one as well. In the vision of a 
post-crisis world promoted by Orbán, China is viewed as one of the new 
global centres, along with central Europe (defined as the area from the 
Baltic Sea to the Adriatic Sea), which in terms of economic importance 
will soon replace western European countries. In June 2011, during the 
China–Central and Eastern European Countries Economic and Trade Fo-
rum, also held in Budapest, the Hungarian PM praised Chinese leaders for 
their “loyalty to a few principles, which we here in the West have turned 
our backs on in recent times” (Orbán 1, 2011). Among them he listed: 
moderation in consumption, ennoblement of work, and reluctance to in-
debtedness, which was even likened to “sin”. Orbán further paralleled the 
Chinese and Hungarian viewpoint on the global economic crisis: “China 
and Hungary understand the new world; we understand its new rules and 
simple truths. Both our countries have firmly committed themselves to a 
value creating, work based economy”. Since then, Orbán has consist-
ently made reference to his concept of the two new global poles, includ-
ing at a meeting at the London School of Economics in November 2011 
(Orbán 2, 2011).
Orbán’s strategy has not only strengthened the foundation for Chinese-
Hungarian economic relations, but has also enhanced the image of 
Hungary as a faithful partner, which could become China’s gateway 
to central Europe. Hungary aspires to become a regional leader, which 
has lead to a quiet central European competition for Beijing’s attention. 
When the Chinese state company Covec unexpectedly withdrew from 
a highway A2 construction project in Poland in June 2011, the Hungarian 
media linked the decision to Wen Jiabao’s visit to Budapest, which took 
place at the same time (HVG, 2011). In January 2012, however, it was Po-
land, a country much less committed to China that signed an agreement 
on a bilateral “strategic partnership” with China. Hungary’s disappoint-
ment might be understandable, since there had previously been no other 
country in central Europe as openly enthusiastic about increased coop-
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eration with Beijing. Orbán is perhaps the only European leader opining 
that relations with China should be defined as a “new alliance of primary 
importance”. His uncritical approach to China and public statements on 
the stability and security of Chinese investments in Europe aim to both 
draw Beijing’s attention toward Hungary’s loyalty, as well as enhance the 
overall character of Chinese diplomacy in the EU (Godement, 2011). In 
fact, experts have argued that Orbán’s failure to mention both human 
rights and Tibet, and his overwhelming posturing of the two countries’ 
shared political goals, suggests that he is something of a spokesman for 
China in Europe.
Table 3:
Source: Chinese Central Statistical Office.
4. Unfulfilled Relationship: The Results of Hungary’s 
China Campaign (2010-12)
Although Hungarian leaders have presented a strong commitment to 
strengthened political relations with China, their efforts have not amount-
ed to the expected economic benefits. In 2010 and 2011, the value of 
Hungary’s trade with China amounted to 8.6 and 7.2 billion USD respec-
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tively31. While the 2010 figure represents a record high, it is actually the 
continuation of year-on-year growth. According to unofficial Chinese sta-
tistics, China has invested between 2 and 2.5 billion USD in Hungary over 
the last two years; however, half of it (1.25 billion USD) derived from one 
company, Wanhua Industrial Group, which in June 2010 became a strate-
gic investor in a Hungarian chemical producer, BorsodChem, and in Feb-
ruary 2011 acquired full control over it. In the fall of 2011, some claimed 
that China purchased a small number of Hungarian state bonds, but no 
detailed information has since been given. Twice – in June 2011 and April 
2012 – Chinese leaders, Wen Jiabao and Li Keqiang, promised to pro-
vide Hungary with a loan for development projects; to date, however, the 
money has not been transferred. 
Moreover, the major infrastructure investment plans, which were prior-
itized by the Hungarian government, remain unimplemented. Orbán has 
repeatedly encouraged Chinese investors to invest in the downtown-
to-Ferenc Liszt International Airport high-speed train connection, which 
would initiate a close cooperation between Hungarian State Railways 
MÁV Zrt and the China Railway Construction Corporation. Yet the future 
of this project has been negatively impacted by the bankruptcy of Hun-
gary’s national airlines, Malév, in February 2012. The bankruptcy has result-
ed in the temporary closure of Terminal 1 and the suspension of expensive 
direct flights between Budapest and Beijing. Hence, a high-speed train 
has lost its economic importance for China. Further, with the reopening of 
direct flights between Warsaw and Beijing, Poland – a much larger and 
more economically stable country than Hungary – has signalled its willing-
ness to cooperate with China. 
Orbán also believed that China would come to the aid of Malév, which 
bankrupted in the wake of an EU competition law case32. Yet negotiations 
conducted between Hainan Airlines and the Hungarian government, with 
the participation of one of the most prominent businessmen in Hungary, 
Sándor Demjan, were not successful. While it remains unclear why China 
did not purchase the collapsing Malév, one of the prevailing opinions is 
31 This figure is according to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office; however, it does not match Chinese data. The 
latter claims that the value of trade volume for 2011 was approximately 9.0 billion USD.
32 The idea of China’s investment in Málev originated during the mandates of previous left-wing governments. Orbán, 
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that the Chinese were only interested in a majority stake acquisition, and 
Hungarians had doubts if such a purchase would violate EU regulations. 
Further adding to Hungary’s infrastructure woes, the ambitious project of 
the Eurasian railroad line Záhony-Korgas, which would connect Hungary, 
Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan and China, will not be realized in the near 
future. If such an initiative were to be successfully completed, Hungary 
would quite literary become China’s gateway to Europe. Instead, China 
appears more committed to the corridor China-Russia-Ukraine-Slovakia-
Austria, which already is slightly more advanced. Due to a number of in-
frastructural difficulties, the rail line would bypasses Hungary altogether.
The modest results of the Sino-Hungarian rapprochement in 2010-12 can in 
part be explained by the lack of a clear Chinese strategy towards Europe. 
Moreover, Hungary’s poor economic health and confrontational policy 
towards western organizations did little to improve upon the proposed 
partnership. One can further argue that Chinese investors prioritized coun-
tries by their ability to stave off economic crisis and remain stable, rather 
than those which maintained a loyal political rhetoric. In fact, the Chinese 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Song Tao, remarked in Budapest in April 
2012 before a visibly unsettled Orbán that it is always favourable to have 
a predictable and stable partner with whom to cooperate33. The pattern 
of China’s relations with Hungary suggests that China is not interested in 
becoming an alternative pole for dissident EU states, but rather seeks to 
engage with stable and well-integrated countries. The EU may as well be 
concerned with the growth of bilateralism between individual Member 
States and large external powers; however, the Sino-Hungarian relation-
ship reveals that it is the maintenance of good relations with other EU 
states that makes a country attractive to Chinese investment.
With respect to Hungary’s political efforts, it should be further noted that 
the centre-right government has over the previous two years made sev-
eral missteps as a result of its misunderstanding of Chinese politics and cul-
ture. The position of a Special Commissioner for Hungarian–Chinese Eco-
nomic Relations was not only kept but upgraded within the government; 
however, the position was not reasonably filled34. In order to highlight 
33 Speech by Song Tao at the China-Central and Eastern Europe Symposium, 12 April 2012. Own notes
34 When the left was in power there was a similar position in the government; however, these existed at much lower 
political levels. Over a period 2006-10 András Huszty, an economist and the former general director of Málev, 
was the Commissioner for Hungarian-Chinese Economic Relations and Coordination.
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the importance of bilateral ties, two members of the government were in 
charge of relations with China: the Minister of National Economy, Györ-
gy Matolcsy (2010; and again since 2012), and the Minister of National 
Development, Támas Fellegi (2010-2011), who was even nicknamed “Mr 
China” by the Hungarian media (Matura, 2011). Yet surprisingly neither 
made Sino-Hungarian relations a priority. According to unofficial sources, 
the Chinese did not really know with whom they should communicate. 
Bilateral communication became even more strained, when for consecu-
tive weeks the Commissioner position remained vacant after Fellegi as-
sumed responsibility to negotiate with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Further, Orbán’s government gave little attention to the develop-
ment of person-to-person contacts, a crucial priority for China, e.g. the 
establishment of scholarship programs for students and young research-
ers. Between 2010 and 2012 several economic and cultural goals were 
achieved35; however, their scale is nowhere near comparable to the 
political efforts put into strengthening bilateral relations. It is not surprising 
that during another visit to Beijing in November 2011, Fellegi impatiently 
explained that the time is right to implement projects, which until then had 
only been discussed (SEW, 2011).
The limited performance with regard to the above is not the only cause for 
modest gains made between the two countries. China’s strategy towards 
Europe has yet to fully crystallize; Central-Eastern Europe in the near future 
may play a more significant role in EU-China relations. In fact, according 
to Wen Jiabao, the region will eventually become a “Chinese gateway” 
(Rodier, 2012). Just recently other central European states have also put 
forth efforts to generate interest from China. Such programs, however, 
may not necessarily be detrimental for Hungary as it is more practical for 
Beijing to be involved with a range of states in the region rather than just 
one. In April 2012, during the China–Central Europe–Poland Economic Fo-
rum in Warsaw, Wen Jiabao promised to establish a special credit line of 
10 billion USD for infrastructure and technology to the whole region (Baj/
Bielecki, 2012). Previous China–Central Europe summits organized in Hun-
gary in June 2011 and in April 2012 (Symposium) did not result in such high-
volume declarations. It is also noticeable that in the first half of 2012, Or-
bán’s attitude has become increasingly conciliatory towards both the EU 
35 For instance, at the University of Miskolc, a China Center was established in April 2012. In the same month it was 
announced that Huawei Technologies agreed to establish its European Logistics Centre in Hungary.
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and the IMF, with which Hungary reopened stand-by-credit negotiations. If 
this trend is to remain, it could result in the gradual restoration of economic 
stability which would positively impact Hungary’s relationship with the Chi-
nese. In 2012 the Orbán government seems keen to maintain continuity 
in reinforcing Chinese-Hungarian political contacts. In April Li Keqiang, the 
Chinese Deputy PM and next head of the government visited Budapest 
where a series of investment and co-operative agreements were signed 
(Index, 2012). Orbán also plans to visit Beijing in the second half of 2012. In 
sum, China is poised to remain a focal point of Hungary’s foreign policy. 
5. Conclusions
1. Between May 2010 and May 2012 Hungary was the only country in 
central Europe to present a clear, open, and uncritical interest in 
strengthening relations with China. Such an interest was visible in Or-
bán’s rhetoric, as well as in the number of contacts established at the 
highest political levels. The interest in China stemmed from both the 
poor national and regional economic conditions and the governing 
party’s sceptical attitude concerning the future of the European Un-
ion. With regard to the former, Hungary has definitively new sources 
of investment for its weakened economy. The latter, however, is con-
nected with the more general vision of the evolution of international 
relations in the aftermath of the global economic crisis. According to 
the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, both central Europe and 
Asia in the long term will become the beneficiaries of economic crisis 
because of the expected decline of the former economic centres 
in western Europe, i.e. the establishment of new economic poles will 
become necessary.
2. Despite the strong political commitment exerted by Hungarian lead-
ers, their efforts have not brought about the expected results. The pri-
mary obstacle for Hungary is most likely its current political and eco-
nomic situation. Orbán’s confrontational policy towards the west, his 
distrust in markets, and Hungary’s unstable economic situation (e.g. 
the bankruptcy of Malév) revealed the Chinese investors’ position 
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on Budapest to be decidedly lukewarm. China, on the other hand, 
failed to fulfil its promise to provide Hungary a much needed loan 
and purchase its state bonds. The positive trade figures in 2010 and 
2011 can be explained by the development of economic contacts 
established between 2003 and 2010. Orbán’s left-wing predecessors 
are responsible for enhancing economic, cultural, and educational 
ties with China, making Hungary the only country in central Europe 
to experience a fruitful cooperation with Beijing in the first decade of 
the 21st Century.
3. Although the Fidesz-KDNP government failed to capitalize on its part-
nership towards China during the first two-years of its mandate, it is 
likely that in the near future China will become more active in cen-
tral Europe which will benefit Hungary. Therefore, in order to achieve 
their aims, Hungarian leaders should on the one hand continue to 
encourage Chinese politicians and investors to draw more attention 
to Hungary, and on the other, soften their policy towards the EU and 
the IMF, bearing in mind that stability and effectiveness in combating 
economic crisis are held in high esteem in Beijing.
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Abstract
The global financial crisis has revealed structural weaknesses within Serbia’s economic and social 
systems, which have heightened concerns for their long-term sustainability. The crisis has also been 
accompanied by a sharp decline in the national GDP, the deterioration of the national labour market, 
an increase in poverty rates, and adverse social consequences commonly pinned to economic frailty. 
Short-term measures to mitigate the negative effects of the crisis have only partially succeeded. 
Serbian social reforms in the previous decade incorporated profound changes to the state’s pension 
and health care systems, unemployment protections, social welfare, etc. National social policies 
have likewise been reformed under the broader framework of European harmonization and the 
country’s orientation towards EU accession. Yet the underwhelming results in all areas of social 
reform suggest that Serbia continues to fall further behind EU standards – a fact which has only 
intensified since the crisis began. 
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Significant political, economic, and social problems followed the so-called 
period of transition in Serbia. In the aftermath of the “democratic changes” 
in 2000, progress has been made in terms of macroeconomic stability, eco-
nomic reform, and standards of living. The 2008 global financial crisis, how-
ever, halted economic growth trends, resulting in decreased production, 
reduced exports and foreign investments, severely aggravating labour 
market conditions and increasing levels of poverty. The crisis has also nega-
tively affected the privatization process for remaining public companies, 
cancelled various concession agreements, brought forth permanent insol-
vency for many companies, and raised the level of unemployment.
Initial estimates concerning the impact of the global financial crisis sug-
gest that the national situation varied from the more optimistic to warn-
ings about the need to prepare state intervention packages. Confronted 
with the problems surrounding the repayment of public debt, high infla-
tion, and large budgetary deficits, the Serbian government adopted anti-
crisis measures as a means to stabilize the financial sector, ensure eco-
nomic liquidity, and promote economic development. In 2009 funds for 
the repayment of overdue loans intended to reduce the negative effects 
of the crisis were provided during negotiations with international financial 
institutions (the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development). 
After a short period of recovery in 2010, Serbia succumbed to a new wave 
of recession and crisis. As a result, the government prepared a document 
featuring a new model for economic growth, which aimed to increase in-
vestments, reduce public spending, strengthen industry, and raise exports. 
In line with the Strategy “Europe 2020”, a similar report entitled “Serbia 
2020”39 was produced by the Serbian government in late 2010, envisag-
ing increased employment, investments in education, poverty reduction, 
and the mitigation of social exclusion.
39 “Serbia 2020”: The concept of development of the Republic of Serbia by 2020 was presented in December 2010 
by the Prime Minister and Vice-President of the Government in charge of European Integration. The main intention 
of the authors of the document was to coordinate Serbia’s social-economic and political objectives with the EU. 
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The transition processes in Serbia were followed by an overhaul of the 
social system with a view to overcoming enduring problems and building 
a sustainable financial model. The crisis has now actualized the need for 
reviewing the results of the neo-liberal changes made in the provision of 
basic social rights and creating an adequate institutional framework.
2. Transition trends and effects of the global eco-
nomic crisis 
The socialist transition in Serbia was a phased process. The first period 
(“blocked transformation”) is characteristic of the 1990s, while the first 
decade of the twenty-first century (“de-blocked transformation”) is con-
sidered the actual beginning of the transition process. 
The first wave of political and economic changes in Serbia occurred si-
multaneously with the crisis in the former-Yugoslavia, which resulted in the 
disintegration of the federation and the creation of several independent 
states made up of its former republics. War, sanctions by the United Na-
tions (1992), and economic crisis led to a decline in GDP, unprecedented 
inflation (1993), a constant decimation of wages (from 5 to 10 German 
Marks per month), increased unemployment and poverty, and near-eco-
nomic collapse. During the 1990s, Serbia survived on reserves, the has-
tened printing and redistribution of currency, and the disappearing hope 
that international sanctions would soon end. NATO’S 1999 bombing of 
Serbia, the destruction of industrial, infrastructural, and civilian facilities, 
the large number of fatalities, and military defeat accelerated the pro-
cess of political reform.
Following the “democratic changes” of 2000, a brief period of optimism 
took hold based on the easily given promises of resolving problems quick-
ly and securing a European future for Serbia. The new government pre-
pared a package of reform proposals aimed at “creating a real market 
economy” and “strong social policy”; these would nevertheless help the 
transition’s losers confront the difficulties of economic reconstruction and 
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ensure a minimum living standard. Domestic and foreign trade were lib-
eralized, companies and banks were privatized, and the tax system and 
public finances underwent a period of transformation. Dynamic GDP 
growth, as well as price and foreign exchange rate stability were soon re-
alized alongside the continued growth of foreign reserves. By the middle 
of 2008, however, economic growth curtailed. 
Positive trends achieved between 2001 and 2008 were the result of sound 
economic policy; the primary objectives were to maintain macro-econom-
ic stability and achieve higher rates of economic growth. “One of the transi-
tion characteristics of the Serbian economy has been a mismatch between 
production and consumption, i.e. consistently higher levels of consumption 
from production (about 20%). The consequence of this disparity was reflect-
ed in the growing trade deficit, which influenced the growth of the current 
account deficit. The structure of the use of GDP was characterized by high 
share of personal consumption and insignificant share of investments into 
fixed assets, as well as of exports of goods and services. High share of ag-
gregate personal consumption was affected by the growth of real wages 
(which was higher than the labour productivity growth), pensions, loans as 
well as remittances from abroad” (Ministarstvo finansija, 2012: 55).
Table 1 – Macroeconomic Trends 2001-2010
2001 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP, in bil.EUR 12.8 19.0 28.5 32.7 28.9 28.6
GDP, real growth in % 5.3 9.3 5.4 3.8 -3.5 1.8
Inflation, end of year 40.7 13.7 10.1 6.8 6.6 10.3
Average exchange rate 
RSD/EUR 59.78 72.70 79.96 81.44 93.95 102.94
Current account deficit, 
as % GDP 2.2 -13.8 -17.7 -21.6 -7.2 -7.3
Direct foreign invest-
ments, as % GDP 1.4 4.1 6.4 5.6 4.8 3.0
Reserves of the National 
Bank of
Serbia, in bil. EUR
1.33 3.13 9.66 8.19 10.6 10.00
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Fiscal deficit, in % GDP -0.5 0.7 -1.9 -2.6 -4.5 -4.6
Public debt, in % GDP 104.8 50.9 30.8 26.3 32.9 41.4
Foreign debt, in % GDP 85.5 49.8 60.2 64.6 77.9 83.5
Private foreign debt, in 
% GDP 5.5 11.5 38.1 44.6 51.0 51.6
Source: Ministarstvo finansija, 2011.
GDP growth in the pre-crisis period was enhanced by the development of 
the service industry, particularly the financial sector, while the contribution 
of heavy industry was considerably modest. The inflation rate decreased 
from 40.7% in 2001 to 6.6% in 2006; however, it again reached double-
digits (10.1%) in 2007. The high inflation rate, despite a restrictive monetary 
policy, resulted from high domestic demand based on the availability of 
affordable credits and the increasing indebtedness of households. An ex-
pansionary fiscal policy, encouraged by the growth of capital and current 
spending, was reflected in the growth of consolidated public spending, 
which reached 44.9% of GDP in 2007 (Republički zavod za razvoj, 2009). 
The initial period of “democratic changes” were also characterized by 
the expansion of foreign trade and a large trade deficit resulting from the 
weakened competitiveness of Serbian products on the European market. 
The first indicators of the crisis in Serbia40 were seen in the final quarter of 
2008, and were first evident in the banking sector (the panicked withdraw-
al of money) and a dramatic decline in the domestic currency value. The 
National Bank of Serbia has since spent a significant portion of its foreign 
exchange reserves to stabilize the national currency (RSD) and reduce in-
flationary pressure. 2008 was also marked by a cessation of foreign capital 
inflows, declines in domestic demand and export, and also a significant 
drop in production. In such circumstances, “the accepted view became 
that the crisis has not bypassed Serbia, and that it rather represents an 
acute threat to the achievements in the sphere of human development, 
stability and economic progress, which were achieved during the last dec-
ade. Long-term risk lies in the fact that the crisis rapidly completed an entire 
40 For a more detailed approach, see Vuković, D. Perišić, N., Annual National Report 2010 - Pensions, Health and 
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cycle of economic growth which was based on increased demand and 
consumption, which was driven by substantial capital inflows. Recovery from 
the crisis will not mean a return to the old model, but it will be necessary in the 
meantime to lay the foundations for a new development model, based on 
greater reliance on own real sources of growth” (Krstic, 2010: 6).
A number of negative effects of the economic crisis emerged in 2009 as a 
result of a further fall in production, primarily in industry, construction, and 
trade, while other sectors continued the upward trend characteristic of previ-
ous years. For example, the agricultural sector in 2009 experienced (symbolic) 
growth. Overall, the economic crisis resulted in decreased foreign investments 
in Serbia, which significantly affected economic development. In the second 
quarter of 2009, public expenditures were 13% higher than in the same period 
in 2008. Also in 2009’s second quarter, consolidated public spending record-
ed a 6% decline, which contributed to decreased capital investments and 
increased social transfers (mainly for pensioners). Some positive growth trends 
were recorded in 2010, namely GDP growth of 1.8%, a result of the service sec-
tor’s relatively high growth rate (3.1%) (Ministarstvo finansija, 2012). 
The 2011 current account deficit hovered around 2.5 billion EUR (or approxi-
mately 7.5% of GDP), which was almost the same as in the previous year. The 
inflow of foreign capital has enabled its financing; however, the situation may 
aggravate in 2012 due to the obligations of the loans. It is estimated that the ser-
vicing of public debt and interests abroad will require over 7 billion EUR in 2012. 
At the end of 2011, public debt approached its legal limit of 45% of GDP. The 
planned fiscal deficit in 2012 calls for 4.25% of GDP (Ministarstvo finansija, 2012).
The increase in living standards from 2001 to 2008 resulted from the dy-
namic increase to wages and pensions. During this period, earnings quad-
rupled and in 2008 averaged EUR 400. In 2009, average wages dropped 
to EUR 338 as a result of the crisis. In 2010 they continued to drop (to EUR 
331); and in 2011 there was a negligible increase (EUR 337) (Republički za-
vod za razvoj, 2009). It must be noted that increased living standards dur-
ing this period significantly aided in the reduction of poverty: according to 
the Household Measurement Survey, rates of absolute poverty decreased 
from 14% in 2002 to 6.6% in 2007 (Republički zavod za statistiku, 2009).
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3. Measures to mitigate the consequences of the 
crisis
The global financial and economic crisis has potentially presented an op-
portunity to create a policy that mitigates the negative effects of recession 
and creates conditions that expidite economic recovery, raising employ-
ment rates and living standards. In late 2008, the government enacted a 
Framework Programme as a response to the crisis and its impact on the 
economy. The planned austerity measures and cuts in public spending 
sought to increase the competitiveness of the national economy along-
side the simultaneous affirmation of the “social character of the state.” 
More specifically, the programme envisaged the protection of the most 
vulnerable groups in society and find a means “[to go] through the crisis 
in a way that it feels like a mild slowdown, not a decline in living standard 
and return to the poverty years” (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2008: 8). It also 
planned to freeze pensions in 2009, write-off interest charges on unpaid 
taxes and contributions, and dispose of old health insurance obligations in 
cases where citizens regularly meet their current obligations. 
In early 2009, three packages of economic policy were adopted. The first 
related to the reduction of risks and costs in the financial sector by increas-
ing the amount of insured deposits in banks from EUR 3,000 to EUR 50,000. 
In addition, the implementation of tax regulations to incomes based on in-
terests, and taxes on capital gain in the trading of securities was suspend-
ed in 2009. The second package aimed to stimulate bank lending in order 
to mitigate the recession in the national economy and ensure an increase 
in domestic demand. An integral part of this package were foreign cred-
its (from EIB, KFB, EBRD, and the Government of Italy) amounting to EUR 
480 million, which were intended for lending to small and medium-sized 
enterprises. An Action Plan on the construction of roads and the railway 
corridor 10 was adopted. Finally, during March 2009 negotiations started 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a new credit arrangement 
and other measures to reduce the crisis (Vukovic, Perisic, 2010).
“The prepared emergency package of economic policy in Serbia is fo-
cused on: 1. stimulating economic growth (increase in domestic demand, 
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liquidity, investments and export), 2. social measures (support to the most 
vulnerable layers of population – beneficiaries of social assistance, unem-
ployed and persons aged 65 and over), 3. rationalization of government 
expenditures at all levels, 4. infrastructural measures (investments into Corri-
dor X, the reconstruction of local infrastructure, promotion of social housing, 
modernization of public enterprises, development of rural infrastructure), 5. 
monitoring and correction of the package of measures, depending on the 
type of economic disorder” (Republički zavod za razvoj, 2009: 12). 
Further, the government adopted the Social Protection Plan in August 
2009 with a view to solving the key problems in the field of employment 
and enabling the insured to effectuate their statutory rights based on so-
cial insurance. The Plan called for the state to pay contributions for el-
derly and disability insurance to employees whose employers failed to 
pay contributions from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2009 (and also “con-
necting” the years of service). The Plan additionally comprised of paying 
contributions for health insurance in 2009 in cases where employers had 
not done so. This provided lump sum benefits for employees with the low-
est incomes, the rescheduling of arrears for electricity, and the preventing 
of abuses in the privatization process, etc.
A stand-by arrangement with the IMF provided financial support to Ser-
bia valued at EUR 2.87 billion in 2009 and 2010, which positively impacted 
negotiations with other international financial institutions and stabilized the 
national banking sector. “The Letter of Intent of the Government of the Re-
public Serbia was released in December 2009 and contains the presenta-
tion of a programme agreed with the IMF, as well as results achieved in 
the field of macroeconomic stability and other fields. The planned deficit 
in the budget is 4% of GDP in 2010; the Letter envisages a reduction of 
the number of employed in public administration by 10% and the freezing 
of pensions and salary levels in the public sector. The Letter highlights the 
government’s commitment to ’perform key reforms in the fields of pensions, 
education and health’. Other unintended social transfers are also frozen, 
but it is expected that the social expenditures will grow, due to increase in 
the number of poor people during the crisis” (Vukovic, Perisic, 2010: 9).
In early 2010, the Programme of Measures to Reduce the Negative Effects 
of the Global Economic Crisis in 2010 was adopted. This was in fact a con-
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tinuation of the measures envisaged in the previous year. The main objec-
tive of the new programme was to ensure the preservation of jobs, create 
opportunities for new employment, and propel growth. In order to increase 
citizen purchasing power, the government adopted a special programme 
of subsidized cash and consumer loans for the purchase of domestic prod-
ucts in 2010. That same year, a decree on the conditions and ways of at-
tracting foreign investments was enacted. Its purpose was to harness more 
favourable conditions for new jobs, and provide greater investments for the 
automotive and electrical industries, and telecommunication technology. 
For the packages of recovery measures, the government provided loans to 
the economy and citizens in the amount of EUR 1.1 billion and EUR 1.9 billion 
in 2009 and 2010 respectively. A similar program was implemented in 2011.
Short-term measures to reduce the negative effects of the crisis were par-
tially successful in maintaining fiscal stability. Control of budgetary costs, 
changes in the distribution of funds, and the freezing of pensions and 
wages in the public sector (2009-2010) all contributed to the targeted 
deficit reduction plan. 
Table 2 – Indicators Europe 2020 – Situation and Objectives of Development 
Europe Serbia 
2010 2020 2010 2020
Employment of people aged 20-64 (%) 68 75 49 65
Investment in research and
development
(% of GDP)
1.9 3.0 0.3 2.0
Share of consumption of energy from re-
newable sources in total energy consump-
tion (%)
16 20 12 18
Energetic efficiency (toe/1000$ of GDP) 0.21 0.17 0.96 0.57
Population aged 30-34 with university de-
grees (%) 31 40 21 30
Poverty rate (below 60% median of avail-
able income of the population) 16 12 17 14
Source: Ministarstvo finansija, 2011.  
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Serbia’s development goals for 2020 (as predicted in the Strategy “Serbia 
2020”) consist of increasing employment rates (up to 65% for persons aged 
20-64 years) and investing in research and development (from 0.3% to 2% 
of GDP). In accordance with the objectives of “Europe 2020”, the Serbian 
strategy outlines measures to improve human capital aimed primarily at 
reducing the school dropout rate for at-risk groups, and increasing the per-
centage of the public aged 30-34 with a university degree to 30%. Within 
the realm of sustainable development and environmental protection, 
electricity consumption from renewable sources is targeted to increase to 
18% by 2020, with additional increases in energy efficiency provided for. As 
well, the strategy emphasizes the seriousness of the current demographic 
problem and the reduction of relative poverty from 17.7% in 2009 to 14% 
in 2020. To achieve the projected social inclusion goals, it is necessary to 
increase the amount of social assistance benefits and target better de-
velopment programmes for full access to education, labour, health, and 
social services (active inclusion). Yet during the public debate on “Serbia 
2020,” many public sector actors pointed to its shortages in terms of the 
unrealistic projections of development, the extreme and unfounded opti-
mism, and concerns with how the objectives will be realized.
4. Labour market in the conditions of the crisis
The social effects of the crisis appear to be the most dramatic given the 
negative growth trends in the labour market, i.e. falling employment and 
rising unemployment. The unfavourable conditions in the 1990s continued 
in the following decade, despite evident progress and economic growth 
in the period before 2008. The process of restructuring and privatizing so-
cial sector firms, which centred on releasing redundant workers, led to 
mass unemployment and poverty in Serbia. Among the most disadvan-
taged were those seeking their first jobs; women (who have consistently 
recorded higher unemployment rates than men); those with low and/or 
only secondary school qualifications; older workers (who had lost their 
jobs during the privatization process); the disabled community; refugees 
and internally displaced persons; and some ethnic groups. 
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“The fall in employment since the beginning of the crisis was dramatic. 
The number of working age employees (15-64 years of life) fell by almost 
200,000 or about 7% between October 2008 and October 2009. This led to a 
corresponding decline in the employment rate (15-64 years) from 53.3% to 
50%. In the same period, the number of unemployed persons (15-64 years) 
increased by almost 60,000 bringing the unemployment rate from 14.7% to 
17.4% (October 2008 to October 2009)” (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2010: 3). 
In addition to these paltry figures, the employment situation in Serbia has 
been characterized by less “secure” jobs and work contracts (of limited 
duration); seasonal work in the agricultural industry; and self-employment 
and contributing family members in the retail trade and crafts sector. 
A study identifying the situation of vulnerable groups in the labour mar-
ket conducted by Krstic in 2010 reveals that during the crisis, the youth 
and rural populations in southeast Serbia experienced the greatest so-
cietal pangs. For the elderly and women, no major changes were ob-
served, although the number of older workers (55-64) who lost their jobs 
increased dramatically (Krstic, 2010). For other categories of vulnerable 
groups (Roma, refugees and internally displaced persons, and the disa-
bled), there was no data about their employment situation before 2008. 
Given the demographic characteristics and educational levels of these 
categories, it can be assumed that their position during the crisis wors-
ened, which would be reflected in a further decline in their living stand-
ards and increased poverty.
Table 3 – Labour Market Indicators for the Population Aged 15-64 (%)















Activity rate 62.8 62.6 60.8 60.5 59.1 58.8 58.9 59.9
Employment 
rate 54.0 53.3 50.8 50.0 47.2 47.1 45.5 45.3
Unemploy-
ment rate 14.0 14.7 16.4 17.4 20.1 20.0 22.9 24.4
Non-activity 
rate 37.2 37.4 39.2 39.5 40.9 41.2 41.1 40.1
Source: Republički zavod za statistiku, 2012.
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Unemployment in Serbia is very high, and according to data from the La-
bour Force Survey,41 20% of the working age population (15-64 years), or 
rather 566,000 citizens were unemployed in October 2010. The structural 
characteristics of the unemployed are also unfavourable, giving the ap-
pearance that women also fall into the “vulnerable category” through-
out the transition period. In October 2010 unemployment rates for women 
and men were 20.4% and 19.2% respectively. Even greater differences 
can be observed in terms of employment rates: for women they were 
30.9%; for men 45.0%. Regarding age groups, the highest unemployment 
rate is in the category of persons aged 15-24 years, which was 46.1% in 
October 2010. In other words, the number of unemployed young persons 
in this age bracket was 112,165, accounting for 19.7% of the total unem-
ployment figure (Republički zavod za statistiku, 2012). Young people are 
also more likely to work in the informal economy and accept jobs be-
neath their qualifications.
Unfavourable trends in the labour market and the negative effects of the 
new wave of recession were also visible in 2011. According to the Labour 
Force Survey, the employment rate was 45.5% in April 2011; it was signifi-
cantly lower for women (38.8%) than for men (52.2%). In November 2011, 
there was a further decline (0.2%) in the overall employment rate (45.3%), 
with a slight increase in male employment (52.5%) and decrease in fe-
male employment (37.9%). High unemployment is still the most invasive 
structural problem in Serbia. The registered unemployment rate of persons 
actively seeking employment in October 2011 was 29.6% (Ministarstvo fi-
nansija, 2012). Due to the unfavourable economic climate, significant 
changes in the labour market are not expected in 2012. 
In response to the crisis, positive amendments were made to the laws reg-
ulating the labour market’s functioning; strategic documents and action 
plans were also drafted. The programme of measures for the rapid-solving 
of the unemployment problem envisaged greater investments for active 
labour market policies (ALMP). In 2009, the majority of active labour mar-
ket measures were directed towards programme for young trainees (“First 
Chance”) and the public works sector. 
41 Data on unemployment held by the National Employment Office differ from data obtained by the Labor Force 
Survey conducted by the Republic Statistical Office.
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“Public work programmes are designed as a direct income support for 
the most vulnerable unemployed people, typically in underdeveloped 
areas, providing them with temporary, subsidized, formal employment, 
while increasing their chances to find a subsidized employment at the 
end of the programme. However, recent analyzes have found that these 
programmes, in the form and the manner they have been conducted in 
Serbia, achieve much better results when it comes to the first stated goal, 
than the second one. Not surprisingly, public work programmes did not 
have long-term effects on employment. Partially because of these disap-
pointing results, the budget for public work programmes in 2010 was re-
duced to ‘standard’ amount of RSD 700 million” (Arandarenko, 2011: 34).
As part of the measures to improve labour market conditions, a set of stra-
tegic documents and action plans have been drafted. A new National 
Employment Strategy for 2011-2020 is essentially based on “Europe 2020.” 
Beginning with the current situation in Serbia, specifically the structural prob-
lems within the labour market, the Strategy opted to reduce the differences 
in employment and coordinate employment programmes with EU Member 
States over the next decade. “The current difference of 20% is so large that 
it represents one of the biggest obstacles to fulfilling the core Copenhagen 
criteria for EU accession of the Republic of Serbia. Convergence towards 
the objectives set by the ‘Europe 2020’ requires more rapid average an-
nual economic growth compared to the EU average, with simultaneous 
the same or greater labour productivity” (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2010: 15).
Labour market trend projections for Serbia through 2020 are based on 
assumptions concerning the dynamics of economic growth and the final 
process of labour market reforms. The Strategy for the period 2011-2020 
predicts that employment in 2013 will reach its pre-crisis level, and is set 
to grow at the pace of approximately 50,000 persons on average in the 
following years. At the end of the projected period, the total number of 
employees would reach an estimated 3 million (or 440,000 more people 
compared to the situation in 2010). Unemployment is expected to decline 
beginning in 2013; in 2020 the total number of unemployed persons in Ser-
bia would reduce to about 340,000. Compared to the 2020 employment 
rate projections for the EU Member State populations aged 15-64 and 
20-64 (70% and 75% respectively), the projected rates in Serbia are much 
lower (61% and 66% respectively) (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2010).
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5. Poverty and social exclusion
Programmes and measures of social inclusion in Serbia have also been 
amended in recent years. As part of the activities connected to EU ac-
cession, the first steps to improve upon these social conditions were made 
in early 2009, when a draft list of indicators for monitoring social inclu-
sion was created on the basis of making statements in order to create 
a starting point for defining the policy of reducing social exclusion. It is 
envisaged that the measurement of social inclusion is fundamental to 
the Laeken Indicators (financial poverty, employment, education, and 
health) to expand with two new, nationally-specific dimensions: the satis-
faction of basic needs and social participation. 
Data on financial poverty indicate higher rates of poverty risk in Serbia when 
compared to EU Member States. Taking into account the incompleteness of 
the national data and its subsequent comparability to the EU data, the aver-
age rate of poverty risk in Serbia is 17.7%, whereas the EU average is 16.6%. At 
the same time, the relative risk of the poverty gap amounted to 22% below 
the poverty line, which is fully comparable with the EU average of 21.9%. The 
quintile ratio of 4.7 was slightly lower than the EU average (5) as well as Gini 
coefficient (29.5 versus 30.6 in the EU) (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2011). These 
two indicators are not objectively high in contrast to the subjective feeling of 
the population regarding the “distribution” of inequalities in society.
Contrary to the above, indicators of social inclusion related to employ-
ment in Serbia have been far less favourable than those found in the EU; 
they are only comparable with other countries in South East Europe. One 
factor accounting for this is that, the decline in employment during the 
crisis was significantly higher than the GDP drop, in contrast to all other 
European countries, including those in the region. The long-term unem-
ployment rate (10.9% of total unemployment) and the participation of 
the long-term unemployed of 65.5% rank Serbia highly unpopular on the 
European scale (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2011). The same refers to the un-
employment rates of young people, those without qualifications, the rural 
population, refugees and internally displaced persons. A special chal-
lenge concerns the unemployment of Roma. All these indicators were 
generally unfavourable, but they became even worse during the crisis.
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Indicators of education, as in the case of employment, reveal significant 
deficits when compared to the EU, especially where it regards the quality 
of educational programmes and contents. The participation of children 
in preschool education is just 46.9% (the EU average is 85%). The ratio of 
coverage of children aged 0-3 years is even less favourable. Coverage 
rates of children with primary education in Serbia are high, amounting to 
98.07%, and primary school completion rates are almost 100%. Yet the per-
centage of children dropping out of primary school is high – 7.04% annual-
ly, or 5,997 children, most of whom are Roma. Net enrolment rates for sec-
ondary schools also increased, amounting to 82.7%; however, the dropout 
rates are comparatively very high (23.5% and 9.3% for three-year and four 
year secondary schools respectively). In addition, they are highest within 
Serbia’s most marginalized groups (62% of Roma), as well as those from 
poorer families (42%) (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2011). The coverage of the 
population with programmes of life-long learning is extremely low. 
Health as a factor of social inclusion has shown mixed results. Indicators 
relating to access to health care reveal a high percentage of the popula-
tion with health care coverage (about 94%) and shortages in coverage 
for more marginalized groups. Life expectancy in 2009 was 73 years on 
average (76.4 and 71.1 for women and men respectively), but it still falls 
behind the EU average. Survey statements about the general health situ-
ation rank Serbia worse than the EU (56% in Serbia versus 65.1% in the EU 
said they are of good health). Despite some progress in this area, indica-
tors of the reported quality of health care in Serbia reveal patient satis-
faction rates to be considerably high. The prenatal mortality rate, how-
ever, is also very high (8.9% and 5.8% in Serbia and the EU, respectively). 
Moreover, differences concerning the inequalities in health outcomes for 
people in the general population compared to vulnerable groups have 
endured. Finally, the long-term financial sustainability of the health care 
system indicates that the percentage of GDP expenditures for health are 
higher in Serbia than in the EU (9.8% of the GDP compared to 9% of the 
GDP in EU Member States). This fact, however, is only relative because the 
Serbian GDP is disproportionately smaller, so the actual consumption is ex-
tremely low by comparison. Thus, the cost of health care in 2008 amount-
ed to $838 PPP per capita, as opposed to $2,877 PPP per capita in the EU 
(Vlada Republike Srbije, 2011).
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6. Social reforms 
The nature of social problems and the severity of the situation for the ma-
jority of the population in Serbia during the 1990s influenced the content 
and objectives of social reforms in the period after 2000. The first social 
policy steps aimed to alleviate poverty and pay deferred benefits (social 
assistance, pensions, child allowances, etc). Following this, the state has 
taken its obligation to pay regularly all of the cash benefits in the system 
concerning social protection. In parallel, a process of shaping a new so-
cial policy, coordinated by the Ministry of Social Affairs in consultation 
with international monetary institutions (IMF, WB) and governments of do-
nor countries has been established.
6.1. Introduction of private pension option 
The strategic objectives of the pension system reforms have been de-
fined as “ensuring stable and sufficiently high pensions for all, creating a 
financially sustainable pension system, increasing domestic savings and 
accelerating economic development, increasing fairness of the pension 
system and expanding choices for insured” (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2003: 
113). The most significant changes were made in the period 2001-2003. 
Parametric reforms of the pay-as-you-go system (PAYG) included a one-
time raising of the retirement age from 55 to 58 years of life for women, 
and from 60 to 63 for men; the application of the Swiss formula of pension 
indexation (i.e. the adjustment of pensions based on wage growth and 
living costs); a reduction of contribution rates; the calculation of pensions 
based on earnings realized during the entire life cycle; and the introduc-
tion of more stringent conditions for effectuating the right to disability pen-
sion (Vuković, 2009). 
Subsequent changes in legal regulations (beginning in 2005) aimed at 
reducing public expenditures and establishing macroeconomic stabil-
ity. These were carried out amidst strong pressure from the IMF. Critical 
tones in the debates about the proposed changes and the differences 
in opinion between political parties have led to the mitigation of radi-
cal demands and the adoption of compromised solutions. The retirement 
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age was again raised by two years, with a gradual introduction of this pro-
gramme beginning in 2011. The changes included pension indexations: in 
lieu of the Swiss formula, the government opted for a cost-of-living index, 
provided that the average pension cannot be lower than 60% of one’s 
average earnings at the end of 2008 (Mijatović, 2008).
Recent changes to public pension insurance (in late 2010) partially re-
lated to the elimination of certain benefits for the insured with privileged 
years of service, and the extension of years of service for retirement for 
women from 35 to 38 years, as well as the raising of the retirement age 
for survivor pensioners. Other and more integral changes address pension 
indexation.42 Changes have been introduced in connection with raising 
the minimum retirement pensions for agricultural pensioners, the status of 
farmers, and the introduction and transfer of those insured within the mili-
tary system into the public old-age and disability insurance. 
Another direction of reforms within Serbia’s pension system is based on a 
decision made in 2001 in consultation with the WB on the introduction of 
a voluntary private pension insurance. Deciding on the introduction of 
the so-called third pillar was motivated by the desire to prevent the con-
sequences of the current and projected demographic situation in Serbia, 
as well as the distribution of burden for financing pensions.
The legislation based on which voluntary private pensions were introduced 
in Serbia was made only in 2005. Its insufficient development is most likely 
the result of a small number of actively insured, and the low level of assets 
of private funds in the national GDP, despite their growth. The reasons for 
this are the short time since its introduction, low living standards, and mac-
roeconomic instability (caused by the crisis); however, they also speak to 
the low level of informed citizens where it concerns this issue.
At the end of 2008, the total number of those maintaining voluntary pen-
sion funds amounted to 195,000, while only 66,000 of them regularly made 
payments into their individual accounts. The majority of the property of 
42 The changes in the indexation mechanism were among the most noteworthy topics up for public debate. The 
adopted solution provides for the following: “in two first years (2011/2012) pensions are to be indexed based 
on percentage representing a sum of the percentage of consumer prices’ growth in the previous 6 months and 
percentage representing one half of the actual rate of GDP growth in the previous calendar year (Similar to the 
Swiss formula with GDP). After that, pensions are to be indexed twice a year (in April and October) based on 
consumer prices’ trends” (Stanić, 2010: 32). 
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funds were on custody accounts (54%), and invested into state shares 
(34%); 60% of the funds were in EUR. At the end of 2009, the net assets 
of funds increased to 66.3% compared to 2008, a result of increased net 
payments from the insured and profits realized by the funds. Data for 2010 
pointed to a further decrease in the number of insured (2.5%) compared 
to 2009, and an overall growth in the net property of funds to 39.2% (Vu-
kovic, Perisic, 2011).
Along with the implementation of reforms in the first and the third pillars, 
the option of introducing the second pillar (mandatory private pensions) 
was also discussed. It was subsequently delayed (for an indefinite peri-
od of time). The reason why decision-makers should accept the change 
of model without the mandatory private system lie in the fact “that the 
existing system ensures that all those who have paid contributions can 
achieve certain security in their old age. If the system would be based 
only on savings accounts and if the money would be invested by private 
companies, the uncertainty would be much greater, because, of course, 
no matter what control mechanisms and regulations are put in place, it 
is possible to assume that a number of such accounts would be emptied 
due to bankruptcy or wrong investments, which would mean that even 
though people have been paying contribution for old age, such a system 
would not enable that” (Matković, 2003: 269). Among the reasons listed 
were: high transition costs; underdeveloped financial markets; the lack of 
realistic and convincing arguments for its introduction in other countries; 
(Mijatović, 2008) and inadequate mechanisms of control concerning the 
supervision of private funds (Vuković, 2009).
Recent studies (Stanić, Živković, 2009) reveal that the transfer of 7% of 
current contributions for the public old-age and disability insurance (out 
of a total of 22%) into the second pillar would result in extremely high and 
long-lasting transition costs (Stanić, Živković, 2009).
6.2. Access, quality and financial sustainability of health 
  system
An explicitly formulated health care policy did not exist for a long period 
of time in Serbia. Consequently, there are many problems in the field of 
public health and an absence of national policy objectives that would 
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be in line with real (financial) possibilities and the actual and perceived 
needs of the population. Only in 2003 (note: many years after other parts 
of the social protection system were addressed) did health insurance 
and health care reforms begin. To date, most reforms have related to 
the aspirations aimed at putting primary care at the centre of the system, 
after which a concept to choose doctors was introduced. Yet financial 
developments have only recently been made, and in most cases only 
partially: in late 2011 the final activities for the introduction of capitation 
as a method of payment in primary care facilities were implemented. The 
introduction of diagnosis-related groups for secondary and tertiary care is 
planned to be begin in the next five years.
Public health insurance has not undergone any significant changes. In 
2008, a voluntary health insurance was introduced; at the moment, this 
programme has very modest coverage. 
Public and private health sectors exist in parallel, but are still independent 
of one another, despite the proclaimed objectives of reform “to increase 
the participation of private, profit and non-profit sectors in providing health 
care funded by the Republic Health Insurance Fund” (Ministarstvo zdrav-
lja, 2003: 25). Even though nearly a decade has passed since this state-
ment was made, no significant developments have been undertaken.
The legal introduction of the possibility to sub-contract health services, 
based on which the Republic Health Insurance Fund pays fees to private 
doctors, did not affect the changes aimed to bring the public and private 
health sectors closer together; this model is also not used in practice.43 
As it turns out, the so-called temporary engagement of doctors (who are 
regularly employed by the public sector) in the private sector is not a re-
alistic option for the legal binding of these two sectors.
According to estimates of the Private Medical Chamber, over 50% of the 
population uses private health sector services; 50% for diagnostic and 
specialist health services; 65% for gynaecology; 80% for laboratory and 
dental services (Privatna lekarska komora, 2012).
43 The reasons for that partially result from the “overlapping of the public and private health sectors, widespread 
corruption, and the inability of the state to introduce [a] control system” (Vuković, 2010: 215).
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A systematic and complex evaluation of reform measures thus far under-
taken has not been carried out; however, partial examinations provide 
insights into specific aspects of the health system. 
According to the WB,44 “the health care system in Serbia has seen signifi-
cant progress in the last 15 years” (Svetska banka, 2009: 22), which was 
largely achieved in two important areas: the management of the system, 
and the activities conducted by the Republic Health Insurance Fund. Yet 
“most of the reform objectives have not been achieved” (Vuković, 2009: 
137). Recent studies show that there are still many difficulties in the imple-
mentation of statutory rights and that this directly affects the health of the 
population. The differences are apparent in the indicators related to ac-
cess to health services, the availability of all types of institutions, the level 
of quality, and the overall satisfaction of patients, etc.
In general, health services are evenly distributed, but these figures are 
based on the existing standards. Shortcomings are evident in the equal-
ity of the services provided. They are generally of higher quality in larger 
urban centres, as opposed to the quality of services in less developed 
areas of the country. Inadequate health care coverage (even for primary 
care) is especially visible within the more vulnerable population groups.45 
Its underdevelopment continues to prevent the overall raising of services. 
Progress in increasing quality has primarily been achieved by investing 
large pools of resources in the reconstruction of health facilities and the 
purchasing of modern equipment. A significant number of hospitals and 
institutes were re-invigorated, primarily in cities with large medical centres, 
while the situation in rural areas remains poor. 
The organization of public health services is an inherited problem of the 
socialist system. In practice, there are complex organizations where a 
clinical approach is dominant, while health promotion and prevention 
are neglected. 
44 WB was among the health care reform actors in Serbia (together with the EU and UN); it conditioned its help to 
the energy sector with health sector reforms (Arandarenko, Golicin, 2006).
45 Many Roma children are not covered with health care. Unfavorable situation is also in refugees and internally 
displaced persons, who do not have personal documents. At the same time, mechanisms of control of paying health 
contributions became stricter so that the employees whose employers do not pay health contributions for them 
cannot obtain medical booklets. 
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Problems connected to the financing of health care persist and their in-
teraction prevents the partial reform measures from taking hold, and re-
quires substantial changes. Yet the level of acceptance among the gen-
eral population concerning the need to change the funding model does 
not automatically lead to acceptance of its consequences (whether it 
could be increased contributions, taxes, or the separation of the public 
and private sectors). This results from the low purchasing power of the 
population, and thus limited options for private health care. Factors inher-
ited from the generous socialist period also do not favour private options 
(Vukovic, Perisic, 2009).
6.3. Support and help for the poor
The reform framework of poverty reduction and strategic directions for 
the fight against poverty are outlined in the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper adopted in 2003. The Strategy is based on three main areas: dy-
namic economic growth and development, with an emphasis on job 
creation in the private sector; the prevention of new poverty as an ex-
pected consequence of modernization and economic restructuring, and 
rationalization of the state and its basic functions; the effective implemen-
tation of existing and defining new programmes, measures, and activities 
directly targeted to the poorest and most vulnerable, particularly in the 
least developed areas (children, elderly, disabled, refugees, internally dis-
placed persons, Roma, rural area inhabitants, and the undereducated). 
The objective of these activities is defined as the start of a long process of 
training the above-mentioned groups to emerge from poverty, enabling 
them thus to develop skills necessary in a new economy, and providing 
them with the minimum standard of living (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2003).
In contrast to the centralization of social assistance in the 1990s, the Social 
Assistance Development Strategy of 2005 envisaged a greater degree 
of decentralization (with mixed results in practice). The legal basis of the 
system over the past 20 years was regulated by the Law on Social As-
sistance and Providing Social Protection to Citizens of 1991. During this 
period, the law was subjected to numerous and substantial changes. In 
2004 one of the most important innovations was introduced concerning 
the right to social assistance benefits; these were limited for able bodied 
beneficiaries (for 9 months during a given year). This led to a reduction in 
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the total number of beneficiaries. Yet the unification of the poverty line (as 
opposed to previous differences between the municipalities) at the state 
level has resulted in an increase in the number of beneficiaries in general. 
Finally in March 2011 a new law was enacted in this area. The new solu-
tions provide for modified rights to cash benefits and social services.
The population coverage with social assistance is very low – approximate-
ly 2% of the total number of households in Serbia (Matković, Mijatović, 
2009). Defined eligibility conditions and real financial constraints of social 
assistance expenditures have basically dictated the coverage of benefi-
ciaries, their socio-economic status, the number of individuals and family 
structure, and finally the amount of the benefit.
The criteria for the effectuation of rights are extremely strict. The defined 
poverty line is lower than the absolute poverty line used in the Living 
Standard Survey so that the amount of social assistance does not provide 
coverage for basic needs. Cash benefits reduce the risk of poverty, but 
they do not guarantee an adequate level of security.
The targeting of cash benefits can still be improved. First, the existing data 
on the average share of social transfers of income for the lowest earners 
of the population reveal an increase (from 10.1% in 2006 to 12.1% in 2009). 
However, they also testify that “about 50% of social transfers are received 
by those who are not poor” (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2011: 96). On the 
other hand, “data show that from 2006 to 2008 the efficiency of social 
transfers increased, since the percentage of social transfers distributed to 
the poor (before receiving social transfers) increased from 44.9% in 2006 
to 49% in 2008, and then in 2009, it dropped to 47.7%” (Vlada Republike 
Srbije, 2011: 96). Social transfers in Serbia only moderately contribute to 
poverty reduction, compared with the average EU Member State, and 
their efficiency in Serbia is “almost seven times lower than the average of 
the Union” (Republički zavod za razvoj, 2009: 63). The most efficient social 
transfers were targeted for children: child allowances have reduced child 
poverty from 24.5% to 22.1% in 2009. In contrast, the poverty rates for the 
elderly after social transfers (excluding pensions) decreased from 18.9% to 
only 18.2% in the same year (Vlada Republike Srbije, 2011).
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7. National and European contexts 
- comparative view
The Serbian social protection system is generally comparable to Europe-
an social models, both from the point of view of its organization (Bismarck-
ian basis) and expenditures (the so-called “new” EU Member States). At 
the same time, in order to resolve many problems in its functioning and 
balance its current strengths and advantages with its distinct weaknesses 
and threats, the reform orientations during the last ten years have been 
adjusted to the guidelines and norms of the EU. However, the general 
characteristics of Serbia’s dialogue with the European Union have fo-
cused more on political rather than economic criteria. Likewise, social di-
mensions have largely remained in the shadow. Frequently, the aspiration 
to join the EU was used by the national elite as a means to reduce social 
transfers, while the introduction of those changes which are a positive 
legacy of the European welfare states have been omitted. 
The immediate impact of EU social policy on social reforms in Serbia re-
mains difficult to evaluate. Conditions have modestly changed in recent 
years as a result of progress made within the realm of EU accession and 
Serbia’s determination to become a Member State. Ratings of the Com-
mission on the progress have had a positive impact on the harmonization 
of regulations and practices, particularly where they concern employ-
ment policy and social assistance.
As a means to assess the impact of EU policies on the Serbian social pro-
tection system, the government’s responses to the European Commis-
sion46 and the First National Report on Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduc-
tion are relevant national documents. 
The national policy of active aging, the greater participation of the el-
derly in the labour market, and life-long learning are discussed within the 
framework of special national programmes and reports. The National 
Employment Strategy (2011-2020) illustrates the need to develop pro-
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grammes specifically oriented towards unemployed older workers (50-
64 years). In addition, the need to develop an adequate system of adult 
education and new skill acquisition courses, particularly those promot-
ing active ageing policies and the concept of life-long learning and 
motivating the elderly to continue to work in accordance with their skills, 
is recognized. The programme also encourages employers to hire and 
retain older workers on the job and prevent discrimination in employing 
the elderly, especially women. 
Health care reforms have also been popular topics in government dis-
course, frequently those equalized with European harmonization and the 
better positioning of indicators and performance of the Serbian health sys-
tem. The first steps have been completed, including the harmonization of 
Serbian health legislation with the EU, and the adoption of numerous strate-
gies, inspired by the development of health care in EU Member States.
 Some elements of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in the health 
system, such as reports and indicators, have been partially introduced, 
even though the concept of the OMC is not directly represented in any 
national context. Although there are pessimistic signs concerning the re-
alization of objectives related to the promotion of accessibility and quality 
of health services, as well as the long-term sustainability of the health care 
system, OMC represents one of the most important segments of national 
health care reform.
Finally, considerations for the problems stemming from relative poverty 
and social exclusion are one of the most important elections of national 
social policies towards the harmonization with European trends. In this 
context, the need to improve many aspects of the social system and the 
position of many vulnerable groups in society is more than evident. Diversi-
fied social services introduced by the new Law, among others, are direct-
ed towards the expansion of social networks for the poor and those at risk 
of poverty. Efforts aimed at decentralization have been also motivated 
by the need to better recognize the social needs of the communities and 
to react to them in a timely manner.
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At the onset of 2011 an unprecedented wave of social unrest and political upheaval began to 
sweep across the Middle East and North Africa. Following the first demonstrations in Tunisia, and 
the flight of its President Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia, the wave has engulfed much of the Arab-speaking 
world, from Morocco to Bahrain. While some rulers have abdicated peacefully, violence has been a 
constant. In the majority of cases, the ruling regimes met the spontaneous, massive, and peaceful 
demonstrations with brutal police repression; some even called in the regular army to strike down 
unarmed civilians with heavy conventional weapons.
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1. Introduction: The Peculiarities of the “Arab 
Spring” and Comparisons to 1989
Many indicators suggest that the upheavals in Arab states reflect and in-
corporate a much wider phenomenon of social fever, which in 2011 led 
millions of protesters to the streets of major cities across four continents. 
Such underlying similarities include the deep and general dissatisfaction 
with the global economic recession, austerity measures imposed by re-
spective governments, and high unemployment rates, etc. Specific to the 
Arab region, the protests were largely provoked by the higher costs of 
staple foods brought about by drought, floods, and fires in several of the 
world’s leading grain exporting countries. The spotlight soon shifted to the 
ruling regimes’ loss of legitimacy, namely its use of heavy-handed oppres-
sion, and wide-spread corruption among the elites. Further motivating the 
crowds was the exceptionally high rate of unemployment, which showed 
no bias between the laborer and the well-educated, and the overall lack 
of opportunities for social promotion. The culmination of these factors 
brought out hundreds of thousands of young people, initially led by urban 
unmarried males, to the movement now termed the Arab Spring.  
Social unrest, political upheavals, and revolutions in several Arab states 
have subsequently activated a growing cross-section of urban popula-
tions, including among them women, teachers, medical personnel, and 
civil servants. Although many members and supporters of Islamist parties 
and associations participated in the demonstrations, few Jihadist or anti-
western slogans were notably displayed. In this respect, the Arab Spring 
widely and almost wholly differs from previous incarnations of mass pro-
tests in predominately Muslim countries, including Iran, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan. Rather, the main targets of the Arab protesters were exclusively 
their distrusted, brutal, and corrupted domestic regimes and home-grown 
dictators. Contrary to the accusations of many of the endangered Arab 
regimes, there has been no credible evidence linking the protests to ex-
ternal, i.e. non-Arab, influence or interference. On the other hand, reason-
able evidence suggests an intra-Arab demonstration effect; commercial 
mass media of the events has been obvious and particularly salient prior 
to and during the most famous of demonstrations in Cairo. Blocked from 
the regime-controlled public communication systems, the young organ-
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izers successfully utilized the so-called powers of electronic social media, 
e.g., personal computers, cell phones, and the Internet, to incite mass 
demonstrations. In fact, the revolutionary use of such devices has added 
an additional texture to the Arab Spring movement, garnering near equal 
attention from the western media and academic communities alike in 
discussions centering on their social and political applications. 
Although some similarities may be observed between the Arab Spring 
and the wave of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe in the 
late 1980s, the two events are more different than alike. Among the 
Eastern European members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, (WTO), 
demonstrations and protests targeted authoritarian, communist regimes 
imposed and maintained by the eastern superpower, the USSR, and 
brought about major upheavals in all of Central and Eastern Europe’s 
communist states, including non-WTO members Yugoslavia and Albania. 
The upheavals of 2011, however, have been more sporadic, occurring 
in a sizable but limited number of Arab countries. Moreover, the protests 
were not directed against foreign domination. Further separating the two 
movements, the ideologies supporting the Arab Spring have been char-
acterized as tremendously heterogeneous; notably, they lack known and 
charismatic leaders. In this regard, the movements of 1989 were seen as 
unitary and were often led by a prominent opposition figure. In terms of 
force, many of the resisting Arab regimes could not have been defeated 
without the use of military intervention. In contrast to the movements in 
Europe (with the partial exceptions of Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania), 
the Arab armies and professional military units played a crucial role in 
determining the outcomes of the democratic uprisings in their own and 
even in neighboring countries (Bahrain). Such roles varied between brutal 
and determined suppression (Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria), to the mostly 
benign yet authoritative (Egypt), to the protecting of unarmed demon-
strators against police brutality (Tunisia). 
The dynamics and outcomes of the Arab Spring have also varied greatly 
from one affected country to another. By December 2011 only two dic-
tatorial Arab regimes disappeared (in Tunisia and Libya). In fact, the new 
regime in Libya still does not control the entire country; it continues to 
share and compete for power with local warlords, tribal chiefs, and unruly 
armed gangs. In Egypt an ex-general and dictator was replaced by a 
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military junta, which has been accused by the leaders of the still-ongoing 
protests of “stealing the revolution.” In Yemen and Syria the two dicta-
torial regimes remain in power despite the months-long mass demon-
strations, thousands of casualties, and in the case of the former, Yemeni 
President Ali Saleh’s formal resignation. All told, the key political benefi-
ciaries of the upheaval in several Arab states (notably Egypt) were not the 
young, democratically-oriented initiators, but rather the various shades of 
the much better organized Islamist groups, from the more moderate to 
the radical Jihadists. 
The developments since the Arab Spring have neither brought about a 
radical geopolitical realignment of the region (as many experts predict-
ed), nor the disbandment of the regional interstate organization (the Arab 
League). Further, the social and political upheavals have not created a 
new, hitherto unknown variety of direct and spontaneous party-less street 
democracy, as some western neo-Marxists and anarchists quixotically ex-
pected. Further, there has been no radical change in the Arab economies 
or in the patterns of trade relations with their major international partners. 
In sum, the Central and Eastern European experience of region-wide tran-
sition to competitive politics and market economies has only a passing 
relevance to the Arab Spring; seemingly such a transition has not and 
cannot be replicated in the culturally-different Arab world. 
2. The Roles of the European Union and NATO
Given its support for liberal democratic foundations and preference for 
the use of soft power, the European Union was widely expected to sup-
port and engage the democratizing political transformation in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Moreover, the political, social, and economic prob-
lems that ignited the Arab Spring offered useful starting points for new EU 
policy initiatives in the region. In addition, the new governments strongly 
needed external support to avoid political regression and the pitfalls in-
herited from their dictatorial predecessors. 
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However, the events and aftermath of the Arab Spring revealed the 
European Union, despite its network of experienced and well-paid del-
egations in the region, to be unprepared, poorly informed, and frozen 
by confusion. The primary reason for the EU’s ensuing passivity was the 
member states’ unwillingness to allow the EU to play an active role in the 
region, instead favoring a (delayed) response from the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). To the massive upheavals across the Medi-
terranean, the EU Commission responded with a proposed Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity. Such ‘paper democracy,’ however, 
has brought forth nothing new, and in real terms merely altered the label 
of the previously established European Mediterranean Policy (EMP). Fur-
ther, the political and economic sanctions imposed by the EU on several 
dictatorial regimes have produced little notable effect on the political 
dynamics of the Arab world. 
More troubling, the tempered reaction to the crises in Tunisia, Egypt, Lib-
ya, and Syria exposed serious cleavages between EU countries, an even 
more considerable gap between the EU’s proclamations and the actual 
policies of its member states, and the insufficient coordination capabilities 
between the European Commission and the EU External Action Service. 
The EMP, as part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which has 
espoused the promotion of liberal reforms and human rights in southern 
Mediterranean countries, has proven to be ineffective despite the consid-
erable funds invested in it over the years. The European Commission’s pri-
mary goals for the EMP now seems rather to have concerned maintaining 
political stability in the region, assuring uninterrupted oil and gas imports, 
and preventing excessive illegal migration within EU borders.  
Further constricting an EU response, the leaders of its most influential mem-
ber states had visibly entertained cordial relations with (i.e., more than tol-
erated) the region’s dictatorial regimes, which presumably guaranteed 
political and energy stability, and served as a bulwark against Islamic fun-
damentalism and terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda. As part of this tacit 
agreement, the majority of European leaders had usually turned a blind 
eye to the wide-spread violations of human rights and fundamental free-
doms occurring in practically every Arab state. Yet in failing to respond 
at such a crucial moment in time, the European Union has now relegated 
itself to an ineffectual geopolitical actor and, in accordance with real, 
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long-term European interests, squandered its ability to influence tangibly 
the seminal developments in its southern neighborhood. 
In contrast to the EU, NATO has played a much more defining role in the 
Arab Spring, namely within the regime overhaul in Libya during the spring 
and summer 2011. For the first time in the alliance’s history, NATO deployed 
an “out of area” operation jointly initiated by two European members, 
France and Great Britain. The United States, despite providing crucial mili-
tary support, declined to take the lead role. Operation Unified Protector 
was commanded by a Canadian general and coordinated from the NATO 
and SHAPE Headquarters. Legitimacy for NATO’s “humanitarian” interven-
tion was made possible by UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which was 
adopted with little interference on March 17, 2011 and subsequently sup-
ported by the Arab League as well as the Organization of Islamic States. 
The resolution’s clearly stated objective was to protect Libyan civilians from 
the brutal repression of the long-tenured Gaddafi regime. 
On March 19, 2011, following air strikes targeting Libyan military installa-
tions, NATO imposed a no-fly zone for Libyan aircraft, and a naval block-
ade in the Mediterranean to prevent the flow of war supplies to Libyan 
ports. The initial missile attacks were carried out by the US Navy, while 
subsequent bombing and fighter raids were led by the air forces of other 
NATO members, and later by Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. On 
average, 150 missions were flown daily. By September 29, 2011 the sum 
total included 23,246 sorties, of which included 9,040 “strike missions.” With 
its advanced capabilities, NATO soon neutralized the Libyan Air Force, 
destroyed the government’s command and control centers, anti-aircraft 
defenses, and a large number of combat units. By all accounts, NATO hon-
ored UNSCR 1973’s prohibition excluding a “foreign occupation force” in 
Libya; although contingency plans for a limited invasion were developed 
by NATO’s Southern Command. 
While most analysts commend the proficient and successful mission in 
Libya, there were several internal problems within the NATO alliance dur-
ing the operation. Of NATO’s 28 independent member countries, only 
eight actively participated in Operation Unified Protector; fourteen others 
provided military support. Small members understandably could not offer 
appropriate advanced air and naval assets. This, however, was not the 
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reason for the abstention of the two largest European members, Germa-
ny and Turkey, whose governments refused to join the military Operation 
on purely political grounds. Further, because of internal disagreements 
among its members, NATO never had a clear and agreed upon political 
strategy for the mission, which prevented the Alliance from fitting its op-
erational goals with the means required. More significantly, the operation 
confirmed NATO’s chief operational criticism: the insufficient capabilities 
of European allies to carry out, without US support, large-scale, protracted 
air combat operations, even in Europe’s immediate neighborhood. Such 
capabilities, including intelligence, reconnaissance, target acquisition, 
precision ammunition, and air refueling were provided by US forces. While 
the United States’ contribution was far less visible than that of the Europe-
ans, it was an indispensable component for the operation’s success. 
The constraints imposed by the UN mandate increased the number of 
targeting errors. On a number of occasions, NATO forces overstepped the 
restrictions on the use of force imposed by the UN Security Council resolu-
tion. Further, the barrage of air raids caused moderate collateral damage 
among the Libyan civilian population and also among the rebels; subse-
quently, public support for the mission, particularly among Arab states, 
soon dwindled. Moreover, in what had become a Libyan civil war, NATO 
clearly sided with the anti-Gaddafi forces. In fact, the Alliance superim-
posed on the fully legal and legitimate humanitarian mission, a politically 
problematic and controversial military intervention to enable the over-
throw of Libya’s dictatorial regime. 
In spite of NATO’s total air and sea dominance, the heavy losses suf-
fered by the Libyan government’s armed security forces, and the wide 
international, moral, and political support for the rebels, the heavily-
isolated Gaddafi regime fought back fiercely for more than six months. 
For the purposes of comparison, the mission lasted twice as long, and 
produced many more military and civilian casualties than NATO’s 1999 
mission in Yugoslavia, where by all accounts Milošević’s forces were 
much better armed. Perhaps as a result, a similar international response 
has been ruled out in Syria; although from a humanitarian standpoint, it 
appears even more justified given the large number of civilian casual-
ties. This has been due, i.a., to the Russian Federation’s stiff opposition 
in the UN Security Council (supported for different reasons by China), 
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the Russian and Iranian military and political support for the Assad re-
gime, and the greater military risks involved. 
In contrast to the European Union’s response to the Arab Spring, NATO 
reacted much faster, performed more proficiently, and more than ful-
filled its immediate objectives during the Libyan crisis. Unlike the EU’s 
cumbersome institutional structure and burdening decision-making 
framework, both of which function poorly in times of crisis, the Alliance 
has been designed and organized from its inception to operate well 
under the worst of conditions. The difference in the resulting perfor-
mance has been impressive. NATO proved once again to be the only 
inter-state organization capable of dealing effectively with severe hu-
manitarian crises in Europe and its neighborhood. In spite of its internal 
tensions, NATO was able to organize and execute a large scale “out-
of-area” military operation successfully. On the political side, NATO 
forces decisively contributed to the overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime, 
and even accidentally to the dictator’s capture, where after he was 
tortured and hasty executed by the rebels. Following this violation of 
international humanitarian law, NATO officially terminated the opera-
tion on October 31, 2011; however, the National Transitional Council of 
Libya requested a several month extension of the mission. The success 
of Operation Unified Protector allowed the new authorities to declare 
an end to the civil war and begin preparations for the orderly rebuild-
ing of the Libyan state, which would be, according to public state-
ments, based on the principles of representative democracy, as well 
as Arab religious and cultural heritage. 
Much more effectively than the European Union, NATO has contributed 
to the creation of favorable internal and external conditions for the transi-
tion to democracy in Libya, allowing Libyans themselves to decide their 
state’s future. Further, the Alliance is ready to provide advice in rebuilding 
the Libyan armed forces, carry out security sector reforms, and develop 
democratic civil-military relations should the newly legitimate Libyan au-
thorities request such assistance.
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3. Lessons to be drawn
Following the EU’s failed policy in the southern Mediterranean, the Euro-
pean Council and European Commission are expected to review and es-
tablish the EU’s future priorities in the region. Given the well-documented 
support many European leaders gave to the region’s dictators, perhaps 
the organization’s most pressing concern is whether it can present itself 
as a friend of the Arab peoples, rather than an energy-hungry, fortress 
Europe. 
Yet the need for revising the EU’s Neighborhood Policy could not come 
at a more inconvenient time, given the prolonged period of financial in-
solvency in several EU Mediterranean states, and the overall crisis in the 
Eurozone as a whole. The resulting stagnation and economic downturn 
in many EU member states only increases the pressures on the EU and 
national budgets. Thus, it would be unrealistic to expect the ENP and the 
EU External Action to receive much needed funds above what has been 
forecast in the 2007 – 2013 Financial Perspective. The same limitation ap-
plies to the European Investment Bank as well.
The philosophy behind the European Neighborhood Policy has to date 
been based on the presumption that it is essentially up to the partner 
countries to reform themselves. In fact, the developments in a number 
of Arab states reveal that the EU must reform some of its most basic poli-
cies. Therefore, in order to promote long-term democratic stability in the 
southern Mediterranean and in the Middle East, the European Union must: 
 - coordinate a consistent Mediterranean policy and refrain from us-
ing double standards when dealing with Arab regimes;
 - remove protectionist barriers; liberalize trade in agricultural prod-
ucts and in labor intensive industrial products. Such measures would 
promote more balanced economic developments in the southern 
Mediterranean;
 - develop a comprehensive and proactive immigration policy that 
would alleviate the problems associated with the EU’s aging popu-
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lation, reduce the high unemployment rates common to the region, 
and reduce the pressures caused by illegal migration into the EU;
 - adapt the Schengen system to possible future extraordinary events 
in the neighborhood;
 - assume an active role in managing the Israeli–Palestine conflict in-
stead of quietly following American policy, which has been for in-
ternal political reasons biased in favor of Israel and harmful to the 
American and EU political and economic interests in the Islamic 
world. 
Another lesson from the experience of the Arab Spring concerns the 
“strategic partnership” between the EU and NATO, which obviously lacks 
a concrete functioning ability. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and the more specialized European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) have both proven to be resounding disappointments. Un-
fortunately, without the determined efforts of its chief architects, it will be 
difficult to improve upon ESDP during the two 2012 Presidencies of the 
Council of the European Union, given the respective positions of Denmark 
and Cyprus (Denmark does not participate in the CSDP and Cyprus often 
blocks its implementation due to the long-standing conflict with Turkey). 
The very modest achievements of the Arab Spring, particularly in Egypt, 
combined with the disquieting lack of progress in managing the Arab-
Israeli conflict, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions have all exposed the serious 
limitations of the European Union’s political influence within the Arab-
speaking world. The EU’s European Mediterranean Policy, NATO’s Medi-
terranean Dialogue and the two Euro-Atlantic organizations’ relation-
ship with North African and Middle Eastern states must be reviewed and 
adapted to the new political conditions. Further, it would be appropriate 
to rethink the “Berlin-plus” arrangement between the EU and NATO, intro-
ducing a potential Berlin-plus-in-reverse mechanism. EU-NATO coopera-
tion could be improved by combining the top-bottom and bottom-up 
approaches. Moreover, Turkey and other non-EU contributors must be 
given full access to ESDP missions; EU member states Greece and Cyprus 
must be prevented from blocking NATO member Turkey. Finally, there is a 
pressing need to clarify and implement the rules for applying the doctrine 
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The recent events in the southern Mediterranean have provided the EU, 
NATO, and the international community as a whole with ample grounds 
for serious introspection and reflection on the best ways to aid social, eco-
nomic, political, and security concerns in the Mediterranean. It should be 
noted that such improvements in the EU’s southern neighborhood would 
be highly beneficial to Europeans, as well. 
References
Aliboni, R. et al. (2008). Union for the Mediterranean: Building on the Bar-
celona acquis. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
Asseburg, M. and Salem, P. (2009). No Euro-Mediterranean Community 
without peace. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
Barry, B. (2011). Libya’s Lessons. In: Survival: Global politics and Strategy, 
vol. 53, no. 5, pp. 5-14. International Institute for Strategic Studies.
De Vasconcelos, A. (ed.), (2011). The Arab democratic wave: How the EU 
can seize the moment. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
Gaub, F. (2011). Libya in Limbo: How to Fill the Security Vacuum. In: Re-
search Report. Rome: Research Division – NATO Defense College.
Gaub, F. et al. (2011). The Arab Explosion: Questions and options for NATO. In: 
Research Report. Rome: Research Division – NATO Defense College.
Gaub, F. et al. (2011). NATO’s Role in a Post-Conflict Libya. In: Research 
Report. Rome: Research Division – NATO Defense College.
Nicoll, A. (ed.), (2011). Forging a democracy from Libya’s Jamahiriya. In: 
Strategic Comments, vol. 17, comment 31, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies. 
Manoilo, A., The fig revolutions (in Russian). In: Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizh, 
pp. 63-78. (Moscow, May 2011).
Orlov, A., The first revolutions of the XXI century (in Russian). In: Mezhdun-
arodnaia Zhizh, pp. 45-52. (Moscow, May 2011).




o. 66 - 2012
XV
III (66) - 2012
114
Sloggett, D. (2011). Libya resolutions pose international questions. In: 
Jane’s Defence Weekly. Surrey.
Smith, S. J. (2011). EU-NATO cooperation: a case of institutional fatigue? In: 
European Security, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 243-264. Routledge.






o. 66 - 2012
XV
III (66) - 2012
116
Power and Progress. International politics in 
transition, Jack L. Snyder48
The end of the Cold War was marked by a breakthrough that brought 
change to the international system, and awakened a widely shared en-
thusiasm about the victory of liberal democracy over totalitarian expe-
riences of the past century. The new democratic order with a unipolar 
structure and the United States as the leading power was expected to 
guarantee peace and equal development all over the world. More than 
20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is evident that this double revo-
lution was only partial, and that the world remains heterogeneous and 
unstable, whilst current classical international relations thought fails both 
to explain the developments, as well as to predict them.
Jack Snyder, one of the leading American IR theorists associated with the 
Columbia University, has been dealing with the above mentioned issues 
for the past few decades and in his new book Power and Progress. Inter-
national politics in transition he presents a collection of his most important 
essays in a single volume framed with a new introduction, highlighting the 
crucial findings and referring to the conclusion of the early essays from a 
time perspective. Snyder’s main argument in the book is that in order to 
be analyzed, understood and ruled, the constantly transforming and ex-
tremely heterogeneous modern world requires the integration of the realist 
logic of the struggle for power and security together with the liberal logic 
of change. Only then can the system be seen as a whole constructed of 
and reproduced by both consolidated democracies, countries dealing 
with the consequences of transformation and partial democratization, as 
well as illiberal and non-democratic states, whereas the liberal theory is 
applicable rather in the world of mature democracies, and the realistic 
one in the anarchic systems of autocracies. 
Snyder makes an attempt to explain the anarchical dynamics of power 
and the modernization dynamics of progress by tracing the development 
of his own thoughts and perception of the international system over the 
past two decades. The collection of twelve essays written between 1990 
48 London and New York: Routledge, 2012. 315 pp. Security and governance series. ISBN 978-0-415-57573-7
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and 2004 has been arranged around three key subject areas: anarchy 
and its effects; the challenge of democratic transition; and empire and 
the promotion of liberal order. In each of the three parts the selected 
key IR conceptions have been addressed, whereas strong references to 
structural – both defensive and offensive – realism and liberal (though not 
idealistic) thought are clearly visible. 
In the first part of the book, devoted to the role of anarchy in international 
systems, Snyder presents fours essays published originally in 1990, 1999 and 
2002. Anarchy, perceived neither as a clearly constructivist idea, nor as 
a concept of an unchangeable and indispensably brutal world (p. 113), 
should be – according to the author – taken for granted as a starting 
point for analysis. However, security fears resulting from anarchy and the 
behavior under the security dilemma should be perceived as shaped not 
only by the strategic situation itself, but by the participants’ perception 
of their situation (p. 76). Snyder argues that none of the by now devel-
oped perspectives on security in the changing European order succeeds 
in explaining these dynamics, since the complex world requires a highly 
complex view (p. 68). Exemplarily, while referring to Waltz’s findings re-
garding the alliance strategies in multipolarity, the author underlines that 
the chain-ganging and buck-passing logics need to be completed with 
a security dilemma variable of whether offense or defense is perceived to 
have the advantage (p. 38), since only a multivariable model can mirror 
the reality of international politics.
The challenges of democratic transition became Snyder’s concern in the 
four essays written between 1994 and 2008, and collected in the second 
part of the book. The fact that consolidated democratic states have nev-
er fought wars against each other does not mean that democracy per 
se guarantees peace. Moreover, the processes of democratic transition 
often lead to extreme forms of aggressive nationalism and destabiliza-
tion, whilst Snyder’s particular concern refers to the future of the Islamic 
world (p 140).  Peaceful transition can be supported by numerous con-
ditions such as breaking up the information monopolies, promoting the 
inclusive, civic-territorial concepts of national identity or institutionalization 
of effective norms of mass political participation (p. 167). Snyder claims 
that the likeliness of experiencing a war or destabilization rises when the 
democratic transformations remain incomplete (p. 180), and takes the 
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Russian Federation into consideration, being a prominent example of a 
blurry democratic system with an unknown future (p. 202).
Hegemonic strategic myths are issues addressed in the last four essays 
written between 2004 and 2009 and selected for the third part of the book 
as a kind of reference to author’s 1993 book Myths of Empire: Domestic 
Politics and International Ambition. Starting with the observation about 
the US post 9/11 paradoxical combination of omnipotence and particular 
vulnerability to external threats (p. 214), Snyder asks questions about the 
future hegemonic role of the USA in the globalized world and argues that 
the current strategy of using military occupation as a tool to promote de-
mocratization is a very vague concept that needs to be applied carefully 
and planned strategically (p. 225). Moreover, finding the human rights 
abuses as one of the key problems of the modern world, Snyder claims 
that also the legalist approach itself, based on international courts, com-
missions and trials does little to deter further violence and is not highly cor-
related with the consolidation of peaceful democracy (p. 285).
The international system is undergoing a dual liberalizing transition – within 
the individual states and in the system as a whole,  Snyder argues in the 
conclusion to his book (p. 293), and claims that the proceeding transfor-
mation generates a significantly unstable situation and therefore creates 
new roles to be fulfilled by the mature liberal democracies. Furthermore, 
the author proposes five rules of thumb for managing the dual transition. 
Creating and sustaining a global “operating system” which indirectly fa-
cilitates democratization is so far the crucial task to be completed (p. 297), 
and should be supported by the practice of offshore balancing against 
regional threats (p. 298), together with maintaining an open door policy 
to join the liberal club (p. 298). The cooperation with illiberal reformers 
in potentially transitional states (p. 299) should be applied as an indirect 
strategy of democracy promotion (p. 299). In the meantime, standard 
diplomacy should be developed (p. 301), and the international democ-
racy promoters ought to conduct their actions patiently and in a correct 
sequence (p. 300).
The new Snyder book obviously lacks more profound criticism and expla-
nation on his findings collected over the past two decades. As he himself 
states, the world is being transformed and the time perspective changes 
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the perception, therefore, the short introduction he offers to his readers 
seems to be unsatisfying. Moreover, the idea of integrating the standpoint 
of liberalism and realism, although interesting and definitely worth devel-
oping, disappear in the book and the perspective applied in all of the 
essays is coherently neorealist. An important remark should be made also 
to one of the general assumptions being a fundament for the proposed 
analysis, mainly the certainty about the current and future unipolarity of 
the world. This US-centric bias represented by Snyder, although analyti-
cally interesting, provides the answers to the central question raised  – on 
the future role of China and other non-democratic rising powers; on the 
development of regions with weak political institutions and a rising de-
mand for mass political participation; and on the Western response to 
the opportunities and threats of leadership in a heterogeneous modern 
unipolar world (p. 10) – pretty easy to be found, though questionable in 
their explanatory value. 
Despite the assessment made above, the book represents an important 
input to the highly needed discussion about the current state and the fu-
ture IR theory, by stating that the classical thought is no longer applicable 
and that the new schools do not bring much of explanatory and pre-
dictive power. Moreover, the idea of collecting the academic achieve-
ments of the post-Cold War era and having a look at them as a whole 
signifies another requirement of modern IR theory, namely the require-
ment to treat the development of the IR as a linear, holistic process, just 
as the international politics themselves are. Only this will allow science 
to develop and increase its ability to explain the logic of power and the 
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Global trends 2030: Citizens in an  
Interconnected and Polycentric World49,  
Álvaro de Vasconcelos (ed.)
The statement that the world is changing on an unprecedented scale 
and in an unknown direction has been an academic and political mantra 
for the past twenty years. Nevertheless, change is and has always been 
an inherent element of the international system, whereas fulfillment of the 
predictive function has always been the weakest point of all international 
relations theories. Álvaro de Vasconcelos, director of the European Un-
ion Institute for Security Studies, together with the research fellows from 
the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System research project, have 
made an attempt to address and identify the long-term trends on major 
policy issues facing the EU. The report “Global trends 2030: Citizens in an 
Interconnected and Polycentric World” is a key outcome of the project. 
The results of the analysis included in the report have been structured into 
four main parts, which basically reflect the key findings of the research 
and indicate that by 2030 the world will face and will be shaped by sev-
eral global trends, such as the empowerment of the individual, greater 
stress on sustainable development against a backdrop of greater resource 
scarcity and persistent poverty, compounded by the consequences of 
climate change and the emergence of a more polycentric world char-
acterized by a shift of power from states, together with the growing gov-
ernance gaps. Each of the four parts has been further developed in sev-
eral chapters and each of them further on in few other sections.
The first part of the report has been devoted to the empowerment of in-
dividuals which is, according to the authors, one of the main symptoms of 
the declining role of the state in the international system. The evolution of 
the meaning of individual actors results mainly from developments such 
as demographic growth, global emergence of the middle class, universal 
access to education, influence of the information and communications 
technology as well as the changes in the status of women in the world. 
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Moreover, the authors further claim that the values, ideas and demands 
of people all over the world are likely to converge which, together with 
the rising civic political participation, will contrast sharply with govern-
ments’ capacity to deliver public goods. At the same time however, the 
authors underline that nationalism and populism will remain serious risks to 
the democratic developments. 
Social inequalities together with climate change and scarcities are the 
subject of the second part of the report. Despite the above mentioned 
social developments, phenomena such as diseases, corruption or weak 
education systems will restrain the empowerment and democratization 
processes. Moreover, living standards and public safety will be signifi-
cantly affected by climate change and resource scarcity. The authors 
emphasize that state security will not dominate the international agenda 
by 2030, and although it will remain a key issue, a shift to human security 
will be made a global political agenda. According to the authors neither 
a war among great powers, nor a major conflict involving WMD is likely 
to happen. Nevertheless, the possibility of inter-state conflict cannot be 
disregarded entirely, whereas border tensions, tensions over raw materials 
and nationalisms seem to be the most possible ones to occur. 
The birth of a polycentric world together with the growing governance gap 
is the issue addressed in the third part of the report. A shift in economic 
power from the U.S., Europe and Japan to China and India, increasing 
Chinese military capabilities and rising middle powers, including Indonesia, 
Turkey and South Africa, accompanied by the increasing significance of 
the non-state actors are in the author’s opinion the critical developments 
when it comes to the world’s polarity. The polycentric world tends, more-
over, to create greater awareness of the global character of the world 
citizens’ topmost concerns whereas the global governance structures will 
most probably be unable to deliver many of the international public goods. 
In the last part of the paper the authors clearly state that the global trends 
they identified do not allow defining with any certainty how the world will 
look like in 2030, as the importance of the unknown variables should not 
be underestimated and each of the trends observed now can develop 
in various directions. Therefore, the authors further argue that it remains 
crucial for the European stability to efficiently and effectively monitor the 
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transitions and develop Europe’s ability to adjust and react quickly to the 
changing international environment. 
The methodology of the ESPAS research was based on a mix of in-house 
and contract-based expertise, whereas the scholars tried to exploit the 
expertise of the EU institutions most effectively. The report is an outcome of 
cooperation of experts and think tanks both from and outside of Europe, 
namely from the United States, Brazil, China, India and Russia, but also 
from Africa, the Arab world and Turkey, and was aimed at avoiding a Eu-
rocentric perspective. The research process was organized in three main 
phases and included analysis of the existing literature and identification 
of the knowledge gaps; mobilization of the best expertise available world-
wide in order to fill those gaps and finally conferences, where the prelimi-
nary findings were discussed. Moreover, some brainstorming sessions and 
working group meetings were held and representatives of the younger 
generations were invited to attend ad hoc discussions (focus groups) on 
questions of identity, the future challenges and opportunities facing their 
countries, and political participation and social networks.
As many large-scale research projects in social sciences aimed at cap-
turing a holistic view of a systemic phenomenon and based on a broad 
spectrum of secondary sources accumulated and discussed in forums, 
the project can be criticized for its methodological dimension as well as 
subjectivity of the findings. Therefore, although the relatively low level of 
objectivity is an imminent element of social sciences per se, it is important 
to underline, that the report largely reflects the current discourse and per-
ception of the global developments, and not the developments them-
selves. And even if one agrees that the meaning of a discourse should be 
appreciated in international relations, as Barry Buzan and his fellows from 
the Copenhagen School claim, due to the deeply incoherent nature of 
both the academic and the political discourse themselves, it seems to be 
extremely hard to predict the future on the basis of such an analysis.
The above seems to be particularly visible and particularly dangerous 
when the issue of the negative dimension of international security, in the 
strict meaning, is concerned. The authors of the report undoubtedly state 
that major conflagration involving chemical, biological, radiological or 
nuclear weapons (CBRN) is not likely to happen over the next two dec-
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ades (p.17). Even in the report’s section devoted to Iran the attention is 
paid to its democratization and support for inclusive governance, and 
not to the possibility of a conflict outbreak. This matches perfectly with 
the post-Cold War broadly shared peace enthusiasm and negation of 
the possibility of a large scale war incidence. However, since security still 
remains the priority function of the state (which was also confirmed by 
the authors of the report, p. 95), it seems to be highly risky to ignore the 
possibility of a rise of a serious conflict, especially when one has in mind 
what the authors themselves emphasize, namely, that the multiplicity and 
diversity of the actors in the international structure create a great level of 
uncertainty and unpredictability in further developments. Therefore, the 
extent to which the intervening and unknown variables may influence the 
international system can be unprecedented. 
The third element of the report, which should become subject of criticism, 
is the omission of the intervening variables and their potential influence on 
the direction of the developments in the analysis. As long as it is obvious 
that some, if not the majority, of the intervening variables are at the same 
time the unknown variables, the experiences from the past two decades 
seem to prove that some trends can be observed also when the interven-
ing variables themselves are concerned. This can by exemplified by the 
9/11 attacks being a breakthrough point which was firstly, unpredicted 
(in contrast to the previous biggest turning point which was the collapse 
of the bipolar world), secondly, of an unknown nature, and thirdly, signifi-
cantly changed the global approach to security. The European Union will 
most probably have to face a similar – new, unpredictable and break-
through – phenomena within the next 20 years and a report which aims 
to outline how the world will look like by 2030 should include at least an 
attempt to address this problem. 
The last crucial issue which seems to be at least questionable among the 
findings included in the report is the problem of the individuals’ empower-
ment. In the authors’ line of reasoning, the assumption is that the weaker 
the state is, the more empowered the individuals are. This seems however, 
to be a far reaching simplification. The de-etatization of international rela-
tions indeed creates the space for the non-state actors but non-state does 
not mean grass-root, civic or individual. Furthermore, it may appear that 
the bigger the competition on the non-state level is the smaller chances 
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the individuals have to influence the decision makers and to create the 
political agenda. 
The conclusions of the EUISS report are basically confirmed by several simi-
lar reports prepared by scholars and analysts represented by institutions 
and bodies of various natures and geopolitical backgrounds. The research 
conducted by the Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, the U.S. National 
Intelligence Council and the British Wilton Park basically support the find-
ings concerning the fragmentation of the international system and the 
development of a multipolar international structure. The conclusions relat-
ed to the demographic developments, de-etatization of the international 
relations or rise of importance of BRIC powers along with several other fast 
developing countries, reveal some serious differences in results regarding 
security issues and the approach to future development trends of modern 
armed conflicts, terrorism, proliferation, etc. The NIC’s report underlines 
the rising geopolitical significance and possibility of the use of nuclear 
weapons, particularly in the Iranian context, but also if any future wars in 
Asia or the Middle East are considered. Moreover, the authors of the NIC’s 
research clearly state that a fragmented international system, together 
with the spillover from regional conflicts and the resource scarcity signifi-
cantly increase the potential for interstate conflicts, whereas new types of 
conflicts could (re)emerge, such as conflicts over resources. This seems to 
confirm Harald Waltzer’s thesis in his Climate Wars, where the attention is 
transferred from war studies to natural developments that enforce critical 
changes of living conditions thus creating migration waves and violence 
excesses with a global impact in the interconnected polycentric world. 
The report prepared by Wilton Park additionally emphasizes that nuclear 
disarmament may be counterproductive in the multipolar world and that 
the future conflicts are likely to move into new frameworks including cy-
berspace, and rising interconnection between terrorism and organized 
crime, which is mainly a result of international governance’ inability to 
adapt to new powers and arrangements.
Although serious criticism can be made when the ESPAS report is con-
cerned, it undoubtedly represents an added value to the European se-
curity discourse because of several reasons. Firstly, it points out the need 
to identify challenges that the world and Europe will have to face within 
the next few decades, and that a coherent approach based on knowl-
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edge is required in order to maintain and develop a stable international 
system. This seems particularly important when the discussion over a new 
European Security Strategy and the question of the further role of the EU 
in the polycentric world is considered. Secondly, the inclusion of a broad 
spectrum of analysts from all over the world in the research project illus-
trates and emphasizes the transfer from European or Western domination 
in international relations to a relatively balanced multipolar world. And 
finally, the holistic, systemic approach applied in the ESPAS research high-
lights one of the challenges that both academics and politicians will have 
to face, namely the rising interconnection of global issues and the impos-
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The Next Decade - Where We’ve Been … and 
Where We’re Going, George Friedman50
The book The Next Decade – Where We’ve Been … and Where We’re 
Going represents a highly detailed analysis of the potential development 
of U.S. foreign policy. The title of George Friedman’s book is self-explan-
atory, as he seeks to propose solutions for the improvement of the U.S. 
foreign policy in the following decade and emphasizes several mistakes 
that were made in the past.  
The author introduces the subject by highlighting the thesis that a cen-
tury is a period when significant events occur, while a decade is an inter-
esting period to analyze, but is usually absent of significant changes. He 
advocates the necessity for change in basic U.S. foreign policy and the 
return to balancing powers in regions throughout the world, while avoid-
ing direct interventions. A short summary of the subjects that are discussed 
in the book are presented. The first chapter outlines the global role and 
influence of the American President. The author’s argument is, on which 
he bases his idea, that the United States are an unintended empire. He 
explains that the U.S. remains the last world superpower following the 
decline, and finally the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Further analysis is 
provided on how the American President should perform his actions and 
which policies he should pursue. Comparisons are made with the Roman 
and British empires, and an account of the most influential United States’ 
presidents is provided together with their distinct qualities. 
The chapter ˝Republic, Empire and the Machiavellian President˝ discuss-
es the moral dilemma of maintaining an empire based on democratic 
principles. It also considers particular mechanisms that could limit the 
power of the American President. The author presents his opinion taking 
into consideration both the idealist and the realist view of the role of the 
United States in the world as well as reinterpreting several Machiavellian 
ideas. The third chapter discusses the aftermath of September 11, and 
the financial panic of 2008, as two key events that had a crucial influ-
ence on the past decade. The author provides a short overview of the 
50 New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2011. 272 pp. ISSN 978-0-385-5329-5
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situation prior to the financial collapse. He further analyses the policies 
which were enacted by former American Presidents in order to revitalize 
the economy. 
The next chapter discusses the belief that the primary goal of the 9/11 at-
tack was to reveal America’s vulnerability. Thus, if the United States could 
be threatened, Bin Laden believed this would prove that no government 
was secure, which would enable his idea of a revolution aimed at the 
restoration of the Islamic caliphate. Furthermore, an interesting argument 
considers the necessity of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also analyses mis-
takes regarding Iraq and the Iranian focus on the nuclear program. The 
chapter ˝The Terror Trap˝ analyses the term ˝War on Terror˝ and why the 
use of such a phrase is focused on a far too wide field. The author does 
not disregard the potential threats arising from terrorism, yet he argues 
that these threats were given a far too central position in creating the 
U.S. foreign policy. He also believes that the risk of terrorist’ possession of 
weapons of mass destruction is minimal.
Chapter six concerns Israel and displays relevant historic data that ex-
plain the roots of the conflict in this troubled region. Friedman proposes 
that the United States should reconsider their policy and involvement in 
the conflict. The following chapter analyses American interests in the area 
between the eastern Mediterranean and the Hindu Kush. It also questions 
the issue of destabilization of balance in the region and discusses means 
for its restoration.  Friedman analyses potential dangers of the rising Ira-
nian power and solutions to this issue. He also considers the consequences 
of a possible U.S-.Iranian understanding that would resolve current issues. 
The eighth chapter analyses the power of the Russian Federation and pro-
vides a short illustration of relevant historic events. The author explains the 
complex geostrategic relations in the region, subsequent to the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union. In addition, an analysis is presented of potential 
development of relations between the Russian Federation and particular 
European countries, taking into consideration countries which represent 
important strategic partners in the region. The chapter ˝Europe’s Return 
to History˝ starts with an outline of the numerous conflicts that Europe had 
throughout its history. Friedman presents a short history of the European 
Union and the pivotal role of Germany. The role of Germany in the eco-
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nomic crisis is examined as well as its relations with peripheral countries 
of the European Union. An interesting analysis of the future of Poland is 
explained as well as its crucial geostrategic position. 
The following chapter proposes actions that should be taken in the Western 
Pacific. The author holds on to the idea of balance of power as he advo-
cates solutions to maintain future stability between China and Japan and 
Pakistan and India. He stresses the dependence of Japan on U.S. resources, 
as well as the fact that China’s functioning would  be a lot harder without 
the United States because a vast amount of their products are being dis-
tributed in the U.S. market. The author bases his ideas on in-depth analysis of 
economic and historical data, taking into account the geostrategic posi-
tion of these countries. He believes it will be necessary for the United States 
to make a significant shift in several of its current policies. 
The eleventh chapter provides an overview of the issues related to South 
America and U.S. policy towards its nearest neighbors. The author pre-
sents reasonable arguments on why no country in the region is problem-
atic to the United States, including Venezuela. The chapter mostly consid-
ers U.S.-Mexican relations and the issues that exist as consequence of the 
co-dependency and the collaboration of these economies, especially 
considering the issue of illegal immigrants and the drug market. The only 
possible emerging threat might be Brazil with its growing economy, al-
though that could also be balanced by assisting Argentine. 
The title of the chapter ˝Africa: a Place to Leave Alone˝ is self-explanato-
ry. The author believes that, with the exception of Northern Africa, Africa 
is a region where the United States have no significant interests and that 
there are no notable threats there. The main argument for these views is 
that the majority of African states do not have a strong central govern-
ment, so establishing a balance of power there is impossible. During the 
Cold War, the U.S. presence was necessary in order to restrain the Soviet 
power. The author does not see any similar threat in the coming decade. 
The thirteenth chapter discusses demographic and technological issues. 
It emphasizes the problem of the generation popularly called the ˝baby 
boom˝ generation of the 1950-s. The analysis is focused on finding poten-
tial solutions. The author displays the evolution of significant technological 
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inventions and their relevance. He also discusses the issue of energy re-
sources deficiency, as well as potential alternative energy resources and 
global environmental issues. The final chapter sums up the arguments 
and solutions presented throughout the book. The author underlines that, 
with the end of the isolation period in 1898, the United States evidently 
stepped on the path of imperial power and also highlights the necessity of 
setting a balance between moral principles and a realistic foreign policy. 
The mistakes of the past decade can be rectified and the next decade 
will be a crucial time for the American nation to mature and understand 
its position in the world. 
Regardless of whether the reader agrees with the argumentation pre-
sented in the book, it is a very well written projection of possible intriguing 
scenarios that might follow the United States in the next decade, as well 
as multiple recommendations as to how the U. S. should deal with the 
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Nations in Transit 2011: Democratization 
from Central Europe to Eurasia, Sylvana Habdank-
Kolaczkowska and Christopher T. Walker (eds.)51
The following book is the 15th volume of Nations in Transit52, published an-
nually by Freedom House. Freedom House is an American think tank that 
conducts international comparative research and publishes reports on 
the state of democracy, political freedom, human rights and freedom of 
the press in the world. Founded in 1941 by Eleanor Roosevelt (spouse of 
Democrat US President Franklin D. Roosevelt) and Wendell Willkie (Repub-
lican presidential candidate), it is a non-governmental research institute 
that was originally intended to popularize American involvement in the 
Second World War.  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Freedom House started doing research on 
democratic transition, issuing reports on country progress in establishing 
democratic standards, protecting civic and human rights and freedom 
of speech. Freedom House’s work revolves around three activities: analy-
sis, advocacy and action (AAA). However, its main goal is not only re-
search on the global state of democracy, it also aims to lobby among US 
decision-makers to adopt policies which further democracy and human 
rights on the global level. Finally, it takes direct action through training, as-
sistance and grants which helps similar organizations in various countries 
– especially those struggling to become more democratic. 
This year’s Nations in Transit 2011 report is subtitled Democratization from 
Central Europe to Eurasia. Its editors are Sylvana Habdank-Kołaczkowska, 
Project Director of Nations in Transit and Christopher T. Walker, Director of 
Studies at Freedom House.
The methodology used in the book is explained in the first chapter. The 
book covers 29 post-communist countries in Europe and Asia and meas-
51 New York and Washington: Freedom House, 2011. 24 pp. www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Full 
Booklet%2C NIT2011_0.pdf
52 The first Nations in Transit report was published in 1995. 
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ures and compares their progress in democratization for the period from 
January to December 2010. The 29 country reports all follow seven re-
search topics: national democratic governance, electoral process, civil 
society, independent media, local democratic governance, judicial 
framework and independence, and corruption. The results for these seven 
categories (criteria) are shown on a scale from 1 (highest level of demo-
cratic progress) to 7 (lowest level of democratic progress). The ratings are 
calculated according to a quarter-point scale, so that smaller changes in 
democratic progress equal a change of 0.25, while changes of a bigger 
scope equal 0.5. The ratings are based on a range of questions posed for 
each of the seven categories. The Nations in Transit 2011 list of questions 
includes five questions on national democratic governance (including 5-6 
sub-questions), ten questions about the electoral process, ten questions 
about the civil society, ten questions on independent media, six questions 
on local democratic governance, (with 4-6 sub-questions), nine questions 
on the judicial framework and independence, and ten questions on cor-
ruption. 
The average score in each of the seven categories gives an overall De-
mocracy Score (which was first employed in the 2004 edition) for each 
country. According to this score (on a scale of 1 to 7), Freedom House’s 
researchers classify the regime types in their country. Countries with a De-
mocracy Score of 1-2 are labeled as consolidated democracies; those 
with a score of 3 are called semi-consolidated democracies, while the 
regimes of those countries which have a score of 4 are named transi-
tional governments or hybrid regimes. On the other hand, countries which 
received the score of 5 are labeled as semi-authoritarian regimes, while 
those which have a score of 6-7 are identified as consolidated authoritar-
ian regimes.
In the introductory chapter, titled The Authoritarian Dead End: The Arab 
Spring’s Implications for the Former Soviet Union, Christopher T. Walker 
shows how the Arab Spring debunked the myths that in some cultures (i.e. 
the Muslim world) people did not desire more freedom and that authori-
tarian regimes provided stability. He also points out that the revolutions in 
the Middle East and North Africa raise questions about the future of re-
gimes in post-Soviet countries, as most of them were consolidated or semi-
consolidated authoritarian regimes (according to the Democratic Score 
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presented in this volume), while at the same time they share many simi-
larities with the regimes which were brought down with the Arab Spring. 
Walker stresses that all nine post-Soviet authoritarian countries have shown 
a further deterioration of democratic standards in the last ten years. The 
author points out the countries where either the power holders enjoy limit-
less terms (Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) or where there 
is a controlled succession of power (Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkmenistan). 
The author emphasizes several things – the resistance to reform in authori-
tarian states, the worsening of media freedom across all regions encom-
passed in the research, strikingly bad results in regionally important coun-
tries such as Ukraine and Hungary and poor performance in the Balkans 
(with Croatia and Serbia standing out as exceptions).
The editor’s introduction is followed by tables which show ratings for all 
countries from 2002 to 2011. The final table before the country report 
chapters shows the 2011 country rankings by regime type. According to 
their Democracy Score, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Czech Republic, Poland, 
Lithuania, Slovakia and Hungary are consolidated democracies, while 
Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro are semi-consolidat-
ed democracies. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova are labeled as transitional governments or hybrid regimes, while 
Kosovo and Armenia are identified as semi-consolidated authoritarian 
regimes. Finally, consolidated authoritarian regimes include Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uz-
bekistan. 
The reports are listed alphabetically and not according to the countries’ 
Democracy Score or regional affiliation. Each report consists of basic 
country information, taken from the Word Bank data, a table showing 
ratings and scores from 2002 to 2011, and an executive summary which 
briefly covers democratic progress across the seven aforementioned cat-
egories and gives an outlook for the following year. The country report 
also includes a main report which further explains the main events and 
processes which influenced annual progress in each of the categories. 
Short information on the authors can be found at the end of each report, 
while the bibliography (references) used is presented as endnotes at end 
of each “case study”.
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Overall, the Democracy Score declined in 12 countries (Albania, Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Hungary, Ko-
sovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Russia and Ukraine), while it improved in 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia. Croatia’s score improved from 
3.71 to 3.64, while its best score was 3.54, measured in 2002. Independent 
media suffered setbacks in Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Ko-
sovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Ukraine, while the electoral process 
saw improvements in Czech Republic, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Mol-
dova, Poland and Slovakia. Croatia achieved democratic progress in the 
fields of civil society and corruption, while in all other categories its scores 
remained unchanged, which implies stagnation in democratic develop-
ment. Out of all seven categories, Croatia received poorest results for judi-
cial framework and independence, and corruption (both 4.25), while civil 
society reached the best score (2.50). 
This book can be useful for academics, policymakers, civil society activ-
ists and the media alike. The year-by-year scores for each category and 
country enables both a cross-country and a chronological comparative 
approach. The concisely collected, carefully sorted and arranged data 
presented in this Freedom House analytical report can be employed for 
further research on a range of topics. For example, a country’s invest-
ment opportunities could be correlated with its corruption score, while for 
the ones aspiring to become members of the European Union, scores for 
national democratic governance and judicial framework and independ-
ence could be linked with each country’s state of progress towards full EU 
membership.
The book can be warmly recommended as a useful resource for students 
and researchers interested in comparative politics, post-communist stud-
ies, processes of democratization and the correlations between demo-
cratic governance and security, as well as those with an interest in one of 
the regions (new EU members in Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans 
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European Union Diplomacy: Coherence, Unity 
and Effectiveness, Dieter Mahncke and  
Sieglinde Gstöhl (eds.)53
The European Union punches below its weight when performing as a foreign 
policy actor, mainly due to its sui generis nature and the inherent tension be-
tween supranationalism and inter-governmentalism as the EU member states 
want to keep their foreign policy prerogatives. Despite some progress since 
the late 1990s, the EU has been struggling to strengthen its capabilities and 
instruments, and secure necessary political consensus in order to upgrade 
its foreign policy. In that sense, the Lisbon Treaty with its latest institutional ar-
chitecture in the EU’s external relations could open a new era for the EU by 
securing a stronger, more coherent and unified EU’s voice in global affairs. 
The book focuses on the Lisbon Treaty-led institutional changes in the 
EU’s external relations and analyses their impacts on the EU as a diplo-
matic actor. The authors provide an analysis of the first results of the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is at the same 
time Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), and the impacts of the 
President of the European Council and European External Action Service 
(EEAS). These changes have improved the EU’s capacity to achieve insti-
tutional coherence and bridge the gap between the European Commis-
sion and European Council through the HR/VP posture whose work should 
be supported by the EEAS as the EU’s diplomatic service. Apart from this 
institutional set-up, authors emphasize the profound change the Treaty 
brought by merging the EU’s foreign policy with other EU’s external poli-
cies (e.g. enlargement, trade, energy or environmental policy), as the EU 
aims to amplify its political clout by achieving greater policy coherence 
across the entire cluster of external policies. However, the first results of 
the post-Lisbon EU represent only a starting point ahead of gradual de-
velopment, whose final outcome will be determined by the EU’s political 
leadership and its strategic vision for the EU’s global role in the 21st cen-
tury. This analysis of post-Lisbon EU is depicted in the foreword given by 
Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, who praises the 
53 Brussels, Berlin and New York: Peter Lang, 2012. 273 pp. ISBN 78-90-5201-842-3
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Lisbon Treaty in developing continuity of the EU’s strategic interests and 
objectives, elaborated in the ensuing ten chapters. The first part of the 
book analyses internal or institutional aspects of the EU diplomacy while 
the second part assesses external aspects of the EU diplomacy.
In the first, introductory chapter, Dieter Mahncke elaborates the historical 
genesis and development of the EU’s diplomacy, that experienced a ma-
jor breakthrough after the collapse of communism and whose position was 
advanced through the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon treaties. Howev-
er, the author expresses major concern over the real content of the EU’s for-
eign policy that should be implemented through the institutional framework 
enclosed in the Lisbon Treaty because the EU possesses only broad foreign 
policy objectives that can be made operational through the HR/VP and 
the EEAS. However, the EU Member States pose a crucial challenge to this 
coherent EU’s foreign policy as they don’t want to hand over sovereignty in 
foreign and security policy and have opposed strengthening of the EEAS. 
Consequently, their reluctance to use the most recent EU’s foreign policy 
toolbox and achieve greater unity undermines the Union’s strength and 
downsizes the strategic significance of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Paul Quinn in the second chapter analyzes the post-Lisbon external rela-
tions through the prism of coherence. Several pre-Lisbon problems have 
been amended by abolishing the pillar-structure, granting legal person-
ality to the EU and uniting external representations under the EEAS au-
thority while the HR/VP became a guardian of the coherence principle. 
These legal and institutional changes have upgraded horizontal coher-
ence across the EU policy-making and improved the EU’s capacity to act. 
However, vertical coherence between the EU and Member State policies 
will be harder to achieve because the „concept of conferral“ allows the 
EU to act only within powers granted by the Member States whereas the 
institutional coherence across different EU institutions is challenged by the 
tension between actors in the EU’s foreign policy machinery. Challenges 
of the vertical and the institutional (in)coherence were clearly visible dur-
ing the setting-up of the EEAS, the analysis of which is provided by Benja-
min Barton in the third chapter. Namely, the EEAS nominally represents an 
autonomous body, aiming to streamline the EU’s foreign policy abilities, 
pool the resources and secure the coordination across various institutions 
dealing with foreign policy. However, it emerged after years of institution-
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al wrangling within the EU regarding the distribution of power and com-
petences within the EEAS. These institutional turf wars have continued in 
the aftermath of the EEAS’ set-up, with the Member States keeping their 
dominant influence. The success of the EEAS fundamentally depends on 
the Member States’ willingness to use the EEAS as the building block upon 
which to construct a unified foreign policy. 
After institutional issues, the following two chapters deal with personalities 
and values in the EU’s foreign policy. Anna-Claire Marangoni analyses the 
first years in office of Catherine Ashton and Herman Van Rompuy. She high-
lights the importance of first appointees in shaping new positions, contrib-
uting to institutional creativity and exercising far-reaching agenda-setting 
powers. Focusing on Lady Ashton’s track record, the general observations 
are that she has not lived up to the expectations yet, especially when com-
pared with the tenure of Javier Solana. Solana was the first EU High Repre-
sentative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and has consid-
erably shaped the EU’s diplomacy by framing issues and pushing towards 
innovative policy proposals. Therefore, Lady Ashton should become a stra-
tegic thinker through her HR/VP post, being able to frame issues, achieve 
compromises and position herself appropriately towards other EU institutions 
and the Member States. Regarding Van Rompuy’s tenure, he has performed 
an important brokering role between a variety of actors and has also shown 
willingness to perform an influential foreign policy role. The following chapter, 
written by Yannick Hartstein, reflects on the role of seconded national experts 
(SNEs) in the EU’s foreign policy. The SNEs are important agents for the Euro-
peanization of the foreign policy through social learning mechanisms that 
reconstruct their interests and identities, previously dominated by national 
foreign policy issues. In that sense, CFSP institutions have an important so-
cialization function because they provide an environment that facilitates the 
adoption of new norms, rules and values among the SNEs, thus contributing 
to the creation of a distinct EU’s foreign policy culture.  
The sixth chapter deals with the EU’s multilateral diplomacy and marks 
the beginning of the second part of the book which focuses on the ex-
ternal aspects of the EU’s diplomacy. Sieglinde Gstöhl analyses changes 
brought by the Lisbon Treaty in the EU’s external representation, namely 
within the UN institutions. She argues the Treaty does not necessarily en-
sure a „single European voice“ because most multilateral organizations 
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are state-centric,  meaning they would require change of their constitu-
tive acts in order to secure membership of the EU as the collective entity 
instead of its Member States, a scenario not likely to happen. Furthermore, 
other major actors are not necessarily in favor of the EU speaking as a 
single block and the EU countries themselves seek to protect their inter-
national positions against the Commission and the HR/VP in the interna-
tional fora. Consequently, the EU emerges as the “patchwork power” in 
multilateral diplomacy, represented by varying actors and lacking a sin-
gle stance. The comprehensive nature of the EU’s diplomacy is evident in 
the following two chapters that focus on the EU’s bilateral and unilateral 
diplomacy. Youri Devuyst and Jing Men analyze, in the seventh chapter, 
the EU’s extensive practice of political dialogue with third countries and 
regional organizations. Political dialogue is an important asset of the EU 
because it affirms the EU’s collective identity and improves the policy-
planning process through a regular exchange of information and by fo-
cusing on priority issues. Authors particularly focus on the bilateral EU-Chi-
na political dialogue that has significantly improved mutual cooperation 
and partnership since the mid 1990s, confirming the valuable place of 
political dialogue for the EU in world affairs. Chapter Eight, written by An-
dré Ghione, elucidates the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU’s trade 
policy because it now falls within the overall EU’s external action objec-
tives and is being scrutinized by the European Parliament. Essentially, the 
EU, by employment of a trade policy, now aims to strike a proper balance 
between its values of human rights, good governance and sustainable 
development, with its commercial interests. 
Shannon Petry, in chapter nine, focuses on the external perceptions of the 
EU’ diplomacy by analyzing the process of transformation from Commis-
sion Delegations to the EU “embassies” within the EEAS ambit since 2010. 
The analysis has shown that the international partners have positively en-
dorsed the Lisbon Treaty-led changes in the EU’s diplomacy and gener-
ally appreciate its importance for the Union. Additionally, it is argued that 
international partners are primarily focused on the substance or capac-
ity of new EU’s diplomatic corps to deliver appropriate results. Therefore, 
research clearly sheds light on the need to secure appropriate training 
of the EEAS staff in order to secure efficient implementation of the EU’s 
foreign policy, as being stressed by Dieter Mahncke and Sieglinde Gstöhl 
in the concluding chapter. This training is a necessary precondition in im-
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proving the EEAS’ working capacity but can also play an important role in 
creating the EU’s diplomatic culture and foreign policy identity. 
The book offers a first account of the impact the Lisbon Treaty had on EU’s 
foreign policy implementation, evidently contributing to the academic de-
bate on the EU’s role in international relations. The book reveals the com-
plex nature of EU’s global posture in the post-Lisbon era and shows its mul-
tifaceted nature, endowed with various subjects and overlapping policy 
domains. The authors analyze in detail the inter-institutional wrangling within 
the EU’s foreign policy domain and the position of the EU member countries 
which still want to have a grip on their prerogatives, representing major ob-
stacles in securing a coherent and unified EU voice in global affairs. 
Additionally, the authors provide an assessment of the EU-induced changes of 
cognitive patterns among national policy-makers, leading to compliance with 
the EU norms and rules. However, this is the point of major objection towards 
the authors’ approach. In particular, the authors remain reluctant towards 
the EU’s possibilities to develop a coherent and unified foreign policy and are 
generally too critical towards the newly established HR/VP post, undermining 
its potential autonomy and giving advantage to the EU Member States. The 
political will of the EU Member States is indeed crucial in definition of the EU’ for-
eign policy however, this policy cannot be solely analyzed through the prism 
of inter-governmentalism or lowest-common denominator logic. The EU has 
developed a “coordination reflex” and the sense of “we-ness” within the for-
eign policy where the EU identity and interests are being mutually constituted. 
This struggle of the EU to define the content and objectives of its foreign policy 
occurs within a particular transnational social milieu where policy makers share 
ideational bonds and seek to translate them into concrete actions. Therefore, 
the emergence of a common EU strategic culture could become the fortitude 
in determining the success of the HR/VP and EEAS because it could stimulate a 
myriad of different voices within the EU’s foreign policy, thus turning them into 
the same direction. Despite the objections, regarding the easily undermined 
perspectives for a coherent EU diplomacy, this book can be recommended 
to scholars, practitioners and the wider audience interested in the EU’s exter-
nal relations as it offers an overview of a historical struggle to reach a single EU 
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An Introduction to European 
Foreign Policy 2nd ed., Fraser Cameron54
The book An Introduction to European Foreign Policy, written by Fraser 
Cameron, one of the leading experts on the external relations of the EU, 
provides an excellent insight into the key topics concerning the Union and 
its role in the globalised world including the reforms that the Lisbon Treaty 
brings, transatlantic relations and the ongoing financial crisis in Europe.
The European Union succeeded in imposing itself as a leading player in 
many international contexts: it is the most prominent actor in environmental 
policies, the largest provider of development assistance and the most im-
portant trade partner worldwide. Still, despite these massive achievements, 
the EU failed to impose itself as a main actor in international politics. 
In the context of a changing geo-strategic environment, where military 
power is rarely sufficient to resolve political problems, the United States 
are far from losing their role of a diplomatic superpower although new 
actors have been emerging as key international actors.  However, while 
BRIC countries seem far from representing a serious challenge to the US 
predominant position due to compelling domestic issues, the EU still lacks 
a clear identity and has trouble expressing independent views.
This shortage is reflected by the poor step forward made by the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), since its institution in the early 1990s 
compared to the enormous progress that have characterized the other 
two pillars of the Union. 
European Member States always tried to prevent the Commis-
sion in having a proactive role in this policy area, the conse-
quence of which is the political cooperation having been estab-
lished, since its creation in the 1970s, on an intergovernmental basis. 
This entails that, in order to adopt joint action and common positions (the 
means that EU addressed to third states), consensus must be reached 
among all the 27 members. 
54 London and New York: Routledge, 2012. 293 pp. ISBN 978-0-415-59923-8
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Turning back to a historical perspective, European Political Cooperation 
started as a merely declaratory cooperation that started its development 
after 1992 in a proper policy area, with its own structures and institutions. 
There couldn’t have been a worse time for the launch of this new policies 
field than the outbreak of the war in former Yugoslavia that underlined 
all the limits of the newborn policy. Still, in such an adverse environment, 
important achievements have been acquired: the EU successfully dealt 
with the Hungarian and Russian minority issues and it managed to lobby 
effectively for the 1995 extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty. 
As described above, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is purely 
intergovernmental, this means the Council has the lion’s share of the deci-
sion making process, leaving little room for  maneuver to the Commission 
and to the Parliament. The institution which emerged as a key player in 
this institutional strife between the EU bodies is the High Representative for 
the CFSP: thanks to the highly charismatic Javier Solana, who was the first 
official holding this position since its creation in 1997. Solana emerged as 
one of the main stakeholders in European diplomacy.
One of the most recent developments has been the creation of the Euro-
pean External Action Service, an independent body meant to overcome 
the frictions between the EU institutions and promote coherent external 
relations. It will be the duty of the new representative Catherine Ashton, 
to shape this agency according to the transparent and consensual ap-
proach held by the former HR, which has been worldwide acclaimed as 
an example of new diplomacy going beyond the mere balance of power. 
Javier Solana also gave a striking contribution to the development of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy. With the adoption of an enlight-
ening document he has set the priorities for many external actions of the 
EU, and following the path traced by the Petersberg Tasks and by the Hel-
sinki Headline Goals, CSDP missions were sent to Bosnia, FYROM, Congo 
and Georgia, giving a significant contribution to security and humanitar-
ian crisis management. 
Furthermore, proving that Internal Security is not the only priority of the Eu-
ropean external activities, the Neighborhood Policies are aimed at build-
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ing a tight cooperation with those countries that have no prospects of 
accession. These actions, targeted towards Mediterranean and Eastern 
European Countries, have been increasingly linked to a strict conditional-
ity concerning the implementation of the rule of law to avoid the risk of 
hindering the process of democratization. 
A different approach has been used towards the Balkans. The Europe-
anization of the region has always been a priority since the failure of sta-
bilisation in the early nineties. With its association programs, the EU has 
undertaken cooperation aimed at the gradual integration of most of the 
Western Balkans into European structures. The fulfillment of the accession 
negotiations by Croatia is the first milestone in a process that will con-
tribute to the consolidation of the EU as an indispensable partner for the 
whole area.
What emerges as a key issue that could legitimize a deeper integration in 
EU external policies is the prevention of conflicts and crisis management. 
This has been seen as a main weakness at the early stages of the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy but its initial failures must be ascribed to 
the initial reluctance of Member States to transfer sufficient powers to the 
supranational institutions.
Still, significant achievements were made in minorities’ protection in Mac-
edonia and effective peacekeeping actions were taken in many African 
nations, despite the comprehensible difficulties related to the respect of 
the will of 27 different nations. Conflict management, by its very nature, 
requires a fast decision making process. This is the ratio underlying the in-
stitution of a new Directorate for Conflict Prevention: a unit that will hasten 
the response capacity of the EU towards unexpected crisis.
One of the most pressing demands that the civil society has addressed 
to the EU is a more effective coordination of the counter terrorism offices. 
The EU is tackling this threat with both internal and international coop-
eration including the creation of common criminal data files and the es-
tablishment of a closer collaboration between national police forces. The 
perspective of the creation of a European Central Intelligence Agency 
would give a crucial shift to the fight against terrorism but it faces over-
whelming obstacles due to the reluctance of the national services.
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Making an assessment of these first two decades of European Foreign 
Policy is no easy matter. The external dimension remains a sensitive area 
for most of the Member States, especially for those who, led by pride, still 
aspire to exert a leading diplomatic role. Still, in this challenging environ-
ment, the CFSP can take credit for some modest success, leaving a prom-
ising future perspective. 
Worldwide calls for an EU speaking with one voice can hardly be ignored 
because a community with over 500 million people cannot escape from 
playing a greater role in the world affairs.
An Introduction to European Foreign Policy is vital reading material for all 
those who want to get a concise and clear overview of European and 
International politics, including the information on the New EU External Ac-
tion Service, European and security defence missions in Afghanistan and 
Kosovo, issues such as Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Iran, and strategic partners 
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The Delphic Oracle on Europe. Is There a Future 
for the European Union? Loukas Tsoukalis and 
Janis A. Emmanouilidis (eds.)55
This book represents a continuance of the European Seminar of the Hel-
lenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), held in Delphi 
in June 2009. The seminar The Delphic Oracle on Europe brought together 
leading theorists and policy makers who discussed the ways forward for 
the EU in times of global crisis. The book itself is divided into three parts: 
Part I focuses on the Union’s institutions and the issue of leadership, Part 
II analyses key elements of the new socio-economic situation in Europe, 
while Part III discusses the EU’s global role in the post-crisis world. 
The book opens with Jonas Condomines Béraud’s assessment of the Lis-
bon Treaty implementation. According to him, it is still too early to consider 
the possibility of extending the classic adversarial political model on a Eu-
ropean level. Even if there existed a political will for this type of transforma-
tion, the transition period for agreement of such new European treaties 
would take longer than expected. In this unfavorable context the princi-
ple question Béraud poses is whether Europe can afford to wait? The sub-
sequent argument written by Olaf Cramme analyses the problem of lead-
ership in the EU. The author makes a distinction between entrepreneurial 
or problem-solving leadership, which the EU has plenty of, and directional 
leadership which the EU is lacking. This situation is explained as a conse-
quence of the rising complexity of policy making in the EU, namely, where 
once there was emphasis on strategic and directional discussions now 
there is increased preoccupation with getting the details right in rather 
technical agreements. In the final account in Part I written by Josep Borrell 
Fontelles, the author analyses the future role of the European Parliament. 
Fontelles explains in great detail the innovations introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty in the case of the EP. In his view, using the new powers assigned by 
the Treaty, the EP will become more like an ordinary Parliament and less a 
talking shop – a criticism repeatedly mentioned in the past. 
55 Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 230 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-959384-2
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Part II of the book sums up an excellent group of authors who are skepti-
cal towards the possibility of Europe to abandon the current unfavorable 
state of affairs any time soon. Pier Carlo Padoan indicates that in order 
for Europe to grow, the Member States need to take necessary steps to 
establish a single representation in international forums and complete 
the process of integration in the areas where such a need exists. Unfortu-
nately, according to Padoan, such development is not very likely, due to 
the famous Olson problem. In other words, decades of integration have 
increased the capacity of special interests to resist changes, while at the 
same time the ability of political leaders to overcome such resistance has 
weakened. In the following chapter, written by Dieter Helm, he evaluates 
possibilities for materializing the proclaimed green growth of the Europe-
an economy. He indicates that, contrary to the idea that decarbonisa-
tion of European economy will cost less than 1 per cent of GDP per an-
num, correct policy cost calculations indicate that the costs would be 
much higher. This does not imply that such actions are not worth doing, 
but rather that the price will be a reduced standard of living.
In his account about the crisis and the governance of the Euro, Area An-
dré Sapir states that the EU treaties did not foresee any mechanism for 
crisis management and crisis resolution. It is as if the treaties assumed that 
crisis prevention would be efficient and the development of instruments 
to manage and to resolve crises would only have a moral hazard effect. 
He concludes by stating that the monetary union does require some form 
of fiscal union. Therefore, current developments towards more fiscal soli-
darity and less fiscal sovereignty clearly amount to an important first step 
towards a fiscal, and thereby, a political union. Assessing the political 
economy of the single market Roger Liddle notes that European recovery 
will be managed by the private sector. “State capitalism” is not the model 
for Europe’s future, even though governments at all levels must exercise 
a developmental role in support of business growth. Therefore, the EU’s 
role will not just be to regulate the market, but to nurture a constructive, 
non-competitive framework for state activism that supports the market. 
In Liddle’s view a refreshed commitment to the European style capitalism 
should support the business ethics of long-termism, social partnership and 
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For Philippe Herzog social Europe needs to adapt to the new circum-
stances and challenges created by the crisis. Therefore, he calls for a new 
growth model based on the development of human capabilities, the pro-
motion and extension of European public goods, the introduction of tax 
incentives to encourage training and investment, reforms in the financial 
sector, strengthening of the EU’s industrial policy, and further develop-
ment of the European social dialogue.  
Part III of the book starts with Jolyon Howorth’s article on the need for 
the EU to develop a grand strategy. According to the author, the Lisbon 
Treaty was devised as a set of instruments which would allow the Union to 
play an ever greater role on the global stage. However, there are many 
obstacles to achieving that ambition such as: bureaucratic in-fighting in 
Brussels, the residual national ambitions or the personal ambitions of indi-
vidual statesmen. These obstacles need to be overcome by a grand strat-
egy which would allow Europe to resume a stronger influence on global 
affairs. The account written by Zaki Laïdi starts with the assumption that 
Europe is risk averse. Being risk averse is in itself neither a quality nor a 
weakness, rather, it is a manner of being in the world and Europe’s task 
is to discover  how to put this characteristic to use and to accord value 
to it in the context of the current international system. The final article to 
Part III, written by Janis A. Emmanouilidis, further evaluates the topic of 
global Europe. In the author’s view, Europe’s ability to assume a global 
role is still hampered by different foreign policy traditions and cultures and 
by diverging interests defined predominantly in the national framework. 
Europe should enable Europeans to manage and co-determine global 
and regional developments. This however, requires the enhancement of 
Europe’s global role through the definition and implementation of a lim-
ited number of strategic projects.  
In a separately written conclusion to this volume, Loukas Tsoukalis, by us-
ing the metaphor “The Delphic Oracle on Europe”, sums up the most im-
portant messages of the book. His general conclusion is that despite the 
current deep crises, there still is hope for Europe. His moderate optimism is 
based on the fact that the crisis in the EU will result with stronger and more 
effective governance structures, including a more effective regulation of 
the financial markets. Still, this is only the first step since the EU needs a 
new narrative. This time the emphasis should be on policy innovation and 
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measures that work in a complementary fashion with those at the na-
tional and local level. Furthermore, there should be enough room for dif-
ferentiation in order to bridge the internal divergence. Last but not least, 
the political system of the EU should be enriched by an increased level of 
political competition while globally Europe should learn how to speak in 
one voice.
This book represents an interesting collection which provides analysis of 
the current state of affairs as well as ideas and recommendations con-
cerning the future development of the EU. It was published at a very sensi-
tive moment, when the EU was going through the most severe economic 
and political crisis in its half century history. Under the pressure of inevitable 
daily crisis management, many of the dilemmas analyzed in this review 
will be resolved in the years to come, one way or the other. Therefore, the 
practical value of this book is exceptionally high – researchers and policy 
makers are likely to come back to it and use it as a credible source of ide-




o. 66 - 2012
XV
III (66) - 2012
147
